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Russia and the West

Moscow Seeks to Renegotiate Relations with the West
By Andrei Zagorski, Moscow
Abstract
Russian foreign policy appears to be going in circles. Each new president begins by emphasizing – or 
repairing – the relationship with the West, only to end his time in oﬃ  ce by questioning and jeopar-
dizing it. It remains an open question if Putin’s successor will seek a new accommodation with the 
West.
Under Yeltsin and Putin: Warm Beginnings, Diﬃ  cult Endings
Boris Yeltsin declared in December 1991 that the new democratic Russia might consider joining NATO. Although 
the text of his address to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was retroactively revised because the request 
met with a lack of understanding, Yeltsin’s ﬁ rst term in oﬃ  ce was characterized by his determination to see Rus-
sia accepted as a full-ﬂ edged member of the community of democratic industrialized nations; not least because 
the West largely had to underwrite his policies, as well as his re-election in 1996 in both political and ﬁ nancial 
terms. Yeltsin’s second term in oﬃ  ce was, however, overshadowed by a number of controversies, including the 
two Chechen campaigns, the eastward expansion of NATO, the dispute over the status of Kosovo and the war 
in former Yugoslavia, the future nuclear balance between Russia and the US, and, particularly, US plans to build 
a missile defense system. Th e legacy of Yeltsin’s policy towards the West just before his resignation at the end of 
1999 was a grim one. “Russia fatigue” was spreading in the West, and the US opposition complained that Rus-
sia had been “lost,” while even Yeltsin himself talked about the advent of a “cold peace” at his last appearance 
before a Western audience at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999. 
Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, began his tenure in 2000 by repairing the heavily-damaged relation-
ship. Russia’s economic stabilization, energetic communication with Europe, and especially the immediate 
announcement of almost unlimited support for the US in ﬁ ghting terrorism after the September 11, 2001 
attacks marked the beginning of a new course. For a while, former disagreements seemed to have moved far 
into the distance. But this was only a brief interlude before the disputes returned to center stage at the Munich 
Security Conference in February 2007. 
It is remarkable that the issues currently at the center of controversy are the same as in the latter years of 
the Yeltsin presidency. Th e main stumbling blocks are still Kosovo, NATO’s eastward expansion, conventional 
forces in Europe, US plans for missile defense, and policies towards Russia’s neighbors. Similarly to Yeltsin’s 
statements in 1999, Putin is threatening a confrontation with the West in his ﬁ nal year in oﬃ  ce. While he has 
not used the term “cold peace,” he has conjured up the prospect of a new arms race in Europe. 
Admittedly, political parallels can often be misleading. Th e mere fact that two successive presidents have 
evolved in the same direction does not mean that this pattern is set in stone. It does not fully apply to Yeltsin’s 
predecessor, Mikhail Gorbachev, the ﬁ rst and last president of the Soviet Union, though Gorbachev did ulti-
mately make the same evolution. In his case, though, skepticism and criticism of the policies of the West, par-
ticularly of the US, only came to the fore after his tenure was disrupted by the 1991 coup and the breakup of 
the Soviet Union. Had Gorbachev remained in oﬃ  ce for a longer period, it is conceivable that his views might 
have changed during his time in the Kremlin as well. 
Th e question now is how Putin’s successor will act. Will he, like Putin in the early days of his ﬁ rst term in 
oﬃ  ce, conclude that no sensible modernization policy for Russia is possible in confrontation with the West? 
Will he therefore have to, and wish to, begin his tenure by repairing relations with the West? Or will he rather 
continue the policies pursued recently by Putin, which have been more critical toward the West? Th is ques-
tion is all the more important because most, if not all, of the decisions pertaining to the current disputes will 
be made during the incumbency of Putin’s successor (assuming that Putin will indeed cede power at the end 
of his second term, an outcome that still appears to be uncertain). 
Return to the late 1990s
It is notable that the current diﬃ  culties between Moscow and the West are driven by almost exactly the same 
topics that shaped the disputes of the late 1990s. One prime example is the status of Kosovo. In 1998, during 
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the debate in the run-up to the war in the following year, Moscow argued vehemently that any solution apart 
from independence for Kosovo was possible on the condition that Belgrade agreed. Otherwise, Moscow threat-
ened, it would veto any decision of the UN Security Council. Th e introduction of UN administration for Kos-
ovo in 1999 only postponed the resolution of this question, which has now returned to the focus of the world’s 
attention. 
Arms control has also provoked contention. From 1999 to 2002, the dispute between Moscow and Wash-
ington over nuclear arms control escalated. Th e debate focused on US plans to establish a rudimentary missile 
defense shield and to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty concluded by the Soviet Union and the 
US in 1972  – an agreement that the Russian side had promoted as the cornerstone of the overall system of trea-
ties governing the limitation and dismantling of strategic nuclear weapons. In 2002, Russia accepted the US 
abrogation of the ABM Treaty, calculating that it had suﬃ  cient means to overcome any potential US defense 
system. Now, however, Russia has reacted to US plans to deploy parts of the global missile shield in Poland 
and the Czech Republic within six or seven years by revisiting the controversy.
Already in the early 1990s, after the Warsaw Pact had been dissolved and particularly after the eastern 
expansion of NATO, Moscow felt that the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty put it at a disadvan-
tage. Furthermore, since the beginning of the ﬁ rst Chechen campaign in 1994, the Russian military had felt 
constrained by the limitations imposed on its southern ﬂ ank by the CFE Treaty. Over the course of two years 
in the 1990s, the necessary adaptations were negotiated. First, the “ﬂ ank” provisions were loosened for south-
ern Russia. In 1999, the adapted CFE Treaty was signed. While the adapted treaty did not take into account 
the Russian desire for rigid collective restrictions on the categories of heavy weapons that could be deployed 
by NATO members as the alliance expanded eastward, lower ceilings were agreed upon for individual states. 
Furthermore, Moscow received assurances of a special arrangement for Central Europe under which foreign 
(NATO) troops could only be stationed there if the national troop levels had been reduced accordingly.
Th e adapted CFE Treaty is not yet in force because the NATO states have linked its ratiﬁ cation to the 
implementation of Russia’s long-overdue “Istanbul Commitments” – the withdrawal of its troops from Geor-
gia and Moldova. Nevertheless, Moscow has little reason for complaints: Th e current 26 NATO members have 
20 percent less manpower and equipment today than the treaty signed by the 16 NATO states in 1990 allowed 
them to maintain. Th e ratiﬁ cation of the adapted treaty by the NATO states has long been among Moscow’s 
major stated policy goals; not least because the treaty is to be opened to admit other states such as the Bal-
tic countries, which are now NATO members, but not signatories to the CFE Treaty. However, it is not only 
NATO’s linkage with the “Istanbul Commitments” that has now convinced Moscow to suspend the applica-
tion of the CFE Treaty as of December 12, 2007. Th e demands laid out by Moscow at the Special Conference 
on the CFE, held June 12–15, 2007, go far beyond these issues and are evidence that the Kremlin is aiming at 
a fundamental renegotiation of the treaty.
In doing so, Moscow is returning to proposals for which it failed to win support in the 1990s. Th e Russian 
government is seeking again to establish collective ceilings for the heavy weapons of an expanding NATO that 
would not exceed those of the “old alliance” as of 1990. Furthermore, it is aiming at having the ﬂ ank restric-
tions for Russia lifted altogether. 
Both topics – the US missile defense shield and the CFE Treaty – are seen in Moscow as being linked to 
the issue of NATO’s eastwards expansion for two reasons. First, the Kremlin rejects NATO’s open-door pol-
icy, which would allow former Soviet republics, including Ukraine and Georgia, to become NATO members 
as another challenge to the status quo. Second, NATO’s eastward expansion is linked to the construction of US 
bases in Bulgaria and Romania and to the planned missile shield projects in the Czech Republic and Poland. 
Th ese policies are seen as violations of the promise made by NATO states in the NATO-Russia Founding Act 
of 1997, according to which no substantial combat forces would be stationed in new member states. Now Rus-
sia is also aiming at a binding deﬁ nition of the term “substantial combat forces” within the framework of the 
CFE Treaty.
Unlike in the 1990s, the relationship between Russia and the EU is also subject to controversy today. In 
addition to the highly politicized debate on energy security, pipeline routes, and Gazprom’s success in buying 
into the networks supplying European gas customers, the focus here is also on Russia’s desire to renegotiate 
the basis for its relations with the EU. By concluding a new partnership agreement, Moscow is obviously aim-
ing to shake oﬀ  the conditionality of the agreement that has been in force since 1997, which stipulated that 
progress in mutual cooperation is dependent on the implementation of political and economic reforms in Rus-
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sia. Th e new agreement, the Kremlin hopes, would instead seal an unconditional global political partnership 
of equals between the two sides.
Not only are there noticeable parallels between the current controversies in relations between Russia and 
the West and the disputes of the late 1990s; there are also clear indications that Russia intends to reopen talks 
on the agreements that it accepted then but now seem disadvantageous, since Moscow agreed to them in the 
past decade from “a position of weakness.” At the same time, however, it is obvious that Moscow continues 
to act defensively as a status-quo power that cannot maintain the status quo. Th is is clear, for example, in the 
case of NATO’s eastward expansion, where Moscow is trying to hold the “red line” it drew in the 1990s. It also 
applies in the case of the vehement rejection of the US missile defense shield, which has nothing to do with the 
Russian missile arsenal as far as technology or defense policy is concerned, but certainly has the potential to 
make obsolete plans for cooperation on missile defense between Russia and NATO that have been discussed 
for years. In both cases, what is noticeable is Moscow’s intention to renegotiate the fundamentals of relations 
with the US, NATO, and the EU. Putin’s Russia clearly feels much more conﬁ dent than Yeltsin’s did. 
Conﬁ dence Based on Oil at $70 a Barrel
Th ere is a diﬀ erence between ruling a country that is the world’s number one exporter of energy at a market 
price of $70 per barrel of oil, and doing so at a price of $14. Th is diﬀ erence also shapes the self-awareness of 
the political class in Russia, which is now largely recruited from former members of the intelligence services 
and the military. Th e diﬀ erence is to be found not least in the external perception of the country. An example 
is a recent CNN series on “Rising Russia” that aimed to present the changes the country has undergone in the 
past seven years. 
Th ere is only little now to remind one of the country that just ten years ago was “a consumer of security 
from the West’s point of view,” that was in transformation “from an authoritarian system with a planned econ-
omy to a democratic and free-market system and [from] the Soviet Union to a Russia that was trying to com-
pensate for the loss of its status as a global power by foreign-policy escapades” and that was primarily charac-
terized by political instability and a potential for chaos, according to Russia analyst Hans-Joachim Spanger. 
In Europe particularly, Russia is increasingly seen not just as an irreplaceable supplier of energy, but also as an 
indispensable, though not exactly uncomplicated partner in regional and global policy matters. No reasonable 
solution to any of the world’s major problems seems feasible without Moscow’s support, whether the issue be 
the ﬁ nal status of Kosovo, a settlement for the Middle East conﬂ ict, or negotiations concerning the nuclear 
programs of Iran or North Korea. 
Th anks to Russia’s current economic growth, ﬂ ood of revenues from energy exports, and ability to pay oﬀ  
its debts, there is a new sense of conﬁ dence in the political class that is increasingly becoming aware of Rus-
sia’s need to prevail and sustain itself in competition with the West. 
All the talk about a “democracy deﬁ cit” in contemporary Russia, according to the Russian political 
elites, is only an exercise in political deception by the West. Such debates only aimed to “gain control 
over Russia’s natural resources” by “weakening the state’s institutions, its ability to defend itself, and its 
autonomy,” according to remarks made by the chief ideologist of the Putin regime, Vladislav Surkov, in 
a speech before the Russian Academy of Sciences in June 2007. Th e newfound conﬁ dence of the political 
class (and the changed external perception of Russia) has caused Moscow to increasingly distance itself 
from the “other” Russia of Yeltsin. Th e country is no longer the weak and apathetic “sick man of Europe” 
forced to accept certain developments due to circumstances. Russia aims to return to the global stage and 
is trying to ﬁ nd its former strength, whether through the power gained by energy exports or in invest-
ment in a new generation of military technology.
Th e theory of a resurgent Russia nurtures the illusion that Moscow might be able to stop further changes in 
the European status quo and particularly in its immediate vicinity, and possibly reverse some of the concessions 
it was forced to make under Yeltsin. Th e aim of redeﬁ ning relations with the West and Europe and to renego-
tiate the basis of this relationship is not at all incompatible with this theory. However, only little time remains 
for Putin himself to translate this wish into reality. Should his successor come from the immediate circle sur-
rounding Putin (and where else would he come from?), will he wish and be able to continue this course, or will 
he attribute greater importance to repairing the relationship with the US and Europe? Th is question cannot be 
answered for another year. Nevertheless, it is clear that the answer depends not only on the personality of the 
successor; it also depends on the West’s response to Russia’s new self-perception.
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Must Relations Between Russia and the West be Renegotiated?
Th ere is every reason to rejoice in the fact that Russia is doing better than a decade ago. Global politics is well oﬀ  
without another “sick man,” especially a big one with nuclear weapons. Th ere is no reason to believe that Rus-
sia, after a brief or longer interlude, will return to the political trajectory of the early Yeltsin years. At the same 
time, there is no reason to believe that the only “other” path will lead Russia to confrontation with the West and 
a new arms race. Its new self-perception and increased international standing will not suﬃ  ce to catapult Russia 
back into the center of global politics. Conversely, a new deterioration towards an arms race or a Cold Peace is 
improbable not only because of Russia’s structural deﬁ cits. Th e reality of Russian politics is very diﬀ erent from 
the picture painted by oﬃ  cial rhetoric. Th e ineﬀ ective pressure on Ukraine and Georgia as well as the failure of 
Moscow’s attempts to push Iran towards cooperation with the international community or to use its contacts 
with Hamas to win back a signiﬁ cant role in the Middle East peace process instead indicate the narrow limita-
tions of Russia’s return to global politics.
While Russia’s resurgence is evident, it is far less powerful than is generally assumed, as Rajan Menon and 
Alexander Motyl correctly point out. What has changed is the fact that Putin is playing the strongman and that 
the increase of energy prices has supplied the political class with funds allowing them to act more conﬁ dently. 
But the new rhetoric is not enough to make Russia strong. Th erefore, for the foreseeable future, the West will 
continue to have to deal “with a Russian petro-state that is weak, boisterous, and potentially unstable.” Th e 
challenge of a new self-perception among the Russian political class is not that “Russia is too strong to han-
dle, but that it is too weak to make a reliable partner.” In this diﬃ  cult phase of self-assertion, Moscow should 
not be unnecessarily alienated by “red lines” drawn by the West; at the same time, the latter need not concede 
to all of Russia’s demands, which are often perceived as diktats. If Moscow should decide in the coming year 
to withdraw from the CFE Treaty, that would certainly be regrettable. Moscow should not, however, be pre-
vented from doing so at all cost. Th e only conclusion would be that despite its rhetoric, Moscow (rightly) has 
no problems with the US and NATO if it is prepared to give up the only instrument that restricts US deploy-
ments in Europe and of NATO forces in the new member states. 
Translated from German by Christopher Findlay
About the author:
Andrei Zagorski is a leading researcher at the Center for War and Peace Studies of the Moscow State Institute 
of International Relations (MGIMO). 
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Russian Opinion Surveys: Friends and Enemies, International 
Relations
Name Five Countries that Could Be Called Friends or Allies of Russia (May 2007)
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Friends and Enemies of Russia (May 2007)
Name Five Countries that Could Be Called Friends or 
Allies of Russia
Which Five Countries  are in Your Opinion the Most 
Hostile and Most Unfriendly in Relation to Russia?
2007 2006 2005   2007 2006 2005
Kazakhstan 39% 33% 20% Estonia 60% 28% 32%
Belarus 38% 47% 46% Georgia 46% 44% 38%
Germany 24% 22% 23% Latvia 36% 46% 49%
China 19% 24% 12% USA 35% 37% 23%
Armenia 15% 14% 9% Lithuania 32% 42% 42%
India 14% 15% 16% Ukraine 23% 28% 5%
Ukraine 11% 10% 13% Poland 20% 7% 4%
France 9% 8% 13% Afghanistan 11% 12% 12%
Bulgaria 9% 10% 11% Iraq 8% 9% 10%
Turkmenistan 8% 2% 2% Iran 7% 7% 6%
Italy 8% 7% 6% Belarus 5% 2% 2%
Tajikistan 7% 3% 3% Azerbaijan 4% 4% 5%
Kyrgyzstan 7% 7% 5% UK 3% 5% 2%
USA 6% 5% 11% Moldova 3% 9% 2%
Uzbekistan 6% 6% 4% Israel 3% 4% 3%
Finland 6% 6% 1% China 3% 3% 4%
Azerbaijan 5% 7% 5% Japan 3% 4% 6%
Japan 5% 6% 4% Germany 2% 2% 3%
Moldova 4% 4% 2% Tajikistan 2% 3% 1%
Poland 3% 4% 5% Rumania 2% 2% 2%
Serbia 3% 4% 3% Czech Republic 2% 1% 1%
Turkey 3% 3% 2% Armenia 2% 3% 4%
Australia 3% 1% 3% Bulgaria 1% 1% 0%
UK 3% 4% 3% North Korea 1% 0% 1%
Israel 3% 3% 5% Turkmenistan 1% 1% 1%
Iran 3% 4% 2% Turkey 1% 1% 1%
North Korea 2% 3% 3% South Korea 1% 0% 0%
Latvia 2% 1% 2% Slovakia 1% 0% 0%
Slovakia 2% 2% 2% France 1% 1% 0%
Egypt 2% 1% 2% Kazakhstan 1% 2% 1%
Canada 2% 2% 1% Uzbekistan 1% 2% 1%
Czech Republic 2% 2% 2% Hungary 0% 1% 1%
Lithuania 2% 1% 1% India 0% 0% 0%
Sweden 2% 3% 3% Kyrgyzstan 0% 1% 2%
Georgia 1% 3% 2% Finland 0% 1% 6%
South Korea 1% 2% 1% Australia 0% 0% 0%
Hungary 1% 2% 3% Egypt 0% 0% 1%
Rumania 1% 1% 0% Canada 0% 1% 1%
Iraq 1% 2% 2% Serbia 0% 1% 1%
Afghanistan 1% 1% 1% Italy 0% 0% 1%
Syria 1% 1% 1% Sweden 0% 0% 0%
Estonia 0% 1% 0% Syria 0% 0% 1%
None 10% 13% 10% None 2% 4% 5%
No answer 18% 15% 14% No answer 17% 19% 15%
Source: http://www.levada.ru./press/2007053003.html, 31 May 2007
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Are Relations Between Russia and the Majority of Other States Today Better, Neither 
Better Nor Worse, or Worse Th an Th ey were During the Yeltsin Era? (August 2007)
Source http://www.levada.ru./press/2007081001.html, 10 August 2007
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What is Russia’s Inﬂ uence in International Aﬀ airs Today? (August 2007)
Source: http://www.levada.ru./press/2007081001.html, 10 August 2007
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Which of the Designations Below Evoke Positive Emotions and Which Designations 
Evoke Negative Emotions? (one answer on every line) (March 2007)
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Th e EU and Russia: Stumbling from Summit to Summit
By Sabine Fischer, Paris
Abstract
Russia-EU relations are in crisis. Th e EU-Russia Summit on May 18 in Samara ended without tangible 
results, providing further evidence that both sides are drifting apart. Th e situation has not improved 
since then. By planting a Russian ﬂ ag in a titanium capsule on the seabed under the North Pole, Mos-
cow opened a new symbolic battleﬁ eld with “the West.” However, mutual economic and political 
interdependencies make it very unlikely that a “New Cold War” will emerge. At the same time, both 
sides have to change and adapt their policies if they want to return to a constructive partnership.
Tough Times for EU-Russia Relations
Relations between the EU and Russia today are in very bad shape. Th e two sides’ inability to open negotiations 
on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) during the May Summit in Samara was only the lat-
est evidence of the mounting problems, which have accumulated in recent years. Commentators on both sides 
interpret the latest developments (not only in EU-Russia relations, but in the relationship between Russia and 
“the West” in general) as the possible beginning of a “New Cold War.” 
Th e German government, which had made the improvement and further development of relations with 
Russia one of the central goals of its EU presidency, ﬁ nally had to accept a summit without tangible results. 
Repeating the experience of the Finnish presidency, Chancellor Angela Merkel had no choice but to announce 
relatively minor deals in the ﬁ elds of trade and trans-border cooperation, while the burning problems remained 
unsolved. In contrast to preceding summits, however, both sides traded blows, openly demonstrating disagree-
ments over political developments in Russia and the course of EU-Russian relations. With the Portuguese tra-
ditionally setting diﬀ erent geographic priorities for their EU presidency term, the meat issue between Russia 
and Poland unsolved and upcoming elections in Russia, it remains to be seen whether the parties will make 
much progress at the next summit in Mafra in the latter part of October 2007.
Bones of Contention
Th e concrete causes underlying the failure of the Samara Summit where the Polish-Russian meat conﬂ ict and 
the turmoil surrounding the movement of the Soviet war monument in the Estonian capital Tallinn at the end 
of April, shortly before Russia celebrated its traditional World War II Victory Day on May 9. Th e meat issue 
had strained relations between Russia and Poland since autumn 2005, but came to the fore of the European 
debate when Warsaw issued a veto against the opening of the PCA negotiations in September 2006. While Mos-
cow insisted that Polish meat did not meet Russian import standards, the Polish side accused Russia of abus-
ing trade relations in order to exert political pressure. Extensive mediation attempts by the Finnish and Ger-
man EU presidencies did not succeed in softening the parties’ positions. Until one month before the summit, 
Poland’s hard-line approach toward Russia had little support within the EU. Some of the other Central Eastern 
European members, namely the Baltic States and the Czech Republic, voiced cautious support without, how-
ever, explicitly joining the Polish veto. Other member states criticized the veto, expressing concerns about sta-
ble relations with Russia.
Shortly before the summit, and fortunately for the Polish Government, the meat issue was replaced as the 
main bone of contention by a far more symbolic conﬂ ict between Russia and Estonia. Th e Estonian govern-
ment’s decision to transfer Tallinn’s Soviet war monument to a military cemetery outside the city center pro-
voked harsh reactions among ethnic Russians in Estonia and from the Russian government. After violent dem-
onstrations in Tallinn, Russian youth organizations close to the Kremlin besieged the Estonian embassy in 
Moscow, forcing the Estonian ambassador to leave the country temporarily. At that point, shortly before and 
during the Samara Summit, the EU ﬁ nally reached a common position. While reactions to the movement of 
the war monument had been rather ambivalent, displaying approximately the same cleavages as responses to 
the Polish-Russian meat conﬂ ict, the unfriendly treatment of an ambassador representing an EU member state 
ﬁ nally forced the other member states to rally around Estonia and clearly criticize Russian actions. 
Both the meat and the monument conﬂ icts seem to be temporary phenomena. However, they reveal struc-
tural changes in Russian and EU policies, which strongly aﬀ ect their bilateral relationship.
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Th e EU Takes a Harder Line on Russia
Th e Eastern dimension of the EU’s foreign policy has undergone signiﬁ cant changes since the 2004 EU enlarge-
ment. After an initial period of re-orientation, these changes have become more tangible since summer 2006. 
Before 2004, EU member states could be divided into two groups regarding relations with Russia. One 
group, containing some of the bigger member states like Germany and France, emphasized Russia’s economic 
importance and supported a pragmatic relationship safeguarding EU economic interests instead of criticizing 
authoritarian tendencies in the Russian political system. Th e other group, most explicitly represented by Great 
Britain, denounced anti-democratic tendencies and human rights violations in Russian domestic politics and 
regularly – although with little eﬀ ect – spoke out in favor of a tougher approach towards Moscow. However, 
between 1992 and 2004, no EU member perceived an immediate security threat emanating from Russia. As a 
consequence, the debate about Russia within the EU almost completely lacked classical geopolitical and secu-
rity considerations. Th is de-securitized discourse on Russia came to an end with the accession of the Baltic 
States, Poland and the Czech Republic. Central European states and societies share a traumatic and violent his-
tory with Russia, which leads them to an extremely critical attitude towards Moscow and to a policy of “con-
tainment” of Russian inﬂ uence in Europe. 
Th e inclusion of the Central European perspective shapes the overall European political process on two 
levels. Th e new EU members pushed for a more active EU policy toward the states adjacent to EU and Rus-
sian borders. Furthermore, they took a much tougher stance in direct relations with Russia, on a bilateral as 
well as on the EU level. Th e new members saw the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine as a window of opportu-
nity to accelerate the democratization of a key country in the so-called “common neighborhood” and its closer 
alignment with the EU. From their perspective, such a development promised not only a desirable spread of 
democratic values beyond EU borders, but also a signiﬁ cant improvement of their national security. Conse-
quentially, the Baltic States and Poland pushed vehemently for strong EU involvement to support the demo-
cratic forces in Ukraine during the conﬂ ict over the presidential elections, and they succeeded. After the vic-
tory of Viktor Yushchenko, they strongly supported the new Ukrainian government’s attempt to build a dem-
ocratic regional coalition with Georgia and Moldova outside the Russian sphere of inﬂ uence. Domestic devel-
opments in Ukraine after the March 2006 elections, when Yushchenko lost much of his power, and the par-
allel stagnation of Ukraine’s policy of democratic regional leadership weakened the regional vector of the new 
members’ eastern policy. On a bilateral level, however, the inﬂ uence of the new members on EU policy toward 
Russia has become stronger than ever. 
Th us, enlargement has added a new dimension to the Russia-policy of the EU, which is characterized by 
strong historical and security components. Th e new Central European members have eﬀ ectively inﬂ uenced the 
development of the EU’s relations with its big eastern neighbor several times since 2004. As a consequence, it 
has become even more diﬃ  cult for the EU members to forge a united position regarding Russia. Combined 
with the EU’s inability to adopt a constitution since the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, 
the rise of the new members has led to paralysis of the Union’s eastern policy. Nevertheless, after the European 
Council in June there is some hope for improvement. Th e compromise on a new treaty (replacing the constitu-
tional project) promises to bring more unity to European foreign policy making, potentially strengthening the 
EU’s position vis-à-vis Russia. However, the ultimate outcome of this project depends on further intergovern-
mental negotiations within the EU and its future remains uncertain.
Russia Has Less Respect for the EU
Russia’s foreign policy has evolved in recent years as well. A new Russian self-consciousness as a global actor, an 
“energy superpower” and center of gravity in a multi-polar world shaped these changes. Th is development was 
accompanied by a changing image of the EU, which forms the basis of Russia’s policy towards Brussels and the 
EU member states. 
Th e Russian Federation Foreign Policy Review, published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs in March 
2007, sheds light on Russia’s current understanding of the EU. Economically, Russia still sees the EU as its 
most important partner. However, on the political level, the Review emphasizes bilateral relations with indi-
vidual EU members. Not surprisingly, Russia particularly seeks to develop ties with countries that advocate a 
pragmatic Russia policy within the EU and ﬁ gure as Russia’s most important economic partners. 
Th is policy marks a shift in the way the Russian elites perceive and talk about the EU. During the 1990s, 
Russia’s leaders did not see the EU as an independent political actor on the international stage. However, at 
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the beginning of his ﬁ rst term, Putin made economic and political relations with the EU his top priority, thus 
signaling Russia’s new recognition of it as a political actor. At the same time, the EU expanded its foreign pol-
icy inﬂ uence by further developing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and preparing its eastern 
enlargement, which boosted its political weight in the post-Soviet space. For a period of three to four years, 
Moscow’s foreign policy elites seemed to be getting used to the idea that supranational institutions in Brussels 
could play a role independent from the member states’ capitals. 
Now, however, Moscow is less inclined to view the EU as an important actor. Th e reasons for this loss of 
interest are partly to be found within the EU, namely in the constitutional crisis and the paralysis of decision-
making processes described above. But the shift also is a function of the fact that Moscow, according to its 
new self-understanding as a global power, claims to act with utmost independence. Th e harmonization of val-
ues and norms, which is at the core of EU identity and foreign policy, is contradictory to this concept. A third 
reason for the Russian elite’s downgrading of the EU’s status is the Russian leadership’s changing understand-
ing of global politics. Th e perceived decline of U.S. capacity to shape international developments according to 
American interests broadens Russia’s room for maneuver. Th ese two developments are perceived as mutually 
reinforcing and weaken, from a Russian perspective, the EU as a supranational actor. As a result, bilateralism 
is now the dominant approach in Russia’s relations with the EU and its member states.
A Diﬃ  cult Global Context
Th e global context of EU-Russian relations is reinforcing the growing distance between the two sides. Th is dimen-
sion has been gaining importance in recent years for several reasons: Th e U.S. has intensiﬁ ed its activities on the 
territory of the former Soviet Union in the framework of the global ﬁ ght against terror – and by doing so has 
provoked increasing disapproval from Russia’s leaders. Moscow is also concerned about the eﬀ orts of some of 
the Central Eastern European EU members to build up close relations with the U.S. Th e ongoing debate about 
deploying parts of an American global missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic has proved this 
once again. It has fuelled the historical conﬂ icts between Moscow and its western neighbors, and added to the 
fragmentation of the EU’s Russia policy. Additionally, Russia’s new self-understanding, together with its chang-
ing perceptions of the EU and the U.S., produce a greater readiness in Moscow to confront Washington on a 
global level. During Putin’s ﬁ rst term, the EU seemed to replace the US as the focal point of Russian foreign 
policy, after the heavily U.S.-oriented Yeltsin years. Now, Russia has returned to a “U.S.-ﬁ rst” policy, without, 
however, necessarily striving for cooperation and mutual beneﬁ t. Th is new approach does not take into consid-
eration the EU’s transatlantic sensitivities. Global conﬂ icts like Kosovo, Iran, and the missile defense system, 
in which Russia and the U.S. ﬁ nd themselves on opposite sides of the political fence, thus have an immediate 
impact on relations between Russia and the EU.
What Comes Next?
Th e current crisis does not imply a “failure” of Russia-EU relations. Th e assumption that a “New Cold War” is 
looming on the horizon between Russia and “the West” is simply wrong. Political and economic interdependen-
cies alone, which have constantly been growing between Russia and the EU, but also the U.S. since 1992, do 
not allow for mutual isolation of both sides. Th e context of a globalized world, in which these interdependen-
cies evolve, also prevents renewed isolation. 
Th e current crisis is not the ﬁ rst, and maybe not even the worst, in the EU’s relations with Russia. Surpris-
ingly, historical memory does not seem to reach back to the quarrel between Russia and “the West” over the 
Kosovo War in 1999, which was solved not the least thanks to Putin’s pragmatic approach before and after the 
terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001. Nonetheless, Russia and the EU face a period of 
serious stagnation and conﬂ ict in their relationship, which is very unlikely to end before the presidential elec-
tions in Russia in March 2008. 
Improving EU-Russian ties depends on a number of factors. Moscow has to ﬁ nd a constructive basis for 
its relations with the new EU members. Developments before and during the Russia-EU Summit in Samara 
made it very clear that the Central Eastern European member states have suﬃ  cient weight to inﬂ uence deci-
sion making in Brussels to Moscow’s detriment. Russia has clearly overestimated the potential of its bilateral 
approach, and this overreach is likely to repeat itself in the future. 
Th e current EU with 27 members has to ﬁ nd a common position on what kind of relationship or partner-
ship it wants to have with Russia. Achieving such a united position has only become more complicated as the 
union has grown. Furthermore, the EU should be aware of the fact that its policy can have geopolitical impli-
18 Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perovic, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder (eds.)
cations, which might not be intended collectively, but can be perceived as a potential threat by Russia. Th e EU 
also has to recognize the limits of its inﬂ uence on domestic developments (not only) in Russia and put this in 
due proportion to its goals. Th e EU must also take into account the global/transatlantic context of EU-Rus-
sia relations. 
Quick solutions are not on the horizon and policy makers should think in terms of years rather than months. 
At the same time, neither side can aﬀ ord to turn its back on the other. Th erefore, relations between Russia and 
the EU will not come to an end or fail, but develop more slowly and remain characterized by recurrent con-
ﬂ ict in the foreseeable future.
About the author:
Sabine Fischer is a Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris.
On the Whole, What Are Your Feelings Towards the USA (August 2007)?
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On the Whole, What Are Your Feelings Towards the European Union? (August 2007)
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Prospects for Developing NATO – Russia Relations
By Andrew Monaghan, London
Abstract
Th e NATO-Russia relationship has gone through an important evolution. Following the establish-
ment of the NATO-Russia Council, a bureaucratic framework has been built up in which cooperation 
can develop across nine areas of mutual interest. Yet political tensions have become increasingly evi-
dent in the last few months. Th ese diﬃ  culties have emerged against a background of frustration with 
the progress of practical relations. As the relationship becomes ever more complex with new problems 
adding to old tensions, both sides need to commit to developing the relationship more actively.
Progress and Problems
NATO – Russia relations have come a long way. From the regional confrontation in northern and central Europe 
of the Cold War years, the relationship has since passed through controversy and then cooperation in south east-
ern Europe to one of a more global aspect. Relations and even collaboration extend to the Mediterranean, the 
Trans-Caucasus region and Central Asia. Indeed, instead of being locked in confrontation, NATO and Russia 
are now partners, linked by the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Established in 2002, the NRC meets regularly 
and provides the trappings of equality for Russia in the relationship, bringing together 27 members, rather than 
26 + 1. Both sides have now established a presence with the other, given the Russian mission to NATO head-
quarters and an oﬃ  ce at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and NATO’s Liaison Mission 
and Information Oﬃ  ce in Moscow.
Th e NRC’s ﬁ ve-year anniversary provides an opportune moment to evaluate the progress of this evolution, 
especially given the tensions that have become all the more apparent this year, repeatedly noted by analysts and 
the media in both NATO member states and Russia. Western commentators depict the development of a new 
Cold War, pointing to Russia’s aggressive Soviet-style rhetoric, while Russian media sources describe the rela-
tionship as a “poor peace” and “bitter friendship.” Oﬃ  cial statements are also more frank than usual. Th ough 
stressing the need for cooperation, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheﬀ er recently noted Russia’s 
confrontational tone and the need to “lower the volume” in NATO-Russia diplomacy. For his part, Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted both the successes and problems in the evolution of relations and stated 
ﬂ atly that the work ahead would not be easy. Disagreements over the status of Kosovo, the Conventional Forces 
in Europe (CFE) Treaty, US ballistic missile defense plans, and Russian statements about re-directing its mis-
siles at sites in Europe illustrate the diﬃ  cult agenda.
Th is article traces the evolution of the relationship, looking ﬁ rst at the progress made and some of the coop-
eration achieved before turning to the diﬃ  culties, which are both political and practical in nature. Th e key 
point to emerge is that though the diﬃ  culties are both numerous and high proﬁ le, the achievements made are 
important steps forward which could not have been envisaged just a few years ago. Th ough the partnership is 
uneven across the diﬀ erent areas of cooperation, the relationship is now on a diﬀ erent footing compared to the 
years of confrontation. Moreover, despite signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences over several important issues, there is no ide-
ological gulf between NATO and Russia as there was during the Cold War and there is an established mech-
anism for discussing problems.
NATO-Russia Cooperation
Th e NRC provides the basic framework for a broad range of cooperative programs across nine areas. Progress has 
been made in all nine areas, particularly in military-to-military cooperation, albeit to varying degrees in others. 
In recent times, there has been visible progress in theatre missile defense (TMD), with a series of yearly com-
mand post exercises and exchanges of information and ideas between NATO and Russian experts leading to the 
development of a common operational doctrine. Additionally, there has been cooperation in civil defense and 
emergency management and nuclear munitions security, with joint exercises being held in both areas.
Th e two sides have also cooperated in submarine search and rescue. A framework agreement in this area was 
signed in 2003, and Russia subsequently participated in the major NATO exercise Sorbet Royal in the Medi-
terranean in 2005. Russia plays a part in the NATO-led Submarine Escape & Rescue Working Group. Indeed 
this framework provided the basis for the UK-led team which rescued the Russian submersible oﬀ  the coast of 
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Kamchatka in 2005, one of the high points of both UK and NATO military cooperation with Russia. Russia 
is also contributing to NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour, naval operations in the Mediterranean to dem-
onstrate NATO resolve and solidarity. Such cooperative measures – this list is by no means exhaustive – pro-
vide an important background to understanding the current situation. 
NATO-Russia Problems
Th ere are, however, a complex range of problems, both conceptual and practical, which have limited the prog-
ress of the relationship. Indeed there is some disappointment among important constituents on both sides with 
the extent of the achievements to date. Several “direct” problems in the NATO-Russia relationship have been 
enﬂ amed further by a series of “indirect” problems in the broader context which have become part of the NATO-
Russia dialogue. Indeed both direct and indirect problems are serving to exacerbate each other: disappointment 
with the slow and uneven progress in the relationship spills into the wider international situation; tensions in 
the wider international situation serve to entrench and perpetuate direct problems.
Key small, but nonetheless important, practical problems hindering the development of the NATO-Rus-
sia relationship include linguistic, budgetary and technical constraints. Th ere are too few translators to facili-
tate the joint exercises, reﬂ ecting a wider shortage of personnel on both sides who speak the relevant languages. 
Th ere are also diﬀ erences in equipment standards, training techniques, and doctrinal assertions between NATO 
and Russia which have aﬀ ected interoperability.
Th ough clearly each side is important for the other, each has a number of other important priorities, some 
of which have tended to push the development of the NATO-Russia relationship into the background. NATO, 
for instance, is deeply involved in Afghanistan and is attempting to establish a more eﬀ ective relationship with 
the European Union (EU).
Moreover, NATO is also still undergoing important internal transformation. While this transformation in 
itself absorbs considerable attention, importantly it also means that Russia is becoming increasingly a priority 
for NATO. NATO’s enlargement to include new members from eastern and central Europe has meant that the 
concerns these states have about Russian policy become part of NATO’s agenda. Th e arrival of the new mem-
bers has not been a wholly positive development for the relationship, given that it has brought the tensions that 
exist between Russia and these states to the NATO-Russia agenda. Furthermore, it has served to highlight the 
diﬀ erences within NATO about how to deal with Russia. A number of member states press for a more robust, 
critical approach towards Russia, while others seek more cooperative relations with it. Th is lack of consensus 
within NATO creates a practical diﬃ  culty for the development of the relationship: without consensus, NATO 
lacks eﬀ ective policy-making with regard to the relationship. A lack of coherence on NATO’s part thus serves 
to weaken the functioning and development of the relationship. Th e inability to formulate a coherent policy 
also provides ammunition for those in Russia who argue that NATO is more about talking than action and 
therefore not a major priority to be actively pursued.
For its part, Russia, though attempting to re-establish itself on the international stage, is still preoccu-
pied by many domestic issues, including economic development. Moreover, Russian elections are approach-
ing, both absorbing political attention and slowing the development of foreign relationships. Th e Russia elec-
toral cycle is beginning to pose other problems for the development of NATO-Russia relations because it high-
lights the fact that apart from a handful of individuals at the summit of the decision-making executive, there 
are few constituencies within Russia that really support such a relationship. Th e Russian Defense White Paper 
of 2003 illustrated well the ambiguity within the Russian military establishment about NATO. While part-
nership with NATO and the NRC is emphasized, and large scale war with NATO is excluded from the list 
of likely conﬂ icts, NATO is still considered by many in the Russian military establishment to pose a threat. 
Th ere is also serious opposition to NATO among political and public circles, and its image is still associated 
with that of the enemy. Such perceptions become particularly salient as Russia heads to the polls: the increas-
ing rhetoric from Moscow about the international situation and Russia’s foreign relations is largely aimed at a 
domestic audience and connected to securing votes. Moreover, the point that it is only a rather narrow section 
of the Russian establishment that seeks to develop cooperation actively with NATO signals NATO that the 
majority of Russians are not really interested in developing a relationship and are simply treating NATO as an 
international actor rather than a real partner.
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It is against this combination of progress and disappointment and a relationship structure that is not fully 
supported by either side that a number of unresolved political problems have come to the fore – some of which 
are new, some of rather longer heritage.
Th ough Russian oﬃ  cials reacted favorably to NATO’s Riga summit declaration, Russian opposition to ele-
ments of NATO’s transformation continues to stand out. First, NATO enlargement is extremely unpopular 
in Russia. Russia has objected to previous rounds of enlargement and still opposes the development of NATO 
infrastructure on the territory of new member states. Further enlargement, and particularly the discussion of 
potential membership for states such as Ukraine and (especially) Georgia, seems particularly fraught with com-
plexity for the NATO-Russia relationship. Second, though initially supportive of NATO operations in Afghan-
istan, many in Russia question and do not accept the increasingly active role that NATO has adopted interna-
tionally, particularly its operations outside Europe, arguing that NATO is simply a tool to facilitate US unilat-
eralism on the international stage. Th is wide-ranging opposition has raised questions about the desirability of 
developing cooperation and therefore interoperability: where would such cooperation be possible? If some Rus-
sians have argued for peacekeeping cooperation in areas of the former Soviet Union, many oppose such eﬀ orts, 
some vehemently. If it is not possible to ﬁ nd areas to cooperate, why enhance interoperability?
Likewise, there has been an extension of the old agenda into new problems. Enlargement is associated with 
democratization – and thus increasingly a conceptual diﬀ erence between NATO and Russia. De Hoop Schef-
fer recently challenged Moscow’s objections to NATO enlargement, questioning why Russia should object to 
the rule of law and democracy approaching Russian borders. Furthermore, the NATO-Russia relationship is 
being drawn into complex international issues such as the US missile defense shield and energy security which 
represent important risks for the development of relations. Energy security particularly has been brought on to 
NATO’s agenda as a result of concerns among some member states about Russia’s role in supplying global energy 
needs. Th ough there is potential for cooperation, for instance in civil defense and emergency management, there 
are also concerns in Russia about the use of NATO military assets and the role NATO might play. 
Conclusions
Th e relationship currently has a rather paradoxical appearance. Bureaucratic relations have been developing and 
the foundation for a partnership exists. Indeed there has been some important military cooperation. Th is, it 
should be remembered, is in itself a major step forward given the longer term historical context.
Yet, alongside these accomplishments, there are several important political tensions which can stall or reverse 
this progress, and relations have clearly become more complicated in 2007. Moreover, to judge by oﬃ  cial pro-
nouncements, both sides are taking a rather passive approach to the relationship: each side places the empha-
sis for relations on the other. NATO oﬃ  cials note that this partnership can go as far as the Russian govern-
ment is prepared to take it. Recently, Lavrov stated that the limits of cooperation will “depend on the course 
of NATO’s own transformation.” Both sides seem to believe that their own actions in the relationship are suf-
ﬁ cient and that the other needs to do more.
But to continue to develop the relationship – and make it bear positive fruit – both sides must take a more 
active stance and make positive contributions. Progress requires more resources and more eﬀ ective use of them: 
as note above, the lack of language skills should be remedied. Politically, both sides could further clarify their 
agendas regarding the other; currently each side seems to be either not explaining or talking past the other 
regarding its intentions. If NATO’s transformation has not been clearly understood in Russia, it is also the case 
that NATO, broadly speaking, does not understand Russian frustrations.
Th e important point for both sides in the immediate future is to protect the institutional structure built up 
so far and not let political tensions undermine the progress made. Th e NRC was established to facilitate dia-
logue. As the NATO Secretary General has stated, it is a forum not only for agreement, but also for serious, 
open and frank discussion on issues about which NATO and Russia do not agree. Th e mechanism must be 
used to calm tensions and prevent any over-reaction to them. Accomplishing these goals will not be easy since 
the two sides must manage both the old agenda of unresolved problems and also a complex new agenda at a 
time of considerable mutual misunderstanding.
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Russian Opinion Surveys: On the Plans of the USA to Station Anti-
Missile Systems in Eastern Europe
What is Your Attitude Concerning the Plans of the USA to Station Anti-Missile Systems 
in Eastern Europe - Positive, Negative or Indiﬀ erent? (May 2007)
2%
15%
74%
9%
Positive
Indifferent
Negative
Difficult to say
Source: http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/international_relations/cold_war/nato_east/d071823, 3 May 2007
In Your Opinion, Do the Plans of the USA to Station Anti-Missile Systems in Eastern 
Europe Th reaten Russian Interests? (May 2007)
68%
15%
17%
They threaten Russian interests
They do not threaten Russian
interests
Difficult to say
Source: http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/international_relations/cold_war/nato_east/d071823, 3 May 2007
Th e USA has Suggested that Russia Cooperate with the USA in the Area of Anti-Missile 
Systems. In Your Opinion, Should Russia Cooperate with the USA Concerning Anti-
Missile Systems? (May 2007)
22%
37%
41%
Russia should cooperate
Russia should not
cooperate
Difficult to say
Source: http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/international_relations/cold_war/nato_east/d071823, 3 May 2007
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Russia and Turkmenistan
By Aleksei Malashenko, Moscow
Abstract
Th e relationship between Russia and Turkmenistan revolves around natural gas. Th e death of President 
Saparmurat Niyazov in January has led to a “thaw” inside the country forcing Russia to react to retain 
its inﬂ uence, if not its monopoly on Turkmen gas exports. Now Turkmenistan is demanding a higher 
price for its gas, particularly given the proﬁ ts Russia makes from sales to Ukraine and the West. Presi-
dent Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov is pursuing separate pipeline projects that could link his country 
directly to China and to Europe without Russian participation. Whether Turkmenistan has the capac-
ity to supply everyone who wants to buy its gas remains a mystery. How Turkmenistan develops its gas 
relations with potential new customers will determine its place in the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion and the region’s larger political economy.
Relations Based on Gas
Russian-Turkmen relations have always been stable. Russia was sympathetic to former President Saparmurat Niya-
zov’s domestic policies, did not condemn him for the creation of a despotic regime, or intervene on the basis of 
protecting human rights. Russia “did not notice” the presence in Turkmenistan of opposition-dissidents, many of 
whom, after ﬂ eeing the tyranny, settled in Moscow and tried to draw the attention of the Russian authorities to 
the situation in their homeland. 
Th e Kremlin also avoided asking delicate questions about the situation in Turkmenistan of the Russian and 
Russian-speaking population, which was increasingly deprived of its rights, opportunities to preserve culture 
and, ultimately, the ability to leave the country. 
After Niyazov’s death in January 2007, the future of Russian-Turkmen relations became a topic of discus-
sion not only in Moscow and Central Asia, but everywhere there was interest in the fate of Turkmenistan’s 
natural gas. Th is gas – its reserves, production, and transportation – were and remain at the center of Russian-
Turkmen relations.
How will these relations develop and what can we expect in the future?
Ashgabad Driving Change
Most importantly, the impulse for change is coming from Ashgabad rather than Moscow. Th e Kremlin would 
beneﬁ t most from retaining the status quo. Russian politicians and businessmen had adapted to the now deceased 
Niyazov, usually called Turkmenbashi, meaning “father of the Turkmen people,” and had learned how to work 
with this extravagant eastern despot. He was predictable!
Th e new president of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov is introducing a degree of liberaliza-
tion in the country. In Moscow, his policy is dubbed the “Turkmen thaw,” referencing Nikita Khrushchev’s 
rule after the death of Stalin. He has granted greater access to the Internet, restored ten years of education for 
young people, promised to open branches of several Russian universities in his country, and restored pensions. 
Turkmenbashi had reduced education by one year and cancelled pensions, saying that adult children should 
take care of their parents. Next year allocations will be increased for healthcare and education. Th e new pres-
ident released from prison 11 political prisoners accused of participating in an attempted coup on November 
25, 2002. Additionally, he has slowly reduced the inﬂ uence of Niyazov’s personality cult: taking down some 
statues and removing his small on-screen proﬁ le from all television broadcasts.
In foreign policy, the new leader has begun to move away from the notorious “Turkmen neutrality,” which 
meant the complete isolation of the country from the external world. He has made the country more open, 
intensively met with foreign politicians at home and abroad. 
Berdymukhamedov’s second international visit, in April 2007, was to Moscow. Th e ﬁ rst he made to Saudi 
Arabia as a devout Muslim, which above all conﬁ rmed the Islamic identity of his country. In the early visit to 
Moscow, many saw a symbolic preservation of the previous relations, continuing the course which both Russia 
and Turkmenistan had supported. Naturally, the main topic of conversation was the fate of Turkmen gas. 
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Turkmenistan Demanding More for Its Gas
In 2005 Turkmenistan had signed a contract with Gazprom, according to which this Russian company remained 
the exclusive importer (and re-exporter to Ukraine) of gas until 2028. Additionally in 2003, Putin and Niya-
zov reached an agreement, according to which in the course of 2006–2010 Russia would receive from Turk-
menistan 50 billion cubic meters of gas each year, essentially all of the Turkmen gas exports. According to these 
plans, deliveries will grow from 42–45 billion cubic feet to 80–90 billion cubic feet. Within the framework of 
this agreement, the price for Turkmen gas rose from $44 to $100 per thousand cubic meters. Whereas earlier 
Russia paid half of the price through barter deliveries, now it pays the entire price in cash. 
Of course, with such long term contracts, the price cannot be ﬁ xed and it is likely to grow in the future. 
It is only a matter of time before the price rises, particularly since Turkmenistan is unhappy that Gazprom 
sells Turkmen gas to Russia for $100 per thousand cubic meters, while Russian gas goes for close to $300 in 
Europe. Turkmenistan is not the ﬁ rst country to point out the great disparity in prices. Kazakhstan, Russia’s 
main partner in Asia set this precedent and did not rule out the possibility of raising the price for its gas from 
$100 to $160.
In the summer of 2007, Russia laid its trump card on the table – the expansion of the Caspian gas transpor-
tation system with the renovation of existing and the building of a new pipelines running along the Caspian 
shore, for which an agreement should be signed this year. If Moscow’s goals are realized, Kazakhstan should 
join Russia and Turkmenistan in constructing and using the pipeline. Th e Russians hope that Kazakhstan’s 
participation will reduce that country’s interest in the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, which is centered on the 
construction of a gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea bed, and Nabucco projects (see more on this below). 
Within the framework of the Caspian gas pipeline project, Russia monopolizes the purchase and import 
of Turkmen gas. However, the project will only work with the good will of Kazakhstan, which initially 
expressed sincere enthusiasm, but since then has voiced some reservations. Kazakhstan, which is gradually 
becoming the main investor in Central Asia, has long since positioned itself as an independent political and 
economic force, emphasizing that it is not a satellite of Russia. In September 2007, Kazakhstan conﬁ rmed 
its participation in the project and even requested that Turkmenistan speed up the preparation of the related 
documents (the head of the Turkmengaz state company said there would be no delays on his side). How-
ever, Astana stresses that it agreed to this project exclusively on the basis of its own national interests and 
not according to “requests from Russia.” 
After numerous negotiations about Russian-Turkmen gas cooperation, including those with the participa-
tion of Putin, former Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Gazprom head Alek-
sei Miller, and others, it became clear that despite the smile of the new Turkmen leader and his assurances of 
friendship, Ashgabad and its Central Asia neighbors would conduct a multi-vectored foreign economic policy. 
For Russia, this would mean the loss of the monopoly right to import Turkmen gas. 
Numerous Export Routes
Before his death, Turkmenbashi had begun to think about the diversiﬁ cation of gas exports. He gave ﬁ rst prior-
ity to the “Chinese project.” In the spring of 2006, during his visit to Beijing, Turkmenbashi promised to deliver 
to China 30 billion cubic meters of gas and even named 2009 as the year when deliveries would start. He sup-
ported his promise with the oﬀ er to build a gas pipeline which would travel through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
Looking at the map reveals the impressive size of the project: its overall length is 7,000 km, including 188 km of 
pipeline in Turkmenistan, 530 km in Uzbekistan, 1,300 km in Kazakhstan, and 4,300 km through China. 
During the 1990s, Turkmenistan had considered the “senseless idea” of constructing a gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and possibly farther to India. Th e price of the pipeline varied 
from $1.5 to $4 billion. Th e company UNOCAL was prepared to cover most of the costs. At that time in Ash-
gabad, emissaries from the Taliban worked to assure Turkmenbashi that they could guarantee the full security 
of the gas pipeline. Th e project for obvious reasons upset Russia and has since collapsed. 
Th ere are also diﬃ  culties with the “Chinese Project”: it requires huge investments, security guarantees, 
and assurances that there is enough Turkmen gas for its full implementation. Nevertheless, the experience of 
recent years demonstrates the possibility of realizing the boldest projects. And the current Turkmen leader-
ship has no plans to back away from this project. Moreover, Berdymukhamedov conﬁ rmed the words of his 
predecessor in full. Th e quick pace of the deadline Turkmenbashi set is hardly realistic, but eﬀ orts are already 
being made in this direction. 
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Th e Role of China
Th us, China has become a powerful competitor for Russia and one that will be very diﬃ  cult to counter. In 2008, 
Gazprom will have to participate in a tender, otherwise its future purchases will be placed in doubt. Th e para-
dox is that China, being an economic competitor to Russia, remains its political ally. Regarding Turkmen gas, 
for Russia the worst case scenario would be that Beijing does not make any concessions to Moscow and its part-
nership with Russia turns out to be merely tactical. Concerning China’s speciﬁ c national interests, one should 
not expect concessions. 
Th e developments within Turkmen politics also have important implications vis-à-vis China. In the course 
of securing power after Turkmenbashi’s death, Berdymukhamedov succeeded in removing one of the most pow-
erful Turkmen political ﬁ gures, the head of the National Security Service Akmurad Redzhepov. It was Red-
zhepov who secured the peaceful transition of power. According to some accounts, he was the chief advocate 
of the Chinese project. Presumably his role in developing Chinese ties was one of the reasons for his removal: 
the new president wanted to personally control relations with China. 
Th e possibility of Turkmen gas exports to China gives Russia mixed feelings about Turkmenistan’s pro-
posed membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). All members have expressed support 
for its membership, including both Moscow and Beijing. However, the Kremlin recognizes that membership 
in the SCO would ease Turkmen-Chinese, as well as all Central Asian-Chinese, relations in the energy sphere. 
In other words, it would create the conditions for yet another gas pipeline that does not pass through Russia. 
A Caspian Pipeline Avoiding Russia
Another alternative for bypassing Russia is the Trans-Caspian Project, which proposes: 
Th e construction of a gas pipeline on the bed of the Caspian Sea with a 30 billion cubic foot annual capa-• 
city
Th e connection of this pipeline to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum pipeline• 
And from there, on to Austria through the Nabucco project, which will have 31 billion cubic feet annual • 
capacity and will start construction in 2010. 
Th is project has the active support of the United States.
Ashgabad has mixed feelings about the Trans-Caspian project. On one hand, it has not given its ﬁ nal approval. 
On the other, the Turkmen leadership has not hidden its interest in the project. For example, during his visit 
to the US, Turkmenistan Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs M. Berdiev noted that the government of his country was 
not against exporting gas to Azerbaijan. Washington succeeded in initiating negotiations on this topic between 
Ashgabad and Baku, a signiﬁ cant accomplishment given the Turkmen-Azerbaijan argument about the owner-
ship of hydrocarbon deposits in the Caspian. (Th ere is also a pipeline in Iran, but since its capacity is 5–8 bil-
lion cubic meters a year, it “is not big enough to matter,” as the Russian experts say.) 
In contrast to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which has mainly political signiﬁ cance, the proposed Trans-
Caspian gas pipeline is important from an economic point of view. It has particular signiﬁ cance to the Euro-
peans, whose demand for gas is quickly rising and who are seeking a diversity of energy sources. Th e Interna-
tional Energy Agency’s current baseline scenario shows that European Union demand by 2050 will be 650 bil-
lion cubic meters a year. And, even if there is a decrease in demand for gas, usage will not fall below 500 bil-
lion cubic meters a year. 
Th e “political thaw” in Ashgabad has helped improve ties with Washington. Th e US has practically stopped 
criticizing the Turkmen leadership for violating human rights and crushing basic freedoms. Th is situation to 
some extent undermines Russia’s position, which always closed its eyes to the totalitarian character of the for-
mer Turkmen regime, stressing its right to build to build a state and establish social relations on the base of its 
identity. Now both the US and Europe recognize the right of Turkmenistan to its identity.
Questions of Capacity
Th e diversiﬁ cation of gas pipelines and the intention of Turkmenistan to satisfy the appetite of all interested sides 
raise questions about the size of its gas reserves and, correspondingly, their export potential. Th ere are no reliable 
statistics on this account. According to most estimates, after Russia and Iran, Turkmenistan occupies third place 
in global gas reserves, with 23 trillion cubic meters, though some sources rank it ﬁ fth. However, in practice, these 
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ﬁ gures ﬂ uctuate up and down. Characteristically, Ashgabad does not publish oﬃ  cial data about the recently dis-
covered deposit in Iolotani, describing them as “enormous,” while other analysts consider them “middling.” 
Turkmenistan currently produces more than 70 billion cubic meters of gas a year. Ashgabad promises soon 
to produce 120 billion cubic meters while independent experts anticipate that production will more likely be 
in the range 70–105 billion cubic meters. 
To meet the needs of all potential customers from 2009, it is necessary to produce 150 billion cubic meters a 
year. Not one serious specialist thinks that such rapid output growth is possible. Accordingly, everyone under-
stands that it will be necessary to sacriﬁ ce something. Th e Russians are convinced that they are safe. Th e Chi-
nese think the same thing. Th e Europeans are also optimistic. One way or another, the competition of foreign 
powers around Turkmenistan will grow and Russia will have to do more to preserve its current inﬂ uence. 
Turkmenistan Seeks Its Place
Interestingly, Ashgabad did not support the Iranian proposal, energetically lobbied by Russia, to create a “Gas 
OPEC,” which would help gas producers control the price of gas. Turkmenistan simply ignored this proposal 
without discussing its merits, preferring to deﬁ ne its relations with its consumers independently on the basis of 
their own considerations.
It is possible that the battle between Turkmenbashi’s successors remains unﬁ nished. In this situation, Rus-
sia will not succeed as before in remaining on the sidelines, giving the view that whoever climbs to the Ash-
gabad’s political Olympus will fully support a pro-Russian line. Most likely, the competing Turkmen leader-
ship factions will appeal to the US, China, Turkey, and possibly others. 
Ultimately, relations between Russia and Turk men istan will depend on how their ties develop in the energy 
sphere. While these relations are formally friendly, they are always embedded in Turkmenistan’s multi-vector 
strategy. Russia must not only take this situation into account, but constantly adjust to Turkmen initiatives. 
In other words, while recognizing that it will not be able to preserve its monopoly on importing Turkmen gas, 
it will try to preserve its leading position in this sphere. 
As Russian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs Andrei Denisov put it, “Russia is not against healthy 
economic competition in energy.” Only in this way will Moscow succeed in preserving its political inﬂ uence 
in Turkmenistan.
About the author:
Aleksei Malashenko is a Scholar-in-Residence and Co-chair of the Program on Religion, Society and Security 
at the Carnegie Moscow Center. 
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Statistics: GDP Per Capita (PPP US$), Central Asia
Turkmenistan’s Main Export Partners 2006 (in % of Total Exports)
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Russia Lures Uzbekistan as its Strategic Satellite in Central Asia
By Alisher Ilkhamov, London
Abstract
After a period of coolness between Russia and Uzbekistan during the 1990s, their relationship has 
returned to a Soviet-style pattern of patron-client relations. Th e rapprochement between them came 
into eﬀ ect after the Karimov regime fell out with the West following the “color” revolutions and Andi-
jan events. Although trade between these two countries remains at a very low level, Russia seeks to 
beneﬁ t politically and economically by asserting control over Uzbekistan’s gas resources and leverag-
ing its advantageous geo-strategic location. In return, the Karimov regime, whose popularity within 
the country is declining, is anxious to guarantee its security. Th us, while Russia’s expectations in this 
case are related to its structural national interests, Uzbekistan is driven by the personal concerns of 
its current political leadership. Th erefore, this strategic alliance is far from stable, threatened by the 
possibility of regime change, which could occur at any time in this Central Asian country. 
Historical context
After Tsarist Russia conquered Turkistan in the middle of the 19th century, this region became an advanced post 
for the Russians in their dealings with the Muslim world. Th e Great Game began when Russia decided to with-
stand the expansion of the British Empire in Asia. Since then the Russians have invested extensively in the region 
in order to integrate it politically and economically into its imperial domain. Th ey built extensive transporta-
tion infrastructure in the region, including a railroad and developed irrigation systems and cotton production to 
boost their own textile manufacturing. With the transformation of the Tsarist colonies into the national repub-
lics of the Soviet Union, this politics of integration and absorption advanced with new vigor. Th e Russians pro-
moted a program of modernization and social reforms, which had a deep and contradictory impact upon the 
local societies. On the one hand, it boosted industrialization of the domestic economy, the education system, 
and the emancipation of women. On the other, the Russians sought to eradicate the local Muslim faith, estab-
lish ethno-nationalist states, impose the Cyrillic alphabet for indigenous languages, and force the local elites to 
speak Russian. Most of current political leaders in the region, including current Uzbek President Islam Karimov, 
are the product of Soviet-era eﬀ orts to cultivate local communist cadres. 
Long after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan still carries the economic, social, and political 
birth-marks of its Soviet past. Th ese are particularly visible in its style of governance. Th e Soviet legacy contin-
ues to shape the relationship between contemporary Russia and the former Soviet republics. Th is relationship 
is somewhat ambivalent: all former national republics are wary of Moscow’s neo-imperial ambitions, yet they 
share many socio-cultural commonalities with Russia that, along with Russia’s revitalizing economic might, 
prompt them to re-adopt the role of client states in respect to their former master. 
Th is current state of aﬀ airs sharply contrasts with the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, 
when the centrifugal tendencies across the former Soviet Union prevailed over centripetal ones. In 1991, prof-
iting from Moscow’s political weakness, the republican political leaders moved to declare independence from 
the Soviet Union. Politically and economically frail under Yeltsin’s rule, Russia pursued a sluggish foreign pol-
icy toward Central Asia in the ﬁ rst part of the 1990s. However, the consolidation of state and economic power 
under Putin and the collapse of the US-Uzbek geo-strategic alliance in 2004–2005 allowed Russia to reinstate 
its inﬂ uence in Uzbekistan. 
When the “color revolutions” started breaking out across the post-Soviet space in late 2003, the Uzbek 
leadership experienced a deep paranoid fear that it would be toppled by plots hatched by domestic civil soci-
ety and international NGOs and rapidly reconsidered its foreign policy orientation. It methodically expelled 
foreign NGOs and cut oﬀ  the military partnership with the United States. Simultaneously, President Kar-
imov worked to ﬁ ll the vacancy in the spot of “elder brother” by oﬀ ering it to Moscow. Th is swing in for-
eign policy contrasted dramatically with the previous period of ﬁ erce anti-Russian propaganda, which was 
characteristic for the Uzbek regime during the 1990s. 
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Th e ﬁ nal landmark signifying the radical shift in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy toward embracing Russian 
patronage was the Andijan events of May 2005.1 While the Western states reacted critically to these events, 
Vladimir Putin (and the Chinese) supported Karimov without hesitation and justiﬁ ed his brutal crackdown on 
the unrest in Andijan. Understandably, President Karimov appreciated this support and consequently worked 
to please the Russians and strengthen strategic ties with them. 
In July 2005, the United States was given six months to shut its K-2 airbase in Khanabad, which had been a 
source of annoyance for the Kremlin. Two months earlier, in May 2005, Uzbekistan had terminated its mem-
bership in GUUAM, an alliance bringing together Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, 
another irritant for Moscow. Less than a year later, in March 2006, Uzbekistan joined the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EvrAzEs), patronized by Moscow, and signed a new bilateral agreement in which Russia assured 
Uzbekistan that it would intervene if the Uzbek regime faced domestic or foreign threats. Finally, in August 
2006, Uzbekistan returned to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), seven years after the sus-
pension of its membership in this Moscow-controlled regional organization. 
In return, the Russian government worked to make President Karimov happy and to seek his favor. During 
his visit to Uzbekistan in June 2005, President Putin pledged to invest one billion US dollars in the Uzbek econ-
omy, mainly Gazprom’s and Lukoil’s deals with their Uzbek counterparts. Th e Russians were especially cour-
teous with Karimov’s daughter Gulnara Karimova, who is considered a likely presidential successor in Uzbeki-
stan and a key mediator in strengthening Uzbek-Russian ties, especially in gas and oil deals. While Gulnara 
remains the subject of an international arrest warrant and can not visit most Western countries, following the 
ruling of an American court in 2001,2 she has received a high-proﬁ le reception in Russia. 
What Are Uzbek-Russian Mutual Interests? 
At ﬁ rst glance, Uzbekistan is not a signiﬁ cant trading 
partner for Russia. As the graphs on p. 12 show, Uzbeki-
stan receives only 3 percent of Russia’s exports and sup-
plies just 6 percent of Russia’s imports from the CIS 
countries. Th e importance Uzbekistan as a trade part-
ner for Russia becomes even smaller when placing the 
CIS countries in the context of Russia’s overall foreign 
trade turnover (see graphs below). 
Nevertheless, in the last several years Russia has 
demonstrated an increasing interest in improving its 
economic and political relations with Uzbekistan. To 
understand the signiﬁ cance of Uzbekistan for Russian interests, and vice versa, one has to place this country, 
as well as the whole Central Asian region, on the larger map of Russian global aspirations, paying special atten-
tion to the context of Russian business with Europe. Th e continent represents the greatest value for Russia and 
its economic interests. Europe is the destination for 66 percent of Russian exports, in which gas and oil are the 
prime commodities. One should examine Russian attitudes toward Central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in 
particular from this perspective. Th e Central Asian region with its vast energy resources3 is vital for Russian 
economic business in Europe, which is the main importer of Russian energy resources. 
In 2004–2006 Uzbekistan produced 59–62 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. Th is output is 
comparable to the production of Turkmenistan, but Uzbekistan exports much less gas than the Turkmen 
because it uses the bulk of it (up to 95 percent) for domestic consumption. Combined, gas exports from these 
two countries allow Russia to supply its domestic market with comparatively cheap gas, at $100 per thousand 
cubic meters, while freeing up Western Siberian gas deposits as a source of high proﬁ t exports to Europe, where 
gas sells for $230–250 per thousand cubic meters. Russia thereby makes a huge proﬁ t thanks to exploiting a 
price scissors in its cross-regional gas import-export schemes. High proﬁ ts are not the only advantage Russia 
1 After the trial of 23 local businessmen, widely perceived in Andijan as unfair and fabricated by the security agencies, a group of armed 
people assaulted a number of state institutions (a prison, military garrison, police station and local government). Th e next day a mass 
demonstration, largely peaceful, took place in the central square. Th e government troops responded by shooting indiscriminately at the 
crowd. Hundreds of people, including women and children, were reportedly shot dead and then buried secretly in mass graves. 
2 After divorcing Mansur Maksudi, an American citizen and businessman, Gulnara secretly took their kids from the USA to Uzbeki-
stan without the father’s consent. Maksudi sought to reverse his wife’s action and won custody of his two children from a New Jersey 
court. 
3 Central Asian overall gas deposits are estimated to be as much as 22 trillion cubic meters, comprising 12 percent of world reserves. 
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gains from controlling the export of Uzbek and Turkmen gas. It fact, Russia is tempted to attain a monop-
oly in supplying gas to Europe and the GUAM zone (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) as a lever 
of political inﬂ uence.
Uzbekistan, as well as Central Asia in general, is a top priority for Russian interests not only because of its 
gas and oil reserves, but also for its advantageous geo-strategic location. It is positioned at the nexus of sev-
eral zones of global geopolitical interest, including Russia, China, South Asia, Iran, the Caspian Region, and 
Transcaucasia. Uzbekistan is particularly important for global powers because it is situated exactly at the heart 
of Central Asia and borders all its countries. Russia’s claims for control over this region could not be realized 
without Uzbekistan as a close ally. Uzbekistan is crucial because it is close to Afghanistan and maintains com-
paratively well developed infrastructure in the areas approaching the Uzbek–Afghan border. 
Although Uzbekistan does not have a common border with China, it is close to this rapidly growing super-
power, and within ﬁ ring range for short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and aircraft. In short, neither 
of the other Central Asian countries possesses such a combination of geo-strategic advantages as Uzbekistan. 
Th erefore, Russia must consider the return of Uzbekistan to the CSTO as a big gain.
When it comes to the area of security cooperation, one should make a distinction between two parties’ real 
and rhetorical interests, as well question whether these interests have a structural or personalistic character. Both 
countries try to explain to the public, both domestic and international, that they ostensibly have common inter-
ests in ﬁ ghting international terrorism. But surprisingly, the “international terrorists” are rarely speciﬁ ed by name. 
In most cases, “terrorists” refers to Islamists, but Russia and Uzbekistan have in mind diﬀ erent groups, which are 
only tenuously linked with each other (for instance, Chechens in Russia and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
in Uzbekistan). In fact, both parties have little need for each other in dealing with their domestic enemies. 
For Karimov, Russia is important as a guarantor of his personal security and his hold on his oﬃ  ce. Th e 
challenge to his rule may come from domestic mass unrest, but external threats are a less likely problem. Rus-
sia, in turn, is driven by its concern about the expansion of NATO, which is still seen by the current Russian 
political and military leadership with some hostility. When in 2001 Karimov invited the Americans to use the 
airbase in Khanabad, it made the Russians extremely nervous. So the ejection of the American military was a 
great relief for President Putin and his team. 
Th e Looming Limits of Russian Inﬂ uence 
In dealing with Uzbekistan, Russia and the West perceive each other as seeking to exert exclusive inﬂ uence over 
this country. As a consequence, this contest is zero sum rather than win-win for all large stakeholders involved. For 
the time being, the Russians are taking the lead in this game, but have achieved this position largely due to the fail-
ure of the Uzbek regime to employ a multi-vector foreign policy as, for instance, the neighboring Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan do much more successfully. Karimov has for a long time expressed contempt for a multi-vector foreign 
policy and, as a result, suddenly found himself vulnerable due to his one-sided approach. 
Th ere are some signs that the Uzbek leadership is reconsidering its policy of aligning with only one great 
power and is now seeking to diversify its foreign policy partnerships. First of all, the Russians have not yet been 
allowed by the Uzbeks to replace the Americans in leasing the Khanabad airbase, despite the Russians’ undis-
guised desire to acquire it. Instead, Uzbekistan proposed that they use the airbase in Navoi, located much far-
ther from the Afghan border, and only in crisis situations, i.e. without the permanent deployment of their mil-
itary facilities. 
Observers paid particular attention to the presentation made in March 2007 at the Moscow Carnegie 
Center by Raﬁ k Saifulin, an analyst from Uzbekistan who is closely associated with the Presidential Security 
Council. His criticism of the Uzbek-Russian relationship reﬂ ected the intention of some circles in the Uzbek 
political elite to restore, to some extent, ties with the West as a counter-balance to Russia in Uzbekistan’s for-
eign policy. Current Uzbekistan Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs Vladimir Norov is also widely seen as a propo-
nent for Uzbekistan’s rapprochement with the West, especially with NATO and the European Union. 
After oﬃ  cially announcing its entry into the Russian-sponsored regional organizations CSTO and EvrAzEs, 
Uzbekistan is evidently not rushing to join the approximately 70 EvrAzEs conventions on speciﬁ c issues that 
would require Uzbekistan to adjust its legislation to its commitments as a member-state of these regional enti-
ties. Uzbekistan was notably absent from the SCO military exercises “Peace Mission – 2007.” Another indi-
cation of President Karimov’s cooling attitudes toward Russian-controlled regional entities has been the small 
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number of reports published in the Uzbek oﬃ  cial press, reﬂ ecting the president’s mood about the last united 
CIS-EvrAzEs-CSTO summit in Dushanbe on October 5, 2007. 
For the moment, the stumbling block preventing Uzbekistan from adopting a multi-vector foreign pol-
icy has not been the Uzbek leadership’s lack of desire to keep an equal distance from the great powers, but its 
unwillingness to pay the price for doing that, i.e. by improving its appalling human rights record. 
It is evident, that further struggle between Russia and the West over inﬂ uence in Uzbekistan will probably 
focus on bargaining around such issues as energy, military bases and human rights. Europe could pay for Uzbek 
gas and invest much more than Russia, but the regime’s human rights violations aﬀ ront the European Commu-
nity and restrain it from embracing such a brutal regime as a partner. Th ough Russia’s “tolerance” toward the 
crackdown on civic freedoms in Uzbekistan satisﬁ es Karimov, Russia’s ultimate intention is to limit the sover-
eignty of its former subjects and expand control over their foreign policies. 
One can fairly conclude that Russia would like to impose upon Uzbekistan, as well as the other weak Cen-
tral Asian states, a limited sovereignty akin to what Bukharan and Khivan khanates had in the 19th century. 
Political elites in Uzbekistan deﬁ nitely oppose Russian objectives and are inspired by them to ﬁ nd a counter-
balance against Russian neo-expansionism. 
Besides, the asymmetry in the expectations held by Russia and Uzbekistan makes their current strategic 
alliance unstable, particularly since it relies heavily on the personal fate of President Karimov and his fam-
ily. After Karimov, the new elites in Uzbekistan may ﬁ nd that they are no longer interested in courting Rus-
sia. At that point they would ﬁ nd it attractive to seek a counter-balance to Russian expansion in closer rela-
tions with Europe and China.
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Uzbekistan's Main Export Partners 2006 (in % of Total Exports)
23.9%
11.8%
10.5%
7.5%
6.0%
4.7% 4.4%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Russia Poland China Turkey Kazakhstan Ukraine Bangladesh
Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html
Uzbekistan's Main Import Partners 2006 (in % of Total Exports)
Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html
27.8%
15.6%
10.4%
7.3% 7.1%
4.8% 4.5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Russia South Korea China Kazakhstan Germany Ukraine Turkey
36 Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perovic, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder (eds.)
Shares of CIS Countries in Russia’s Exports in 2006, mln USD
Source: Russian Federal Service of State Statistics, 2007
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Th e Kazakh-Russian Relationship
By Martha Brill Olcott, Washington
Abstract
Since independence, the Kazakh-Russian relationship has been a deﬁ ning one for Kazakhstan, and 
as long as Russia continues to exist as a single sovereign state, Kazakhstan’s domestic and foreign pol-
icies will continue to be formed partly in Russia’s shadow. But, while Russia has sometimes been a 
troublesome neighbor for the Kazakhs, it has never been a cripplingly nasty one, and overall the rela-
tionship between Kazakhstan and Russia has been much smoother than most expected. Th is is due 
in large part to the skill with which Kazakhstan’s leaders have handled their Russian interlocutors, 
in bilateral and multilateral settings, and to Kazakhstan’s success in maintaining a multi-vector for-
eign policy. 
Russia’s Evolving Strategy
Over time it has been Russia, not Kazakhstan, which has been the more unpredictable partner. Th rough much 
of Boris Yeltsin’s term in oﬃ  ce, the Kazakh-Russian relationship satisﬁ ed neither party. Russia sought to use 
Kazakhstan’s energy debts and geographic isolation as a brake on Kazakhstan’s economic development, forcing 
the Kazakhs to develop a multi-vectored foreign policy and investment strategy in order to survive. 
By contrast Putin, realizing that the Kazakhs had attracted new and potential economic and security part-
ners, tried a more positive approach. Russia’s second president has used the carrot more frequently than the 
stick, creating a series of partnerships between the two countries and their key industries which is likely to 
withstand Putin’s departure and that of Nazarbayev as well.
Kazakhstan Nervously Eyes Independence
Nazarbayev had initially been quite nervous about what independence could mean for his country, which had 
nearly as many ethnic Russians as ethnic Kazakhs, and shared a seven thousand plus kilometer border with Rus-
sia. Kazakhstan lacked any sort of international constituency to advocate its national sovereignty. But once inde-
pendence became a reality, Nazarbayev was determined to make the best of it. Th e Kazakh leader appreciated 
his country’s major strength – that it had inherited part of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal, which could be 
traded away for international recognition, especially by the U.S.
Nazarbayev quickly sparred with Yeltsin over questions of economic and political integration, wanting the 
various post-Soviet states to function collectively, but as relative equals. Nazarbayev continued to hope for this 
under Putin, but although Russia and Kazakhstan are technically part of a “common economic community,” 
in reality there is no secure legal basis for functional economic integration with Russia. However, on tradi-
tional questions of security, Nazarbayev was, and remains, willing to follow Russia’s lead. Kazakhstan signed 
an agreement on collective security with Russia in May 1992. It has remained an active member of the Col-
lective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) ever since, cooperating with NATO but never at the expense of 
its security relationship with Moscow. 
Kazakhstan’s economic policy is much more independent of Russia, placing priority on receiving foreign 
direct investment from the U.S., Europe and Asia’s economic powers, not just in the energy sector, but in a 
number of other economic clusters designed to make the country self-suﬃ  cient. 
Nazarbayev went through an important mental shift in the mid-1990s. As Yeltsin started to fail physically, 
the more youthful Nazarbayev gathered new strength. Leaving economic planning to close associates, Naz-
arbayev concentrated his eﬀ orts on trying to advance the international image of Kazakhstan, aided in part by 
the fact that the Kremlin never took advantage of Kazakhstan’s seeming Achilles heel, its large and increas-
ingly dissatisﬁ ed Russian population. 
Border delineation between the two countries did not begin until 1996, and it took roughly a decade to con-
clude, with the Kazakhs making numerous small concessions to Russia, giving over to their jurisdiction many 
divided settlements that were largely composed of ethnic Russians. Russia then began the process of fortifying 
parts of the border, but has managed to complete only a small fraction of the necessary work.
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But even in the years before border negotiations began, the Kremlin never pursued an aggressive policy of 
trying to rile up Kazakhstan’s ethnic Russians. Th e Russian diaspora has always been a focus in the Duma, 
but there has never been large-scale funding of Russian nationalist groups, and Kazakhstan’s Russians never 
received the right to dual citizenship from Astana. Most of the prominent Russian nationalists basically aban-
doned their cause, moving from Kazakhstan to Russia by the late 1990s. Th e Cossacks of Kazakhstan, a fre-
quent nuisance to the Kazakh government, largely faded into the woodwork after 1999, when a small group of 
them from Ust-Kamenogorsk were charged with treason and given long prison sentences, with only some blus-
tering from the Russian press and Duma. Th e Kazakhs responded to the bad press by re-broadcasting fewer 
Russian programs, and began restricting the hours of Russian language programming more generally. 
One thing helping to defuse these tensions was Russia’s willingness to absorb the millions of Russians who 
sought repatriation – more Russians (in both absolute numbers and in percentage terms) came to Russia from 
Kazakhstan (about two million) than from any other post-Soviet state. In recent years, however, the direction 
of ﬂ ow has begun to reverse. Th e Kazakh government, though publicly maintaining its eagerness to have all 
of its citizens remain in their “homeland,” was in fact quite happy with the demographic shift which occurred 
through the departure of the Russians and ethnic Germans. In a span of ten years, the Kazakh population in 
the country went from being a minority (38 percent) to over 50 percent in the country’s ﬁ rst census, in 1999. 
Th e “return” of Kazakhs living in China and in Mongolia explained some of this boost.
Th ere is no visa regime between Kazakhstan and Russia, and today citizens can pass between these states 
using domestic passports, rather than the passports used for international travel. Kazakh academic degrees are 
recognized in Russia, and Kazakh citizens are legally able to work in Russia. 
Kazakhstan and Russia in the Fossil Fuel Sector
Kazakhstan’s biggest problem with Russia has been securing satisfactory transit rights to move its oil and gas across 
Russian territory to Europe, but there is no evidence to suggest that Russia’s tough negotiating line was ever linked 
in any way to the diﬃ  culties ethnic Russians had in Kazakhstan, although certainly the Kazakhs feared that this 
would be the case if they ever crossed some sort of invisible line in their opposition to Moscow’s terms. 
Th e diﬃ  culties in establishing a commercially satisfactory relationship from Russia during the negotiations 
over the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline left the Kazakhs and their Tengiz consortium partners 
very concerned about the economic consequences of Kazakhstan’s dependence on transporting oil and gas 
across Russia. When the CPC pipeline ﬁ nally opened in 2001, a whole new series of problems appeared, hav-
ing to do with the role of Russian management, the structure of tariﬀ s, and the desire of Tengiz project part-
ners to have Russians expand the pipeline capacity. 
Th ese diﬃ  culties have made the Kazakhs receptive to talk of alternative pipeline routes, ﬁ rst through Afghan-
istan, and then through Iran via Turkmenistan. When neither of these seemed viable, the Kazakhs entered an 
energy partnership with China, which has led to a new pipeline going eastward across Kazakhstan. 
Th e Kazakhs have also remained interested in the U.S. sponsored initiative to build a pipeline to Turkey 
through Azerbaijan and Georgia, but recognized that the proposal to ship oil (and gas) through pipelines under 
the Caspian Sea would be a non-starter for Russia. As a result the Kazakhs did not formally commit to the 
Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline until it was a reality, a decade later, and even then merely agreed to send 
oil across the Caspian in freighters, rather than in an undersea pipeline that was supported by the U.S. 
Th e Kazakhs have also been more solicitous of Russian concerns over the unresolved legal status of the 
Caspian Sea than were either the Azerbaijanis or Turkmen. Key for Kazakhstan was securing Russian agree-
ment on the idea of national sectors, for Moscow’s original position had been on a condominium arrangement 
for the development of undersea mineral deposits, with all ﬁ ve littoral states beneﬁ ting equally. Th is idea was 
unacceptable to the Kazakhs, who have the most valuable deposits oﬀ  their shoreline. 
 Kazakhstan began negotiating the status of the Caspian Sea with Russia in 1996, reaching a prelim-
inary agreement on its status in 1998, which allowed each country to develop their respective undersea min-
eral reserves, and provided a corridor for joint-development along the median line separating their sectors. Th e 
Kurmangazy deposit is the largest ﬁ eld near this median line, and is set to be developed between Rosneft and 
Kazmunaigaz. 
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Kazakhstan’s Approach to International Relations
Th e Kazakhs maintain that their country is going to develop into a bridge between Europe and Asia, and they 
have tried to make an asset out of what is obviously a very disadvantageous economic position. Certainly it is 
no accident that the Kazakhs are working with oil companies and metallurgical concerns from virtually every 
major European and Asian nation, as well, of course, as the U.S and Canada. 
Kazakhstan’s location means that it must contend with transport through Russia, not just of oil and gas, 
but by highway and railroad to reach open ports. For this reason the Kazakhs are interested in international 
initiatives introducing new transit corridors, but opted not to join international groupings, like GUAM (Geor-
gia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, as well as Uzbekistan brieﬂ y) that explicitly sought to reduce Russia’s 
inﬂ uence as a goal in itself. Kazakhstan’s approach was always a softer one, increasing the countries’ options, 
in ways that were open to all takers. 
One of the ways that the Kazakh government always mitigated the damage from the ill-will of the Russian 
center was to encourage contact between local akims and their Russian gubernatorial counterparts across the 
border. Joint ventures with the Russians are often quite rational economically, as the Kazakhs had inherited 
a transit system (both rail and road) that provided better north-south linkages (between Kazakh and Russian 
cities) than east-west linkages (across Kazakhstan). 
While Kazakhstan has never given the Russians anything like a veto in their international relations, they 
are always cognizant of Moscow’s reaction. It is undoubtedly not an accident that the Kazakh-U.S. relationship 
and the Kazakh-Chinese relationship both improved substantially during the late Yeltsin years, when Russia’s 
president was both politically and physically very weak. Th is not withstanding, Kazakhstan’s focus vis-à-vis 
China was always one of trying to achieve balance in its international relations with these two powerful border 
states—one in an inevitable decline and the other in the ascendancy. For this reason the creation of the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ﬁ rst conceived in 1996, has been beneﬁ cial for the Kazakhs, creating a 
forum in which Russian and Chinese initiatives might be successfully parried by the smaller states. 
Th e existence of the SCO has helped mute some of the impact of Russia’s growing assertiveness after Putin 
came to power. Nazarbayev is obviously less happy about Putin’s eﬀ orts to attract Central Asian participa-
tion in Russian-initiated energy projects (and hydroelectric power along with hydrocarbons), but unlike in the 
Yeltsin years, Putin less frequently resorts to threats and has been more amenable to improving the commer-
cial terms on oﬀ er.
Putin certainly made Russia’s behavior more predictable. But although more politic, Putin remains a tough 
and sometimes underhanded negotiator. For example, at the end of a May summit between Nazarbayev and 
Putin, the former agreed to ship Kazakh oil through the proposed Burgous-Aleksandropolis pipeline and 
believed that he had secured CPC expansion as well. However, Putin’s post-summit statements made it clear 
that Russia was still simply considering CPC expansion, and had not yet fully committed to it. 
Th at said, one should not diminish the importance of shared values between the Kazakhs and Russians, in 
both their economic dealings and in their state-building preferences. Both want to attract foreign direct invest-
ment, but do so in a way that protects state management of the development of strategic natural resources. Naz-
arbayev seems to be following Moscow’s lead, and is extracting concessions from foreign companies working 
in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector, albeit in not as dramatic a fashion as Putin has done.
While many of Putin’s domestic policies have occasioned criticism in the West, they have been viewed 
with favor in Kazakhstan, leaving Kazakhstan’s leader feeling freer to concentrate his power as well. Following 
the “color” revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, Kazakhstan, like Russia, introduced more restrictive laws on 
media, political parties, and non-governmental organizations. Kazakhstan also eﬀ ectively became a one-party 
state, with only Nur Otan, Nazarbayev’s party, gaining representation in the lower house of the parliament in 
the August 2007 elections, a pattern which Russia is on the verge of copying.
Kazakhstan has also found synergies with Russia in the development of other economic sectors. Th ere are 
a large number of medium-sized joint ventures that appear to be thriving between Russian and Kazakh entre-
preneurs, especially in agro-business and light industry. 
Russia seems quite pleased with Nazarbayev’s assumption of a greater leadership role throughout Central 
Asia in recent years. When the Kyrgyz government nearly collapsed in November 2006, Nazarbayev and Uzbek 
leader Islam Karimov took a concerted and much more direct role in trying to bolster Kyrgyz President Kurman-
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bek Bakiyev. Th e Kazakhs have a dominating position in the Kyrgyz economy, the Tajiks are asking their advice 
on whom to partner with in the hydroelectric sector, and Nazarbayev has sought to make newly-elected Turk-
men President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov his protégé on questions of Turkmen energy development. 
Certainly, Nazarbayev is not a surrogate for Russia, and clearly has his own agenda. But much of this agenda 
overlaps with that of Moscow. Nazarbayev is not opposed to shipping his oil and gas through Russia. Th e key 
is that he wants commercially attractive prices for it. 
Russia has also been willing to go to bat for Kazakhstan. For example, they have been oﬀ ering dire threats 
of what the future of the OSCE is likely to be if its member states do not support Kazakhstan’s bid for the 
chairmanship of the organization. Of course, Russian hectoring is making some member states more reluc-
tant to support the Kazakhs.
Th e Future of the Kazakh-Russian Relationship 
Vladimir Putin’s term as president ends March 2008, although it is unclear whether or not he will then leave 
the political scene. Assuming he does, there are unlikely to be any dramatic changes in the Kazakh-Russian rela-
tionship. Russia’s next leader is likely to be more nationalistic than Putin, who has made very extensive use of 
nationalist rhetoric in recent years. But Kazakhstan, and the Kazakhs’ treatment of their Russian minority, has 
not been a serious focus of this rhetoric and they are unlikely to be a focus in the future. 
If there is in fact a transition period in Russia, Nazarbayev will use the time to further consolidate Kazakh-
stan’s international position. Obviously, the reverse is also true. Russia will ﬁ nd it easier to get the upper hand 
in dealings with Kazakhstan when Nazarbayev passes from the political scene. For the time being, Nazarbayev 
has changed the constitution to allow him to continue to run for oﬃ  ce. Whatever Nazarbayev’s failings as 
leader – they have been many – he has had some good instincts as to what it would take to make Kazakhstan 
a success as a nation. 
Nazarbayev obviously cannot stage manage what will occur after his death, all the more so if it occurs unex-
pectedly during his current term in oﬃ  ce. But Nazarbayev is also determined to secure his legacy and the inde-
pendence of his nation. It is thus possible that he just may be vain enough to work out a succession scenario 
whereby he insures a successor who will prove a match for whoever is Moscow’s leader at that time. 
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Kazakhstan’s Main Export Partners 2006 (in % of Total Exports)
Statistics: Kazakhstan: Origin and Destination of Exports and Imports
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Russian Opinion Surveys: Attitudes towards Kazakhstan
Sixteen Years Ago, the Soviet Union Fell 
Apart. In Your Opinion, Which of the Two 
Countries Developed More Successfully 
After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union – 
Russia or Kazakhstan?
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Russia’s Resurgence in Northeast Asia: Views from the Region
By Gilbert Rozman, Vladivostok
Abstract
With its current energy strength and renewed self-conﬁ dence, Russia is reasserting its position in 
Northeast Asia. Of the countries in the region, the Chinese are most interested in developing their 
strategic partnership with Russia. After making considerable progress in areas such as demarcating 
the border, the Chinese are now worried that Russia’s state-centered expansion will slow the growth of 
economic ties between the two countries and create tensions for Sino-Russian relations vis-à-vis Cen-
tral Asia and North Korea. Japan remains focused on the return of the four islands lost to the Soviet 
Union in WWII. However, it sees Russia as part of a larger strategy to contain the rising inﬂ uence of 
China. South Korea is mainly interested in Russia’s role in a possible reuniﬁ cation with North Korea, 
but South Korean-Russian relations depend heavily on the Korean presidential elections in Decem-
ber 2007. All three countries are reevaluating their relations with Russia.
Russia Asserts Itself in Asia
As Russia looks ahead to a presidential transition, Northeast Asia faces a changed environment through the 
invigorated Six-Party Talks addressing the North Korean nuclear weapons program and some reshuﬄ  ing of great 
power relations. Present at these talks and a force determined to shape the balance of power in the region, Rus-
sia has emerged from marginalization in the 1990s to become a serious factor in the calculations of the other 
states in Northeast Asia. Not only do the United States and North Korea—the two states locked in a perilous 
struggle through the nuclear crisis—pay greater attention to Russia’s position in the Six-Party Talks, but China, 
Japan, and South Korea—the three regional centers of diplomacy—also show growing interest in Russia’s inten-
tions of inﬂ uencing the region, unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally.
After Mikhail Gorbachev’s Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk speeches and Boris Yeltsin’s visits to Northeast 
Asia in the process of setting new priorities, Russia faded from view. In the ﬁ rst nuclear crisis of 1993–94, 
when the United States ﬁ rst considered a preemptive attack on North Korea’s nuclear reactor and then com-
promised on the Agreed Framework, it was a resentful nonentity. Subsequently, one could observe China woo-
ing it from 1996 to develop a strong strategic partnership, Japan beseeching it from 1997 to reach a deal that 
would return four islands the Soviet Union occupied at the end of WWII, and South Korea enlisting its good 
oﬃ  ces from 1999 as part of the Sunshine Policy to reassure North Korea; yet, all of these moves proved to be 
limited. Th e Sino-Russian partnership gave Russia a chance to reassert its inﬂ uence in Asia, but this arrange-
ment soon was suspect for leaving Russia as a junior partner and was never allowed to realize the full potential 
envisioned by Beijing. Tokyo’s “Eurasian diplomacy” was scorned as nothing more than a strategy for strip-
ping Russia of territory, which was well conﬁ rmed when Vladimir Putin refocused talks on a compromise 
approach and Tokyo lost interest. Finally, Putin’s personal courting of Kim Jong-il may have been welcomed 
by Kim Dae-jung, but it proved futile as a second nuclear crisis arose and Russia’s role did not expand beyond 
that of the least signiﬁ cant player in the Six-Party Talks. Emboldened by the new energy clout of Russia along 
with an image of revived state authority buttressed by renewed strategic military might, Putin is pressing for 
a more signiﬁ cant role in the region. 
Th e agreement on July 1 between Pyongyang and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the 
inspection of the Yongbyon reactor after it is shut down ushers in the critical Phase 2 of the February 13 Joint 
Agreement at the Six-Party Talks, in which the ﬁ ve working groups acquire new importance. As chair of the 
group focused on establishing a multilateral regional security framework, Moscow has a chance to realize an 
oft-declared dream, but achieving this goal depends on others. What do policy elites in Beijing, Tokyo, and 
Seoul want from Putin? Each has fresh concerns about where Russia is heading along with emergent thinking 
about how Russia can serve their national interests anew. China counts on Russia the most, valuing a deepening 
strategic partnership. Japan retains its suspicions, considering relations still to be less than normal, but recog-
nizing that Russia’s growing clout requires reconsideration. Finally, South Korea is eager for some sort of mul-
tilateralism balancing various powers, and it is also prepared to include Russia as conducive to any engagement 
of North Korea, but the stronger Russia appears, the less it ﬁ ts the image of a convenient middle power.
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If Putin’s legacy in Northeast Asia remains incomplete, further bold moves cannot be ruled out. He has 
made several such moves in the past. In July 2000 he made a stunning entrance at the Okinawa G-8 summit 
after stopping in Pyongyang, where he secured Kim Jong-il’s promise to extend his moratorium on missile test-
ing, reinforcing a mood of regional transformation only one month after the historic inter-Korean summit. In 
January 2003 the Russian leader agreed in principle to build a proposed oil pipeline to the Paciﬁ c coast rather 
than Daqing, thereby breaking an agreement with China’s leaders to direct Russian hydrocarbons straight to 
China, while encouraging Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to compete for advantage in receiving 
Russian energy supplies. Most recently, in June 2007 he broke the impasse over transferring North Korea’s 
frozen funds that had put the Joint Agreement on hold by arranging for them to go to a Russian bank after 
the U.S. Federal Reserve received them from Macao. In this light, the July 1–2 summit in Kennebunkport, 
Maine with George W. Bush shifted the tone from his confrontational rhetoric earlier in the year and added 
to his stature as a world leader.
As seen within the region, Putin may have time in oﬃ  ce to leave his further mark in Northeast Asia in ﬁ ve 
areas. First, after the declaration in December 2006 of a new development program for the Russian Far East 
and Eastern Siberia followed by Putin’s visit to Vladivostok in January 2007, he can clarify its contents and 
set the direction for the limited integration of this area into the surrounding region. After the false starts over 
the past twenty years of other such development programs, Putin has the revenue, the control, and the energy 
prospects to establish a long-term plan that Russia’s neighbors would have to take seriously. Second, following 
years of equivocating, a ﬁ nal decision on the route of construction of the oil pipeline from Taishet is expected, 
perhaps prioritizing the Paciﬁ c route and leading to a scramble among states for access to and development of 
ﬁ rst oil and then gas resources tightly controlled by the Russian state. Uncertainty about pipeline plans has 
left in limbo Russia’s regional strategy. Th ird, in the wake of the new Sino-U.S. understanding on how the 
Six-Party Talks should proceed, Putin can seize this opportunity for championing a regional consensus insis-
tent on Pyongyang’s compliance in return for the beneﬁ ts promised to it. Fourth, as talks advance for a visit by 
Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo to Russia in the fall, Putin may strive for a breakthrough in relations on 
the basis of security as well as energy multilateralism. Finally, in the year of China in Russia, Putin could com-
plete his presidency by repositioning these bilateral ties within an enduring regional framework. Th ese varied 
options are on the minds of regional actors.
China’s Expectations for Russia
After realizing its primary strategic objectives through Russian partnership ties—border stability, arms imports 
and licenses, partnership against U.S. unilateralism, and an independent pole to achieve a degree of regional mul-
tipolarity—China is awakening to a new security environment in which Russia’s role is more problematic. How-
ever much a new Russian assertiveness against the U.S. may have been welcome, it may be trailing in its wake 
potential for regional instability or even renewed Soviet-style thinking that may backﬁ re against China. While 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) served to keep rivalry in Central Asia under control, Russia’s 
limited interest in it and advancing ambitions for dominance in Central Asia, including control over the disposi-
tion of energy resources, may pose a threat to stability. Moreover, despite the much lower costs of constructing a 
pipeline to Daqing that could absorb all of Russia’s exports of oil to Asia from existing ﬁ elds of Western Siberia, 
Chinese are preparing for a negative decision. Most likely Russia will build a pipeline to the Paciﬁ c coast so that 
it will beneﬁ t from a diversity of customers for its oil and gas and not be dependent on Chinese purchases.
Conﬁ dent that Moscow is no longer inclined to side with the West politically, Beijing has shifted its gaze to 
economic ties. While it welcomes the operation of normal market forces, it suspects that Moscow is intent on 
state-driven economic decisions. On the one hand, it observes Russia’s intensiﬁ ed restrictions on entrepreneur-
ial activities—shuttle trade, foreigners doing business in outdoor markets, planned industrial parks, imports 
by non-registered organizations in ﬁ shing and other sectors—which hit Chinese business hard. Centralization 
in the hands of Moscow ministries seems to have brought little reduction in corruption, but much tightening 
over market-oriented activities. On the other hand, China faces recurrent pressure to make heavy investments 
in processing industries across the border that would keep raw materials now heading to China inside Rus-
sia, creating jobs there instead. Many regions of the Russian Far East have their own wish list, whether a pulp 
mill, a furniture factory, or a mineral processing plant. Given the high transportation costs for reaching other 
markets, Russian regions do not have other options, but some are playing hardball to try to force investments 
from China. Rather than continued growth in trade from the $30 billion range to $60 billion or even $80 bil-
lion, in accord with Chinese calculations based on unrestricted market openings, there is concern that another 
period of stagnation is coming, such as occurred in the late 1990s.
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Beijing’s greatest concern may be that a newly conﬁ dent and assertive Russia may no longer adhere to the 
stabilizing arrangements along the border and in areas of potential rivalry that were reached in the 1990s. In 
Central Asia China agreed to defer to Russia, but not on the empire-building terms that Moscow may be con-
templating now. At the same time, Russia accepted China’s primacy in dealing with North Korea, especially 
after its bold move to become the intermediary failed in January 2003. Yet, ﬂ exing its energy clout in Central 
Asia, Russia has already marginalized the U.S. and may intend to do the same with China, and as the Sino-
U.S. accord of 2006 in managing North Korea passed recent tests, Russia has shown some signs of restless-
ness. With memories still alive of the great costs from the Sino-Soviet split, Beijing remains intent, whatever 
the wavering may be on the Russian side, on keeping relations moving along a forward-looking track.
Japan’s Expectations for Russia
Long preoccupied with the return of four islands, Japanese have found it hard to prioritize other objectives. Since 
Koizumi’s signature proposal was the oil pipeline to the Paciﬁ c, this remains Japan’s goal despite a lack of con-
crete information from Putin on the extent of supplies and the likelihood that plans will go forward. New fear 
of isolation may ﬁ nally, under Abe Shinzo (or a successor should he be blamed for his party’s suﬀ ering a setback 
in the July elections to the upper house of the Diet) raise the proﬁ le of Russia as a strategic partner. Th e Joint 
Agreement undercut Japan’s trust in the United States, as policies toward North Korea openly diverge. Alarmed 
over the North’s nuclear weapons and missiles, which reinforce their obsession with the abductee issue, many in 
the Japanese political elite remain intent on countering the North as well as limiting the rise of China. Th e alli-
ance with the United States is essential, but may no longer appear to be suﬃ  cient. Interest in Russia says more 
about Japan’s concerns about China, even in the wake of Abe’s October 2006 healing visit to Beijing and Premier 
Wen Jiabao’s April 2007 public relations success in Tokyo, than about any indication of trust in Putin.
Some Japanese leaders would welcome a new tone of cooperation, including in the Russian Far East, accom-
panied by a message from Moscow that downgraded claims for Sino-Russian relations. A clear-cut decision 
to construct the pipeline to the Paciﬁ c (with no certainty that the spur line to Daqing would be built) would 
be taken positively as would overtures in favor of Japan’s greater involvement in the development plans for 
the Russian Far East. Local enthusiasm in Hokkaido could easily be aroused, even after the Russian govern-
ment pressured oil and gas companies to transfer controlling rights over the Sakhalin-2 project. Moreover, as 
the two marginal players with reservations about the Joint Agreement, Tokyo and Moscow may look for com-
mon ground over North Korea. Yet, they approach this possibility at opposite extremes in thinking about the 
role of pressure on the North and far apart in reasoning about the merits of the U.S. alliance system versus a 
multilateral security framework. Having previously shown a dearth of strategic logic for strengthening ties to 
Russia apart from regaining the islands, Japan is unlikely, after a rise of nationalism and under leaders with a 
weaker political base, to give priority to Russia in the near future. Th e Japanese would prefer zero islands to a 
minimal compromise giving them the two tiny islands that were long ago promised, and one-sided reliance on 
the United States to a weak linkage to Russia that would not seriously undermine its partnership with China 
and its nationalist assertiveness. 
South Korea’s Expectations for Russia
If Beijing wanted to build on normalization of relations to reestablish strategic balance in the world and Tokyo 
sought to recover the “northern territories” to emerge from the shadow of wartime defeat, Seoul desired to gain 
the edge in the reuniﬁ cation process through “nordpolitik.” Its success led, however, to the ﬁ rst nuclear crisis, 
and later, in a more limited manner, to a second try at enlisting Moscow, but this time to reassure Pyongyang: to 
make it feel secure, to entice it with energy pipelines and a new railroad line along the vertical axis of Khabarovsk-
Vladivostok-Busan down the entire peninsula, and to serve as a voice of moderation in regional circles that even-
tually became the Six-Party Talks. Progressives led by Roh Moo-hyun are largely satisﬁ ed with Russia’s contribu-
tion, looking back to Roh’s visit in the fall of 2004 to Putin’s dacha as an upbeat convergence in thinking. Yet, 
conservatives, who are well-positioned to regain the presidency in the December 2007 election, are inclined to 
see Russia as coddling Kim Jong-il and unlikely to support the more conditional aid that they would require or 
the tougher line in the Six-Party Talks that they may take.
Having remained wary of Russia since the dual ﬁ nancial crises of 1997 and 1998, South Korean investors 
are little disposed to make large commitments. Only economic ties appealing to North Korea, for instance its 
pursuit of energy security free of outside control, would likely draw Russia and South Korea closer. As a middle 
power, South Korea might have appreciated a modest Russia aware of its limited inﬂ uence far from its heart-
land in Europe, but Putin’s assertive bearing may diminish the prospects for the two to ﬁ nd common cause 
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against the powers that throw their weight around in the region. Much depends on the elections and how the 
Six-Party Talks proceed in the coming year.
Conclusion
Leaders in the three diplomatic centers of Northeast Asia all had high hopes for Moscow in the late 1980s, 
turned to it again at some point in the 1990s for more limited goals, and are rethinking their strategies in light 
of recent events. Moscow’s unilateral pursuit of security, total control over energy resources, and renewed inﬂ u-
ence in Central Asia and North Korea has added an element of wariness in all three capitals. Yet, doubts about 
the strength of Moscow’s bilateral ties with Beijing leave open the possibility for other bilateral moves, espe-
cially if energy security acquires new importance in Russian strategizing. Finally, as the search for multilateral-
ism accelerates, with Moscow poised to lead in this aspect of the Six-Party Talks, all parties have reason to take 
a fresh look at improved Sino-U.S. coordination and how Moscow serves their interests: Beijing through part-
nership, Tokyo through balancing, and Seoul through reassurance to Pyongyang. 
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Statistics: Key Economic Indicators for Selected Countries
Population Population growth GDP (PPP) GNP per capita (PPP)
Russia 142,893,540a -0.37%b $1.723 trnb $12,100b
China 1,313,973,713a 0.59%b $10 trnb $7,600b
Japan 127,463,611a 0.02%b $4.22 trnb $33,100b 
North 
Korea
23,113,019a 0.84%b $40 bnc $1,800b 
South 
Korea
48,846,823a 0.42%b $1.18 trnb $24,200b
a July 2006 estimate; b 2006 estimate; c North Korea does not publish any reliable National Income Accounts data; the datum 
shown here is derived from purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP estimates for North Korea that were made by Angus Maddison in 
a study conducted for the OECD; his ﬁ gure for 1999 was extrapolated to 2005 using estimated real growth rates for North Korea’s 
GDP and an inﬂ ation factor based on the US GDP deﬂ ator; the result was rounded to the nearest $10 bn (2006 est.).
Source: CIA World Factbook
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Russia, Central Asia and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization
By Oksana Antonenko, London
Abstract
Over the past three years, Russia’s inﬂ uence and presence in Central Asia has been steadily increas-
ing. In contrast to the post 9/11 period, Russia has reasserted itself as one of the key players in the 
region, in some cases displacing the US, now associated with a democratization and regime-change 
agenda, as the key strategic partner to many Central Asian (CA) states. Moscow now conducts active 
regional diplomacy, has increased its investment in the region, provides economic and military assis-
tance to CA states and, most importantly, has re-established close relations with the ruling elites in 
all of the region’s states, presenting itself as a strong supporter of the existing political regimes. Rus-
sia’s new strategic alliance with Uzbekistan, crafted following the Andijon crisis, as well as its close 
political and business ties with Kazakhstan, represent the backbone of the Kremlin’s new Central 
Asia strategy. Russia’s new activism is also visible in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and, most recently, post-
Niyazov Turkmenistan. Despite having practically abandoned Central Asia in the 1990s, Russia has 
now made it a top foreign and security policy priority, not only within the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS), but increasingly as part of its wider regional and global ambitions. 
Increasing Attention to Regional Organizations
In addition to bi-lateral ties with Central Asian states, Moscow is paying increasing attention to regional orga-
nizations, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Community 
(EURASEC), and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO). Russia’s role in these organizations is not 
so much as facilitator of integration, norm-setter, or even “banker,” although Russia provides most of the funds 
for the CSTO. Instead, in many cases, Russia acts as a shock absorber, which helps to reduce or manage ten-
sions between regional states and to promote the identity of Central Asia as a post-Soviet region (in contrast, for 
example, with the American vision of a “Wider Central Asia,” which would be part of South Asia rather than 
post-Soviet space). 
Russia’s participation in regional organizations has one important impact on its policies: in these multilateral 
formats Russia is increasingly confronted with the need to move away from unilateral leadership, shaped by a 
domination model, which was prevalent in its policies throughout the 1990s and even in the early Putin presi-
dency, and to accept power-sharing as its new modus vivendi, with the rising regional powers, like Kazakhstan, 
and with powerful external players in the region. Th is power-sharing model was ﬁ rst tested within the SCO, 
which over the years, dating back to the SCO’s predecessor, the Shanghai-Five Process, kept Russia engaged in 
Central Asia and helped to deﬁ ne Russia’s agenda in the region, while providing conﬁ dence-building and trans-
parency in its relations with China in CA. Th e SCO stands alone as the only organization in post-Soviet Eur-
asia to which Russia belongs without being a dominant leader or even the most powerful member. Instead, it 
has been following the agenda set mainly by China and increasingly by Central Asian states themselves. Russia 
has been surprised by the fast pace at which the SCO has been gaining weight in regional aﬀ airs. As the SCO 
develops, Russia is constantly reassessing its attitudes towards the organization and its role among all the pol-
icy instruments available to Russia in the region. 
Th ere are a number of issues which both help explain the importance of SCO for Russia and also raise ques-
tions as to the impact of the SCO’s evolution on Russia’s ability to secure its interests in Central Asia. In ana-
lyzing these issues, however, one must bear in mind that Russia has yet to clearly articulate its interests and 
objectives in the SCO and strategies on how to achieve them. 
Diverging Partnership: Russia and China in SCO
Th e presence of Russia and China among SCO members is the key reason why the SCO is increasingly taken 
seriously, although often with caution, by countries in the West and East. Th e SCO and its predecessor, the 
Shanghai Five, have provided a mechanism under which Central Asia’s two most powerful neighbors can rec-
oncile their interests and develop ways to cooperate. Early observers predicted that there would be unavoidable 
Russian-Chinese rivalry or even conﬂ ict over inﬂ uence in Central Asia. Th e SCO’s ability to regulate this con-
ﬂ ict has been, without a doubt, the most powerful testimony of the organization’s success to date. 
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However, Russian-Chinese relations within the SCO are becoming increasingly competitive, rather than 
cooperative. As China moves from declarations towards promoting speciﬁ c projects in Central Asia, includ-
ing those focused on energy and infrastructure, increasing development loans, and signing contracts for stra-
tegic projects in the energy and water management sectors, Russia’s role as a regional economic power, inher-
ited from the Soviet Union, is diminishing. 
At the same time, China has been more cautious than Russia about using the SCO as a tool for anti-West-
ern, particularly anti-US, declarations, preferring instead a quieter, but often more eﬀ ective, diplomacy. Rus-
sia, on the contrary, has been the key engine behind the SCO declarations – such as those calling for NATO 
base withdrawal or member states pledging not to take steps which could damage the security of other mem-
bers – which sought to openly challenge the Western presence and inﬂ uence in CA. While Russia and China 
both oppose the US and NATO military presence in the region, China is less concerned about engagement by 
the EU and Asian players, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
China and Russia share concerns about the further enlargement of the SCO, although they continue to 
lobby diﬀ erent candidates for closer ties with the organization. China supports Pakistan, while Russia has been 
developing closer ties with India and Iran and, at one point, even proposed bringing Belarus closer to SCO. 
Finally, while Russia and China both agree on the “three evils” – terrorism, extremism and separatism – as the 
key priorities for the SCO’s security agenda, China seems more reluctant at this stage to commit the SCO to 
develop capabilities for dealing with potential security challenges – such as cross-border insurgency or even ter-
rorist attacks – in Central Asian states, while Russia pays little attention to Uighur activities in the region. 
In strategic terms, Russia and China have increasingly diverging views on the future directions of SCO devel-
opment. Russia is keen to keep the SCO as primarily a security organization, with only a limited economic role 
focusing on joint infrastructure projects. Russia seeks to use EURASEC as the key regional economic integra-
tion vehicle. China wants the SCO to evolve decisively into an economic grouping, which makes it easier for 
China to implement its business projects in the region, including those in the energy sphere and trade. China’s 
proposals for the creation of a free-trade zone within the SCO are seen as threatening for Russian and Cen-
tral Asian state economies, which can hardy compete with China’s economic power. Th is power has already 
displaced Russia as the key economic and trading partner for many CA states. As this trend continues, Russia 
might start using SCO mechanisms to limit China’s economic expansion into Central Asia, rather than for the 
purpose of reducing the existing barriers through economic integration, the vision held by China. 
Th e Sino-Russian tensions are likely to grow and Russia will ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to deal with China’s rising inﬂ u-
ence and activism in Central Asia. Th e SCO is unlikely to help tackle such issues as migration, resource com-
petition, and the increasing economic imbalance between China and its neighbors, including Russia. Th e SCO 
can be used by Russia and CA states as a vehicle – a force multiplier – to contain and balance Chinese inﬂ uence 
(just as the Shanghai Five process was used in negotiating border disputes). Such eﬀ orts against China could 
be implemented if Central Asian states decide that their concerns over China’s power outweigh the potential 
and real beneﬁ ts from welcoming Chinese capital and assistance.
Problematic Security Role 
For Russia, Central Asia matters primarily as a potential, and in some cases, such as drug traﬃ  cking from Afghan-
istan, a real security problem. Th erefore its engagement in the region, including multilateral co-operation, has 
been driven primarily by security concerns. Th is emphasis has changed somewhat under Putin, who started to 
actively promote the interests of Russian business, particularly companies close to the Kremlin like Russian Alu-
minum (RUSAL) or state-owned Gazprom, as an additional source of Russian power. However, Putin contin-
ues to view the region primarily as a potential source of instability and threat for Russia itself. Practically all 
regional initiatives involving Russia, perhaps with the exception of EUROSEC, have security at the top of their 
agendas. Th e SCO has been seen, and continues to be seen, in the same light. Th e Shanghai Five helped to pre-
vent potential conﬂ icts over border disputes, worked to develop conﬁ dence-building measures along the former 
Sino-Soviet border, and declared the goals of ﬁ ghting terrorism, extremism (primarily motivated by nationalist 
or radical Islamic ideas), and separatism long before 9/11.
Since the late 1990s Russia has taken a number of decisions in regard to countering terrorist threats in Cen-
tral Asia. Very few of them were actually made within the SCO. In particular, Russia used the CSTO as a vehi-
cle for creating joint capabilities with the Central Asian states, such as the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces 
set up immediately after the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) insurgencies in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbeki-
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stan in 1999 and 2000. In 2001 Putin’s decision to acquiesce to the presence of US and coalition troops and 
bases in CA was testimony of Russia’s real concerns about developments in Afghanistan. Putin realized that 
Russia was unable, even with support from its CA allies, to stop the civil war in Afghanistan, to remove the 
Taliban, and to bring some degree of security to the country and hence to neighboring Central Asia. China, 
by contrast, never openly accepted the bases’ legitimacy and viewed them as directed against China. 
Th e SCO has been used for sending political messages and undertaking information gathering and shar-
ing among its members. Both SCO and Russia have ﬁ rmly sided with Uzbekistan in support of its harsh 
response to the Andijon unrest. Russia and the SCO are actively targeting Hezb-ut-Tahrir activists, consider-
ing them a major security threat both for CA and Russia. For Putin, just as for other SCO states, the democ-
ratization agenda, including support for so-called “color revolutions,” which led to the overthrow of President 
Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan, is seen as a security problem, partly because it undermines the state’s capacity to 
deal with other security challenges. 
Although Russia has been focused on the security agenda in CA ever since the end of the Soviet Union, it 
has so far failed to develop any eﬀ ective mechanisms to address real security threats in CA either through bi-
lateral military assistance or through multilateral mechanisms such as the CSTO. In this sense, the SCO also 
remains a weak security instrument, particularly concerning new threats, which are primarily internal within 
CA states or linked to wider trans-regional organized crime networks. 
Security has been a core preoccupation of the SCO since its establishment. Th e inaugural summit approved 
the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, under which states agreed to 
pursue information exchange, extradition and operational coordination to ﬁ ght these “three evils.” Th e 2006 
Shanghai summit approved a new program for cooperation in ﬁ ghting terrorism, extremism and separatism 
in 2007–09.
Th e SCO Convention laid the foundations for the establishment of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure 
(RATS) and for the development of closer cooperation between security services, law-enforcement agencies, 
and, to a lesser extent, the militaries of SCO member states. RATS, which is located in Tashkent, was the sec-
ond of two permanent SCO institutions established in 2003 (the ﬁ rst was the Beijing-based SCO Secretariat). 
RATS is responsible for information exchange and analytical work among SCO members’ security services. 
Its staﬀ  of 30 includes seven specialists from both Russia and China, six from Kazakhstan, ﬁ ve from Uzbeki-
stan, three from Kyrgyzstan, and two from Tajikistan. Since 2003, RATS has compiled a list of terrorist orga-
nizations and key personalities involved in terrorist activity on member states’ territories. It has made some 
progress in harmonizing anti-terrorist legislation among member states. Yet the SCO has little practical role in 
addressing either the root causes or managing the consequences of terrorist activities. Moreover, it still plays a 
minor role in dealing with the key region-wide security concern, drug traﬃ  cking. 
In addition to RATS’ day-to-day activities, SCO member states also conduct joint anti-terrorist exercises. 
Th e ﬁ rst took place in 2002 on the Chinese–Kyrgyz border. Primarily including security services, but also some 
military and interior forces, they have oﬀ ered the ﬁ rst opportunity for Chinese forces to exercise in Central Asia 
and for Central Asian and Russian forces to enter Chinese territory. In August 2003, ﬁ ve SCO member states 
– Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia and Tajikistan – conducted joint exercises on the Chinese–Kazakh 
border, and in 2006 large-scale anti-terrorist exercises – ‘East-Anti-terror 2006’ – took place with the partici-
pation of all SCO member states. In 2007 the SCO military exercises were the largest to date and included an 
impressive display of military power, which, however, seemed to be go beyond the SCO’s declared terrorism 
agenda and have little in common with modern strategies of targeting terrorist groups or insurgencies. Th e dis-
plays appeared more a demonstration of power in the context of continuing Western military presence in the 
region, rather then a real reassurance against future terrorist threats. 
One role which the SCO could have played is to help translate some of its experience in addressing bor-
der disputes between China and post-Soviet states to tackle the existing border problems within CA itself. 
Many unresolved border disputes represent potential sources of tensions and even conﬂ ict and obstacles for 
trade and economic development. Closer ties with Russia helped to some extent to encourage some normaliza-
tion in Tajikistan-Uzbekistan relations, however this process is far from complete. At the same time, the with-
drawal of Russian border guards from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan meant that Russia was no longer inﬂ uential 
enough to help strengthen border regimes. In 2007 the Russian Secretary-General of CSTO – Nikolai Bor-
dyuzha - refused to discuss the request from Kyrgyzstan to bring Russian border guards back to Kyrgyzstan. 
Th e SCO could have played some role in this issue but Russia is cautious to authorize anything which could 
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imply some form of long-term presence of Chinese military or other security forces in Central Asia on a long-
term basis. Moreover, while keeping the security agenda – where Russia still enjoys greater power than China - 
among the SCO priorities, Russia is reluctant to empower the organization to such a degree that it could ques-
tion the need for the CSTO, where Russia remains the undisputed leader. Unlike the SCO, which only estab-
lished a working group on Afghanistan last year and has achieved few real results, the CSTO has been work-
ing on developing a concept of security belts against drug traﬃ  cking in Central Asia and reinforcing joint capa-
bilities, which still remain rather weak and practically untested in real operations. China, on the other hand, 
is reluctant to see any merger, even on an ad hoc basis, between the SCO and CSTO, perhaps due to the fact 
that such a union could strengthen Russia’s role in the SCO. Any prospective enlargement of the SCO, which 
could include any or all of the existing observers (India, Pakistan, Mongolia and Iran), will multiply security 
problems within the “SCO area” while further undermining any chances for the creation of meaningful joint 
mechanisms to deal with them. 
Economic Limitations
For many of the abovementioned reasons, the SCO’s security portfolio will remain limited. At the same time, 
its economic agenda is expanding, thus posing potential limitations on Russia’s power within the SCO. On one 
hand, Russia’s economic presence in Central Asia is expanding rapidly. However, as Russian companies, with the 
Kremlin’s support, are imposing tough bargains on their Central Asian counterparts in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
and even in Kazakhstan, there is a growing reluctance in the region to allow greater economic dependency on 
Russia. Russia’s key strategic economic interest in CA is to gain control over its energy resources and its transpor-
tation routes to world markets. Th e recent deal signed between the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turk-
menistan on the construction of a gas pipeline along the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea has been trumpeted 
as a key Russian geo-political victory. Yet this approach contradicts the SCO agenda, according to which CA 
states should have the chance to diversify their export routes. Not only China, as a SCO member, but also India 
and Pakistan, as observers, are determined to use SCO membership as a vehicle to get access to CA resources 
and ﬁ nd ways to bring them into South Asia. Th e ideas of an integrated gas market or an alliance of gas-pro-
ducing states, along the lines of the proposed gas OPEC, which was discussed by Putin and Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad on the fringes of the 2006 SCO summit in China, would not beneﬁ t all CA states and 
therefore could not become a SCO project. In those areas where the SCO as a regional institution can really 
contribute – such as regional infrastructure projects – China has so far demonstrated more interest and more 
willingness to commit funds than Russia. China has recently committed over $600 million to ﬁ nance projects 
in Tajikistan, including renovation and construction of roads and the construction of a150-megawatt hydro-
power plant in Sughd province. Meanwhile the construction by Russian companies of another hydropower sta-
tion in Tajikistan has been delayed. 
Geo-political Divisions
Apart from the security and economic agenda, Russian support for the SCO is based on geo-political consider-
ations, ﬁ rst and foremost, its ambition to reassert itself as a major international player and to counter what Rus-
sia sees as the expansion of US inﬂ uence in its backyard. For Putin, the SCO represents a powerful argument 
with which to back Russia’s multi-polar world vision – also shared by China – and present the vision of an alli-
ance between Russia, China and India. Th is idea has been ﬂ oated by Russia since Yevgeny Primakov’s time as 
Russian Foreign Minister under President Yeltsin as a counter-balancer to the US and NATO. Although no such 
alliance can be created in practice for a variety of obvious reasons – such as continuing Sino-Indian tensions and 
India’s close ties with the US, as well it being a democracy – the SCO oﬀ ers an opportunity to claim that such 
an alliance could be established within a wider framework. President Putin has on a number of occasions noted 
that the SCO has more population than any other international organization (counting the populations of India 
and China), the largest territory and a large share of global natural resources. 
In addition to using the SCO as a tool to justify Russia’s regional, and even global power ambitions, Rus-
sia, often with the support of China and most recently Uzbekistan, also uses the SCO as a rhetorical tool to 
deliver some tough messages to the US - such as the famous Astana Summit declaration on the need to with-
draw all coalition troops and bases from Central Asia. In 2006 Putin spoke strongly against “creating any par-
allel structures” in the SCO space which could duplicate the role of the SCO. President Putin has been using 
the SCO as a powerful instrument to back up Russia’s anti-Western rhetoric at home and to demonstrate that 
Russia and “its allies” could present a real challenge to the US and Western interests in Eurasia. 
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However, despite this campaign to promote the SCO, the organization is far from speaking with one voice 
in support of Russia’s new zero-sum geo-political rivalry with the US in Eurasia. Despite the Astana declara-
tion, US and NATO troops remain in Central Asia. Th ey have a base in Manas (Kyrgyzstan) and continue to 
use facilities in Tajikistan and even in Uzbekistan, where German troops are stationed in Termez. Moreover, 
both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continue to expand their co-operation with NATO and the US. Even China 
is reluctant to back strong anti-Western rhetoric as part of SCO declarations. In fact China has been develop-
ing a constructive and positive dialogue with the EU and gradually with NATO. Moreover, any prospective 
enlargement of the SCO would mean that it will have even less appetite for any verbal confrontation with the 
West. Both India and Mongolia have close ties with the US, which they value more than their relations with 
SCO member states, and Pakistan remains a strong ally in the US war on terror. Only Iran, which is in a state 
of cold war with the US and has tense relations with the EU over its nuclear ambitions could move the SCO 
toward greater confrontation with the West, but its chances of obtaining full membership in the foreseeable 
future remain very low. Both Russia and China are reluctant to import the Iranian nuclear problem into the 
SCO umbrella. Sergei Ivanov, former Russian Defense Minister and now the front runner to succeed Putin 
in the Kremlin, has made it clear that Russia will never endorse any collective security guarantees to Iran, as a 
SCO observer, should the West decide to take any military action against it. 
As Russia’s relations with the West continue to deteriorate as a result of US plans to deploy missile defense 
systems in Central Europe or over Russia’s decision to suspend its participation in the Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) Treaty, or in response to Western criticism of Russia’s domestic political developments, Russia 
could be tempted to use the SCO as a vehicle for reasserting its international role and to mount a strong oppo-
sition to Western policies. However, it is unlikely that other SCO members, including China, are open to a 
greater confrontation with the US and the EU. On the contrary they will be seeking ways to position the SCO 
as a partner to the West and to erase its image as a threat or an anti-Western political-military alliance. 
Prospects
Of all the regional organizations in Central Asia, the SCO has the best chances to survive the test of time and 
continue developing in the future while maintaining its role as one of the key, if not the most powerful, regional 
multilateral mechanism. Russia has many powerful reasons to support the SCO. Among them is the need to 
engage with China constructively while simultaneously countering its power in an alliance with CA states, when-
ever China gets too powerful. Th e SCO also oﬀ ers a number of economic incentives, as well as a platform for 
the security dialogue and for keeping the “multi-polarity rhetoric” alive for the beneﬁ t of domestic audiences as 
long as the US remains a skeptical unilateralist. However, the SCO will also pose real and increasing limits on 
Russia’s ability to exercise its power in the region, not only due to China’s unavoidable rise in CA, but also due 
to greater conﬁ dence among CA states themselves and the challenge posed by SCO enlargement. 
Nevertheless, the SCO is good for Russia: it is the only platform where it can learn how to compromise, 
instead of dominating. Absorbing this lesson, in the end, could do more to help Russia to mature as a power-
ful and respected global player than its attempts to use the SCO to back up its great power rhetoric. 
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Russian Views on their Asian Neighbors
Who, In Your opinion, Should Become the Main Partner of Russia in South-East Asia? 
16%
1%
21%
3%2%26%
30%
1%
India
Indonesia 
Vietnam
China 
North Korea 
South Korea 
Japan 
Difficult to say
Translated and compiled by Yuliya Yurchuk
Total sample Federal Districts* CFD NWFD SFD PFD UFD SFD FEFD 
India 16% 17 14 15 18 18 20 8 
Indonesia 1% 1 - - - 3 3 1 
Vietnam 1% 1 - 0 2 - 1 - 
China 21% 22 11 15 19 27 21 36 
North Korea 3% 3 3 5 1 1 3 1 
South Korea 2% 2 1 3 2 1 2 3 
Japan 26% 23 31 28 25 35 23 24 
Diﬃ  cult to say 30% 31 40 34 33 15 27 27 
* Abbreviations: CFD – Central Federal District, NWFD – North-Western Federal District, SFD – Southern Federal District, 
PFD – Privolzhskij Federal District, UFD - Ural Federal District, SFD – Siberia Federal District, FEFD – Far-East Federal 
District.
How Would You Regard the Current Relationship Between the Russian and Chinese 
Peoples? 
23-24 July 2005 
15%
19%
40%
11%
3%
2%
10%
7-8 July 2007
19%
17%
40%
10%
3%
1%
10%
Friendly 
Good, good-neighborly 
Regular, smooth 
Cool
Tense
Hostile
Difficult to say
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Has Your Opinion About China Changed During the Last 10 Years? If Yes, How? 
23-24 July 2005 
28%
38%
12%
16%
6%
7-8 April 2007 
22%
45%
8%
20%
5%
Has changed to the better 
Has not changed 
Has changed to the worse 
I am not interested in China 
Difficult to say
In Your Opinion, What Is China For Russia Today?
23-24 July 2005 
22%
34%
24%
4%
16%
7-8 April 2007 
27%
35%
21%
4%
13%
A friendly state, an ally
Strategic and economic partner 
An economic and political rival, a
competitor
A hostile state, a probable opponent
Difficult to say
In Your Opinion, Will China Be a Friend or an Enemy of Russia In the 21st Century? 
23-24 July 2005 
22%
26%
25%
6%
21%
7-8 July 2007 
28%
24%
20%
4%
24%
An ally, a friendly state 
Close partner 
A dangerous neighbor, rival 
An opponent, an enemy 
Difficult to say
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What Do You Th ink, Who Beneﬁ ts More From the Economic Relations between Russia 
and China?
23-24 July 2005 
53%
8%
25%
14%
7-8 April 2007 
45%
6%
35%
14%
China
Russia
China and Russia equally 
Difficult to say
During the last decade Siberia and the Far East experienced a signiﬁ cant outﬂ ow of 
labor. Th e regional governors declare that their economy cannot develop without 
foreign labor. In your opinion, will participation of the Chinese ﬁ rms and workers 
in the development of the riches of Siberia and the Far East be more likely useful or 
more likely dangerous to Russia? 
 Total sample 
Federal districts* 
CFD NWFD SFD PFD UFD SFD FEFD 
 2005 2007
More likely useful 17% 16% 16% 23% 15% 14% 35% 11% 9% 
More likely 
dangerous 66% 62% 61% 56% 71% 67% 37% 69% 57% 
Diﬃ  cult to say 17% 21% 23% 21% 14% 19% 28% 20% 34% 
* Abbreviations:  CFD – Central Federal District, NWFD – North-Western Federal District, SFD – Southern Federal Dis-
trict, PFD – Privolzhskij Federal District , UFD - Ural Federal District, SFD – Siberia Federal District, FEFD – Far-East 
Federal District 
What Is Your Attitude Towards the Following Questions? (one answer for each point) 
  Positive More likely 
positive 
More likely 
negative 
Negative 
Diﬃ  cult to 
say
A. More goods from 
China are appearing in our 
shops
2005 11% 23% 35% 27% 4% 
2007 11% 25% 35% 21% 8% 
B. Entrepreneurs and 
com panies from China 
are acquiring property in 
Russia 
2005 5% 9% 36% 46% 4% 
2007 2% 7% 37% 48% 6% 
C. Th ere are more and 
more workers from China 
in our country 
2005 4% 10% 36% 45% 5% 
2007 3% 12% 37% 41% 7% 
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What Occurs To You When Talking About China? (open question, up to 5 answers) 
Chinese goods, cheap consumer goods, markets 27 
Large population, high birth rates 18 
Rapid development of the country, achievement in economy 9 
Bad quality of Chinese goods 9 
Migrants, cheap labor 7 
Culture, ancient culture 6 
Human qualities of Chinese people (positive) 6 
Great Chinese wall 4 
Th reat to Russia (territorial disputes, expansion, rivalry) 4 
Friendship between the Chinese and Russian nations 3 
Communism, Communist Party, Mao Zedong 3 
Asian martial arts, Jackie Chan, Bruce Lee, Shaolin 2 
Chinese cuisine, food 2 
Rice 2 
Dragons 1 
Chinese medicine 1 
Porcelain 1 
Tee 1 
Human qualities of Chinese people (negative) 1 
Other 9 
Diﬃ  cult to say 24 
Source for the data on pages 48–51: http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/4397.html?no_cache=1&cHash
=b2dfbfaa46&print=1 Th e survey was conducted on 7-8 April 2007. 1600 men/women were asked in 153 towns in 46 oblasts, 
regions (kray) and republics of Russia. Statistical error does not exceed 3.4%. 
Do You Th ink the Following Should Be Limited Or Not? (one answer for each point) 
  Yes More likely 
yes 
More likely 
no 
No 
Diﬃ  cult to 
say
A. Import of goods from 
China to Russia 
2005 29% 32% 24% 11% 4% 
2007 22% 35% 29% 7% 7% 
B. Acquiring of property 
in Russia by Chinese en-
trepreneurs
2005 45% 19% 14% 19% 3% 
2007 43% 31% 12% 8% 6% 
C. Free movement of 
workers from China to 
Russia
2005 43% 26% 15% 13% 3% 
2007 38% 34% 14% 7% 7% 
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Is China Friendly Or Unfriendly Towards Russia? (%)
67
18 16
55
21
24
48
30
21
49
25 25
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Friendly Unfriendly Difficult to say
%
Jun 2001 Oct 2004 Mar 2006 Feb 2007
Which Country Is More Inﬂ uential In Th e World Today, Russia Or China? (%)
73
11
16
64
18 18
64
21
14
63
19 18
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Russia China Difficult to say
%
Jun 2001 Oct 2004 Mar 2006 Feb 2007
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If You Compare Russia And China, Which Country, In Your Opinion, is Developing 
More Successfully, Russia Or China? (%)
20
67
13
20
64
15
18
67
13
21
59
19
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Russia China Difficult to say
%
Jun 2001 Oct 2004 Mar 2006 Feb 2007
Does the Fact that China is Getting Stronger Th reaten Russian Interests Or Not? (%)
41
36
23
39
37
22
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
It does It does not Difficult to say
%
Mar 2006 Feb 2007
Have You Ever Personally Had Dealings With Chinese?
72%
26%
2%
No
Yes
Difficult to say
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Is Your Attitude To Th e Chinese People Positive Or Negative?
50
60
47
23 23 23
27
17
31
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Total population Dealings with Chinese No dealings with Chinese
%
Positive Negative Difficult to say
Source for the data on pages 52–54: http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/countries/china/d070624 Th e survey was conduct-
ed in 100 towns of 44 oblasts, krays and republics of Russia. 3–4 February 2007. 1500 people were questioned. Th e statistical 
error does not exceed 3.6%.
Russian Attitudes Towards Japan
What is Japan To Russia?
50%
12%
10%
6%
6%
16%
Trade and economic partner
Economic and political opponent,
competitor
Friendly state
Strategic partner
Possible opponent, hostile state
Difficult to say
Source:  http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskiiarkhiv/item/single/2014.html?no_cache=1&cHash=7ae2e2e51d&print=1 
Th e survey was conducted by VTsIOM on the 15–16 October 2005. 1579 people in 153 towns in 46 oblasts, regions (kray) and 
republics of Russia. Statistical error does not exceed 3.4%.   
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What Do You Th ink About the Relationship between Russia and Japan Today, Is It 
Good or Bad?
56%
10%
34%
Good
Bad
Difficult to say
On Th e Whole, Are Relations between Russia and Japan Important For Russia or Not?
83%
7%
10%
Important
Not important
Difficult to say
Are the Relations between Russia and Japan Important For Japan or Not?
82%
4%
14%
Important
Not important
Difficult to say
Which Country Is More Inﬂ uential In the World Today, Russia or Japan?
57%
24%
19%
Russia
Japan
Difficult to say
Source: http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/countries/Japan/tb054615
Th e survey was conducted in 100 towns in 44 oblasts, regions (kray) and republics of Russia. Th e interviews were conducted on 
12–13 November 2005. 1500 people were questioned. Additionally 600 people were questioned in Moscow. Statistical error does 
not exceed 3.6 %. 
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Russia’s Nonproliferation Tightrope
By Adam N. Stulberg, Atlanta
Abstract
Russia’s posture towards nuclear nonproliferation seems increasingly schizophrenic. Over the past sev-
eral years, Russia has begun to transition from the primary beneﬁ ciary of western cooperative nuclear 
assistance, to a G-8 partner at redressing other troubled nuclear regions. Moscow also has assumed 
leadership roles working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S., and states 
interested in boosting nuclear power generation to implement creative solutions to reconcile com-
mercial opportunities with nonproliferation objectives. Yet, the Kremlin has simultaneously acceler-
ated strategic nuclear modernization, both to compensate for travails at the conventional level and to 
counter deployment of ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Moreover, its bullish pursuit of interna-
tional nuclear commerce combined with the preoccupation for independently ﬂ exing its energy mus-
cles, either by intention or not, has stoked controversial foreign nuclear activities and frustrated west-
ern eﬀ orts to confront them. 
Moscow Pursues Contradictory Goals
Although a far cry from the strategic contradictions precipitated by the domestic chaos during the initial post-So-
viet years, Russia’s nonproliferation posture nonetheless tests Moscow’s diplomatic skill and international good-
will. Th e Kremlin today must walk a tightrope between demonstrating leadership on nonproliferation issues and 
indulging strategic temptations, both without alienating needed foreign partners or customers. Others, however, 
must avoid over-reacting to Moscow’s parochial gambits, so that mutual beneﬁ ts of cooperation on ﬁ rst-order 
security interests are not lost amid mounting annoyance and acrimony. 
Not surprisingly, Putin’s nuclear diplomacy raises a set of profound questions. First, what is Russia up 
to? What are the dimensions to its policies, and how does it strive to reconcile competing impulses? Second, 
how eﬀ ective is Russia’s posture? Can it sustain the delicate balancing act? Finally, in light of these motives 
and constraints, how can we assess Moscow’s renewed activism in the commercial nuclear and nonprolifera-
tion spheres? What may be gained (or lost) from extending cooperative engagement with Russia? Answers to 
these questions are critical for advancing international partnership with Russia, as well as for strengthening 
the nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
Moscow’s Two Nuclear Faces
Th roughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union served as a bulwark against nuclear proliferation. Its collapse and 
the protracted transition that ensued, however, overtaxed Moscow’s capacity to control its nuclear inheritance, 
let alone to remain a pillar of the global nonproliferation eﬀ ort. Instead, Russia became associated with the prob-
lems of post-Cold War nuclear proliferation, and a supplicant for cooperative assistance to arrest possible leak-
age of indigenous weapons technology, ﬁ ssile material, and scientiﬁ c expertise from the vast and exposed Soviet 
nuclear complex. 
With the country’s economic and political resurgence under President Putin, Russia’s posture noticeably 
started to change even before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Acknowledging Russia’s vulnerability as a “front-
line” state, Putin pronounced nuclear terrorism as the greatest security threat facing the international com-
munity. Th e 2006 “White Paper on Nonproliferation” targeted transnational nuclear networks, as well as 
weak, poorly coordinated, and instrumentally motivated export controls (both national and multilateral) as 
priorities for strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Rhetoric was matched by action, as Russia served as 
a constructive member of the 6-Party talks that negotiated reversal of North Korea’s enrichment and repro-
cessing programs. Moscow also pursued a soft-landing to the stand-oﬀ  between the U.S. and Iran over the 
latter’s nuclear energy program by proposing to create a joint venture for enriching uranium on Russian soil 
and to take back related spent nuclear fuel in return for Tehran’s promise to forgo these indigenous pro-
grams. By the same token, the Russian government took strides towards invigorating cooperative nuclear 
assistance with the U.S., launching a “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism” to improve cooper-
ation on law enforcement against nuclear terrorists, and co-signing recently the ﬁ fth “Bratislava Report” to 
continue progress towards converting the world’s research reactors from using highly enriched uranium to 
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more proliferation resistant low enriched uranium (LEU). Under Putin's direction, legislation was passed 
to give force to a new “umbrella agreement” clarifying legal liability for accidents encountered on assis-
tance projects. Th is was coupled with agreement between the Department of Energy and the Russian Fed-
eral Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom) on key milestones for completion of planned security upgrades 
at warhead and weapons-usable nuclear material sites by the end of 2008, and maintenance of nuclear secu-
rity and accounting systems solely by Russian resources by early 2013.
Yet, Moscow’s simultaneous steps towards revitalizing the nuclear complex have sent conﬂ icting signals. 
Th e Russian leadership, for example, aﬃ  rmed a lower use threshold for nuclear weapons and limited strike 
options as part of its reﬁ ned thinking on deterrence, as well as voiced strong determination to modernize 
all legs (land-, sea-, air-based) of the strategic triad. Th e government also streamlined budgetary outlays for 
development and deployment of modern ICBMs, SLBMs, a nuclear submarine class, and a nuclear cruise 
missile, as well as extended the service-lives of several other systems and broached resumption of around-
the-clock strategic air patrols. At the same time, Moscow endorsed Iran’s essential right to nuclear power, 
going so far as to obstruct harsher sanctions on Tehran by the U.N. Security Council. Against this back-
drop, the Kremlin’s general enthusiasm for the current nuclear energy renaissance, though not a violation 
of international nonproliferation norms per se, has raised concerns about Russia’s mixed motives. In par-
ticular, the Putin regime set its sights on increasing domestic nuclear capacity at least 2.3 times by 2030 
to cover over 25 percent of the country’s electricity demand, as well as on exporting upwards of 60 nuclear 
power plants, including ﬂ oating reactors, and importing foreign-origin spent nuclear fuel over the next two 
decades. To realize these ambitions, the state company, Atomenergoprom, was established in spring 2007. 
Modeled on the predatory gas monopoly, Gazprom, this vertically-integrated state corporation was formally 
charged with uniting commercial components of the nuclear complex to aggressively pursue competitive 
advantages at growing domestic power generation output, developing new nuclear fuel initiatives, leverag-
ing non-governmental ownership of civilian nuclear assets, and expanding reactor construction world-wide. 
Th is was complemented by the October 2007 reorganization of Rosatom into a uniﬁ ed state corporation 
with overall responsibilities for merging regulation of military, industrial, and scientiﬁ c enterprises of the 
nuclear complex, as well as for supervising radiation safety and attracting private investment to propel the 
state’s nuclear program. 
Squaring Circles?
Th ough committed to pursuing multiple objectives, Moscow’s policies recently have focused on reconciling 
strategic opportunism with nonproliferation leadership. Th is is manifest in the indirect, quiet, and proactive 
approaches to dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and advancing the multilateral dialogue on nuclear fuel sup-
ply guarantees.
On the one hand, Putin distanced Russia from the gathering international confrontation with Iran. He 
publicly questioned U.S. and European concerns about the latter’s intentions to develop nuclear weapons, and 
blocked a third set of tougher U.N. sanctions until the IAEA reports on Tehran’s past nuclear activities by the 
end of 2007. During his historic October 2007 visit to Iran, he reassured his hosts of Russia’s commitment 
to complete construction of the Bushehr reactor and his belief in their peaceful objectives. Assuming a “no 
news is good news” orientation towards Tehran’s plans for nuclear weapons, Putin condemned talk of a west-
ern military strike as “disproportionate and incommensurate” with Iran’s actions, as well as trumpeted prog-
ress towards denuclearizing North Korea as the model for stepping back from the brink. 
On the other hand, by the end of 2006 Russia began quietly to ratchet up pressure on Iran to comply with 
international demands for transparency. Noticeably miﬀ ed by Tehran’s snubbing of earlier oﬀ ers to provide 
sub-contracting services for Iran’s uranium-enrichment, Putin endorsed two rounds of moderate sanctions 
imposed by the U.N. Security Council. Th is was followed in 2007 by construction delays at the Bushehr reac-
tor that coincided with escalation of American and French pressure on Tehran. Frustrated by Iran’s failure to 
meet more than 60 percent of its ﬁ nancial obligations by the end of 2006 and by subsequent shortfalls col-
lecting on the agreed $25 million per month, as well as by attendant troubles with receiving parts from third 
parties, the Russian project contractor, Atomstroyexport, openly questioned the proﬁ tability of the deal and 
pushed back the operational launch of the reactor by a year to late 2008, despite having completed over 90 
percent of the construction. Although dismissive of Iranian accusations of being in political cahoots with the 
west, Putin nonetheless refused to specify when Russia might supply the needed nuclear fuel, on grounds that 
the international seals and safeguards necessary for transport have not been readied. Despite Tehran’s vehe-
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ment rejection of an outstanding debt and lures of additional reactor contracts to Russia to expedite techni-
cal support, Moscow has continued to drag its feet. By presenting Russia as a sober-minded commercial and 
political partner for Tehran, while indirectly slowing development of the Bushehr reactor, Putin has sought 
to position Russia to wrest commercial concessions from Tehran and garner greater international stature as a 
constructive mediator.
Similarly, Moscow took the initiative to mitigate potential proliferation externalities attendant to the pro-
jected global expansion of nuclear commerce. Emboldened by the IAEA’s promotion of multilateral guarantees 
for nuclear fuel service, Putin oﬀ ered to create on Russian soil the ﬁ rst of a series of enrichment centers under 
international safeguards. Th roughout 2006, this evolved into a workable plan for converting the under-utilized 
Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Combine into the ﬁ rst “non-discriminatory and transparent” enrichment cen-
ter, open to all states intent on developing nuclear power that lack the indigenous capability and are members 
in good standing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Russia urged potential partners to accept the IAEA’s 
“additional protocol” for more stringent safeguards, and in October 2007 Putin signed a bill to ratify such 
an agreement with the international watchdog as an imprimatur. Th e center marked a step towards not only 
boosting business for national ﬁ rms but enhancing conﬁ dence in enrichment supply via inter-governmental 
and commercial contracts that would allow members to invest and share in ownership, management, and prof-
its, without providing foreign access to sensitive enrichment technology. Th e ﬁ rst deal was inked with Kazakh-
stan in May 2007 for joint uranium mining, nuclear reactor development, and supply of LEU for Kazakh fuel 
fabrication. Th is was followed by proposals to Ukraine, with expectations that similar discussions with Arme-
nia, Belarus, South Africa, and the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization would soon follow. In 
October 2007, Russia oﬀ ered to place under international managerial control a reserve of $300 million worth 
of LEU by the beginning of 2008 to jump-start the IAEA’s promotion of an international “fuel bank.” Despite 
ambiguities concerning future funding, membership eligibility, administration, and environmental and safe-
guards procedures, the international community, led by the IAEA and U.S., welcomed the center as integral 
to an emerging multilateral framework for implementing workable nonproliferation measures to stem the dif-
fusion of dual-use enrichment and reprocessing technologies among nuclear power-seeking nations. 
Beyond the Kremlin’s Grasp
Th e success of this delicate diplomatic maneuvering, however, hinges ultimately on factors beyond the Krem-
lin’s direct control. Although the movement towards an international showdown with Iran presents opportu-
nities to carve out an independent role, Russia possesses few reliable levers to direct the sides towards a peace-
ful resolution. More generally, Moscow lacks the economic muscle to assert leadership over international 
nuclear commerce and nonproliferation. Russian suppliers do not enjoy market power at the front- or back-
ends of the nuclear fuel cycle, and also face manufacturing bottlenecks for key technologies, such as reac-
tor turbines and centrifuges, that together constrain immediate prospects for leveraging commercial transac-
tions for political eﬀ ect. As evidenced by the September 2007 deal for the delivery of 4,000 tons of uranium 
from Australia, Russia will remain dependent on imports (with no control over prices) to meet the expected 
rise in domestic demand, let alone to satisfy ambitions to fuel foreign reactors. Similarly, the joint venture 
with Kazakhstan is limited by the latter’s commitments to diversifying uranium exports and delving deeper 
into fuel assembly markets tailored primarily to western reactor standards. As with other commercial nuclear 
deals with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine, as well as with the earlier program to import foreign-origin 
spent nuclear fuel, Russia is commercially handcuﬀ ed at imposing responsibilities on its partners and exploit-
ing these arrangements to secure favorable debt-equity stakes in foreign enterprises. Together with interna-
tional concerns about Russia’s willingness to meet the IAEA’s safeguards requirements, as well as about prom-
ises not to divert imported uranium and related technologies to military purposes or to withhold deliveries 
for political reasons, the economics of global nuclear commerce do not augur well for Moscow to dictate the 
strategic terms for engagement. 
Th e recentralization of the nuclear complex also has not necessarily conferred greater state control. Redun-
dant and ambiguous lines of authority between new agencies tasked with managing the nuclear sector create 
conditions ripe for rivalry between federal and regional oﬃ  ces, civilian and military bureaucracies, and the 
security services and diplomatic corps. Th is, in turn, is likely to perpetuate problems associated with unreli-
able foreign access to Russia’s nuclear sector and funding shortages for key non-commercial activities, such as 
nuclear safeguards, safety, and environmental protection. It also is not clear that state subsidies and opaque cor-
porate governance structures can allay anxieties facing minority private investors or improve the proﬁ tability 
of the nuclear industry. Moreover, corruption remains a problem across the nuclear fuel complex, as evidenced 
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by constant complaints of “vanishing” investment funds, bribe-taking and abuse of oﬃ  ce by oﬃ  cial managers, 
and the rising incidence of “non-accidental death and desertion” among guard units assigned to the nuclear 
cities. In short, practical gaps between centralization and control limit the Kremlin’s institutional wherewithal 
to balance its nuclear commercial and nonproliferation ambitions. 
Th e Way Ahead
Upon closer inspection, there is both more and less to the Kremlin’s nuclear nonproliferation posture. Th ere is 
more in the sense that the leadership has undertaken concrete measures to parlay the country’s economic, politi-
cal and strategic resurgence into grandiose commercial pursuits while maintaining sincere commitments to con-
taining the diﬀ usion of nuclear weapons and ﬁ ssile material. At the same time, there is less to Moscow’s statecraft 
and capacity to exert stewardship over the nuclear policies of other states, given deep-seated market and institu-
tional barriers. Despite Moscow’s strategic activism, it can neither dominate regional decision-making or mar-
kets, nor impose via administrative ﬁ at a predatory nuclear leviathan on par with its presence in the gas sector.
Yet, Moscow’s predicament oﬀ ers prospects for revitalizing global nonproliferation. Irrespective of the con-
straints on unilateralism, the international community stands to beneﬁ t from engaging Moscow in the search 
for creative solutions to regional problems and credible nuclear fuel service guarantees. By forging new part-
nerships with Russia to extend its newfound resources and vast experiences with cooperative nuclear assistance 
to other troubled regions, the U.S. and others not only can avert costly nuclear showdowns that advance their 
own interests, but can oﬀ er mutually advantageous opportunities for Russia to reclaim its stature as a global 
leader of nonproliferation. 
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Opinions of the Russian Population on Nuclear Proliferation
Russia’s Nuclear Cooperation with Iran is Worrying Western States. Should Russia 
Continue or Cease Nuclear Cooperation with Iran ?
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What is Your Opinion on Possible “Precision Strikes” against Nuclear Installations or 
Camps of the “Iranian Revolutionary Guard” in Iran?
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Source: Opinion survey by the Levada Insitute, 15 October 2007, http://www.levada.ru./press/2007101504.html
International Opinion Survey on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
Do You See the Spread of Nuclear Weapons as the Greatest or Second Greatest Th reat to 
the World?
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Do You Favor or Oppose Iran Acquiring Nuclear Weapons?
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tudes Survey. Released: 27 June 2007, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf, 28.6.2007, p. 47 and 52
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What will the Th reat to Your Country Be if Iran Acquires Nuclear Weapons?
Global Unease With Major World Powers. Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey. 47-Nation Pew Global Atti-
tudes Survey. Released: 27 June 2007, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf, 28.6.2007, p. 53
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As You May Know, Some People Are Concerned about Recent Developments in Russia. 
Th ose Who Are Concerned Give a Number of Diﬀ erent Reasons. To What Extent Are 
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Documentation: Th e Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) 
Th e NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and 
weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of 
achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Th e Treaty represents the only bind-
ing commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened 
for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended in-
deﬁ nitely. A total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty, including the ﬁ ve nuclear-weapon States. More coun-
tries have ratiﬁ ed the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the 
Treaty's signiﬁ cance. 
Th e provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the operation of 
the Treaty every ﬁ ve years, a provision which was reaﬃ  rmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review 
and Extension Conference.
To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a conﬁ dence-building measure between States parties, the 
Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. 
Th e Treaty promotes cooperation in the ﬁ eld of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technol-
ogy for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of ﬁ ssile material for weapons use.
Th e 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) met at the United Nations in New York from 2 to 27 May 2005. A total of 153 States parties to the 
Treaty participated in the event. Th e Conference was unable to produce a consensus substantive outcome on 
the review of the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Several of the Conference side events, such 
as the Mayors for Peace appeal, in particular commemorated the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Source: http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/index.html
Four states with nuclear weapons are not parties to the NPT: India, Israel, North Korea (withdrawal in 2003) 
and Pakistan.
Nuclear Powers 
Country Warheads active/total Year of ﬁ rst test
Five nuclear weapons states from the NPT
Russia 5,830 / 16,000 1949 (“RDS-1”)
United States 5,163 / 9,938 1945 (“Trinity”)
United Kingdom 750 1952 (“Hurricane”)
France 350 1960 (“Gerboise Bleue”)
China 130 1964 (“596”)
Other known nuclear powers
India 70–120 1974 (“Smiling Buddha”)
Pakistan 30–80 1998 (“Chagai-I”)
North Korea 1–10 2006 (“Th e Beginning”) 
Undeclared nuclear weapons states
Israel 75–200 unknown or 1979 (“Vela Incident”)
Source: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons
For the full text of the Treaty, see: http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf
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US-Russian Bering Sea Marine Border Dispute: Conﬂ ict over Strategic 
Assets, Fisheries and Energy Resources
By Vlad M. Kaczynski, Warsaw School of Economics1
Abstract
Despite the universal implementation of the Law of the Sea principles in deﬁ ning national sovereignty 
over coastal waters and the end of the Cold War, Russia continues to press marine border disputes 
with several neighboring countries. Th e most important conﬂ icts are with the United States, Norway, 
and Japan. Fortunately, these are not military confrontations, but political disputes over the econom-
ically and strategically important marine regions claimed by all four countries. At stake are strategic 
considerations, abundant ﬁ sh resources and large oil and gas deposits at the bottom of the sea. Th is 
article discusses the history of the US-Russian conﬂ ict, the viewpoints of both sides, and the impact 
of this dispute on access to marine living resources of the area. 
Historical Overview
In 1867 the United States purchased the territory of Alaska, acquiring nearly 600,000 square miles of new ter-
ritory. Th e land was purchased for $7.2 million or approximately 2 cents per acre. Th e purchase agreement 
deﬁ ned a marine boundary between Russia and the newly acquired US territory. Th is boundary was readdressed 
in a 1990 treaty, commonly known as the Baker-Shevardnadze Agreement, between the United States and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 
With the collapse of the USSR, the Russian government has taken the position that the Baker-Shevard-
nadze Agreement was invalid since USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze did not eﬀ ectively represent 
Russian interests. Consequently, Russia refused to ratify the agreement, thus placing the United States in the 
position of negotiating in order to seek a modiﬁ ed treaty. One of Russia’s key demands in revising the treaty 
is its desire to secure cross-border ﬁ shery quotas for its vessels, particularly gaining access to Alaska’s Pollock 
stocks. However, the US ultimately rejected this Russian request. From the Russian perspective, there is no 
deﬁ nitive agreement deﬁ ning the marine border between the two countries although international law favors 
the US position. Absent ratiﬁ cation of the 1990 agreement or other arrangements, this conﬂ ict in the Bering 
Sea will continue.
Russian–American Dispute over the Bering Sea Marine Boundary Line
When the United States purchased Alaska from the Russian government, mutually accepted marine claims were 
limited to a narrow band of the coastal zone. However, the 1867 Treaty contained language which deﬁ ned a 
boundary between the two nations through the Bering Sea. Over time, and in particular when the Law of the 
Sea principles started to govern the world’s oceans, the 1867 Treaty line became the most contentious marine 
boundary in the world. Unfortunately, the language of the purchase agreement between Russia and the US is 
silent on the type of line, map projection and horizontal datum used to depict this boundary. Further, neither 
country has produced the original or other authenticated maps used during the negotiations to resolve the issue. 
Diﬀ erences in deﬁ ning this line fuel the continuing conﬂ ict.
Cartographers normally use two types of lines to delineate marine boundaries. Th ese are rhomb lines and geo-
detic lines (also known as great circle arcs) that are used on two common map projections, Mercator and conical. 
Depending on the type of line and map projection used, lines will either appear as straight or curved lines. For 
example, a rhomb line will be a straight line on a Mercator projection, whereas a geodetic line is curved. Because 
each country interpreted the line described in the 1867 Treaty as a straight line, the Soviet Union depicted the 
Bering Sea marine boundary as a rhomb line on a Mercator projection whereas the US used a geodetic line on a 
conical projection. While both appear as straight lines on their respective map projections, each country’s claim 
maximized the amount of ocean area and seaﬂ oor under their respective control. Figure 1 overleaf depicts marine 
borders between the Russian Federation and the United States showing the diﬀ erences resulting from the dif-
1  Th is study was prepared using the research ﬁ ndings and studies of School of Marine Studies’ graduate students 
Mr. Jeﬀ  Randall, Mr. Greg Cassad and Mr. Artur Soule under the aegis of the University of Washington courses 
“Russian Ocean Policy” and “Comparative Marine Business in the North Paciﬁ c: Russia, Japan, Canada and the 
United States” jointly listed by the Russian, East European and Central Asia Studies Center and School of Ma-
rine Aﬀ airs, University of Washington. Both courses are oﬀ ered by Prof. Vlad Kaczynski.
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ferent interpretations of 
the borderline in this 
sea area. 
When the United 
States and the Soviet 
Union implemented 
200 nautical mile 
Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZ) in 1977, 
they exchanged dip-
lomatic notes indi-
cating their intent “to 
respect the line set 
forth in the 1867 Con-
vention” as the limit to 
each countries’ ﬁ sheries 
jurisdiction where the 
two hundred nautical 
mile boundaries over-
lapped. Shortly there-
after the diﬀ erences in 
each country’s inter-
pretation of the 1867 
Treaty became appar-
ent, placing an area of 
nearly 15,000 square 
nautical miles in dis-
pute. While the two 
countries agreed to 
continue respecting 
each other’s interpreta-
tion of the 1867 Treaty 
as an interim measure, 
negotiations began in the early 1980s to resolve the diﬀ ering interpretations. Soviet negotiators had speciﬁ c 
instructions from the Politburo to “insist on a straight line boundary.” 
Some authors speculate that Soviet negotiators may have ceded territory in the Bering Sea to the US in 
order to quell the US objections the Soviet Union’s proposed division of territory north of the Bering Strait. 
Following nearly a decade of negotiations, a new agreement was reached between the two countries in 1990. 
Th e 1990 agreement split the diﬀ erence between the US claim to a geodetic line and the Soviet claim to a 
rhomb line as shown on a Mercator projection. It also created several “special areas.”2 Although both coun-
tries ceded territory from their previous claims, the US still controlled a far greater amount of area in the Ber-
ing Sea than if the new agreement had been based on the equidistant line principle normally used in interna-
tional boundary disputes. 
Marine Resources 
Th e 1990 Agreement “represents a very favorable outcome in terms of US strategic and resource interests…” and 
was quickly ratiﬁ ed by the US Congress, which was eager to begin the sale of oﬀ shore oil and gas leases. Th e US 
Minerals Management Service recently estimated the potential oil and gas reserves in the Bering and Chukchi 
Seas at 24 billion barrels of oil and 126 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. In addition, ﬁ sh harvests from this 
2  Special areas were areas on either country’s respective side of the 1867 marine boundary but beyond 200nm from 
the baseline. Th ere were three such areas on the United States side of the marine boundary called “eastern special 
areas” and one on the Russian side called the “western special area.” In the language of the 1990 Marine Boundary 
Agreement, Russia ceded all claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the eastern special areas to the United 
States and conversely the United States ceded all claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the western special 
area to Russia. 
Figure 1 – Depiction of the Diﬀ erences Between the Bering Sea 
Marine Boundary Using Rhomb and Geodetic Lines on a Mercator 
Projection
Rhomb
line 
Russian 
Federation 
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region are vital to the ﬁ shing industries of 
both countries. US ﬁ sheries alone harvest 
over two million metric tons of ﬁ sh from 
the Bering Sea each year and it is the dis-
pute over access and harvesting rights to 
these ﬁ sheries resources which have fueled 
much of the rising dissent within Russia 
towards the 1990 Agreement.
Although the U.S. quickly ratiﬁ ed 
the 1990 Agreement, the Soviet Union, 
prior to its collapse, did not ratify the 
Agreement. 
Th e US and Russian Positions
When the agreement was signed, provi-
sional arrangements were made by each 
country to abide by its terms until rati-
ﬁ cation, but resistance to the ratiﬁ cation 
of the 1990 agreement has continued to 
rise within Russia along with accusations 
of conceding to American interests. Th e 
Moscow Times stated that Gorbachev, in his 
enthusiastic pursuit of good bilateral rela-
tions with the US, rushed into signing the 
1990 agreement. Other claims suggest that 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze exceeded 
his authority by signing the 1990 agreement with the US. Many accuse Gorbachev and Shevardnadze of ceding 
Russia’s rightful ﬁ shing areas in their haste to negotiate a deal for signature at the 1990 White House Summit. 
“Russian parliamentarians understood perfectly well that the agreement infringed upon Russia’s interests and 
therefore the document has never been ratiﬁ ed by the Russian parliament,” these critics say. Other Russian oﬃ  -
cials have voiced their opposition to the treaty not only because of lost ﬁ shing opportunities, but also due to the 
loss of potential oil and gas ﬁ elds and naval passages for submarines. Many seek a new treaty “that would settle 
claims and protect Russian ﬁ shermen.” 
Russian Far East ﬁ sheries industry stakeholders assert that 150,000 metric tons of ﬁ shing quotas from US 
waters should be given to Russian ﬁ shermen as compensation for the area lost in the 1990 agreement and to 
earn their support for ratiﬁ cation of the treaty. A senior Russian Consulate oﬃ  cer stated:
“I don’t remember ﬁ gures, but as far as I remember there was something said about 150,000 tons of Pollock 
compensation in an annual quota from the American side if the treaty is to be ratiﬁ ed.” 
Personal communications with Russian sources indicate that this ﬁ gure may have arisen from estimates 
of ﬁ sh abundance or Russian harvests in the disputed area between the two countries in the 1980s. However, 
given that most Bering Sea ﬁ sh stocks are considered fully utilized or even depleted, it is unlikely that this 
quota demand will be granted. 
From the Russian viewpoint, the 1990 agreement remains in limbo. Eﬀ orts to ratify it have raised dissent 
and opposition, making the boundary set forth in the 1990 agreement more fragile as time progresses. 
However, the US has steadfastly continued to abide by and enforce the provisions of the 1990 agreement. 
Th e US position may provide evidence of a continued “general state practice” and a basis under customary inter-
national law that the boundary delineated by the 1990 agreement is the actual marine boundary between the 
two countries. Determination of a state practice in customary international law requires evidence of “general 
state practice” and “opinio juris” – a sense of obligation to comply with the practice. Th e United States’ contin-
ued position and enforcement of the boundary prescribed by the 1990 agreement builds evidence of the gen-
eral state practice that the 1990 agreement is the marine border between the two countries.
Figure 2 – Map Showing the 1990 Marine Boundary 
Line with the Special Areas
RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 
78 Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perovic, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder (eds.)
Challenging Russian 
Activities
However, the recent actions of 
Russian ﬁ shing vessels are desta-
bilizing the situation. From April 
through November of each year, 
dozens of Russian ﬁ shing vessels 
ﬁ sh along this boundary to inter-
cept Pollock migrating from US 
waters. Th e number and harvest-
ing capacity of the ﬁ shing vessels 
operating along this border raises 
serious concerns among US ﬁ sher-
ies managers that the Pollock stock 
is being overexploited by Russian 
ﬁ shermen. While near continu-
ous Coast Guard aircraft and ves-
sel patrols attempt to protect the 
integrity of the U.S. EEZ, the bel-
ligerence of the Russian ﬁ shing ves-
sels towards US enforcement eﬀ orts 
continues to increase. In one nota-
ble case, more than a dozen Russian 
ﬁ shing vessels surrounded a Coast 
Guard vessel while it was trying to 
seize the Russian ﬁ shing vessel GIS-
SAR for illegal ﬁ shing. Th e Russian 
ﬁ shing vessels threatened to ram the 
Coast Guard vessel if it tried to seize 
and escort the GISSAR oﬀ  the ﬁ shing grounds. Many Russian vessels simply refuse to submit to Coast Guard 
inspections when caught inside the US EEZ. Th e situation has become so enﬂ amed that the US is contemplat-
ing the use of naval gunﬁ re, in the form of warning and disabling shots, against non-compliant vessels. Such a 
resort to violence may only further destabilize the situation. 
Searching for Solutions 
Against this background, talks between the US State Department and Russian oﬃ  cials have begun in an attempt 
to resolve the issue. However, the United States maintains its staunch position that the 1990 agreement is bind-
ing and constitutes the marine border between the two countries. While there was an oﬀ er to concede some 
ﬁ sh quotas to the Russian Federation as an incentive for ratiﬁ cation in 1997, this oﬀ er has recently been with-
drawn. From the Russian perspective, there is no deﬁ nitive agreement regarding the marine border between the 
two countries although international law favors the US position. However, absent ratiﬁ cation of the 1990 agree-
ment or other arrangements, this conﬂ ict in the Bering Sea will likely continue.
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Th e Kuril Islands Dispute Between Russia and Japan: Perspectives of 
Th ree Ocean Powers
By Vlad M. Kaczynski, Warsaw School of Economics
Abstract
Japan and Russia have never come to an agreement over the ownership of the four southern Kuril Islands 
and therefore have never signed a peace treaty at the end of World War II. Russia currently occupies 
the islands, but Japan claims them as Japanese territory. Th e Soviet Union exerted ﬁ rm control over the 
islands. Under Yeltsin, Russia’s position seemed to weaken, but no progress was achieved in signing a 
peace treaty. Since Putin’s rise to power, neither side has been willing to make concessions and the sit-
uation remains stalemated. 
Introduction
Th e ﬁ ghting in World War II ended on August 14, 1945 when Japan capitulated to the American Paciﬁ c forces. 
Subsequently, the September 8, 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference oﬃ  cially ended hostilities between the 
United States and Japan. However, in the 62 years since the end of the war, Japan and Russia have failed to sign 
a peace treaty ending the conﬂ ict between them. 
Th e main reason for this failure is a border dispute over four small islands in the Kuril chain oﬀ  the north-
ern coast of Japan’s Hokkaido Island. Th e Japanese refer to these islands as the Northern Territories. 
Th e Kuril Archipelago extends for 750 miles (1,200 km) from the southern tip of Russia’s Kamchatka Pen-
insula to the northeastern coast of Japan’s Hokkaido Island. Th e 56 islands cover 6,000 square miles (15,600 sq 
km) and, together with Sakhalin Island, form an administrative region of Russia. Th e Kurils were originally 
settled by the Russians in the 17th – 18th centuries. Japan initially seized the southern islands and in 1875 
obtained the entire chain. After World War II, they were ceded to the Soviet Union, the Japanese population 
repatriated and replaced by Soviet citizens. Japan still claims ownership of the four southern islands and has 
tried repeatedly to regain them.
An associated controversy concerns the status of Sakhalin Island, a large island northwest of Hokkaido 
(approximately 589 miles or 948 km long). It had been settled by Russians and Japanese for centuries but in 
1875 Japan and Russia agreed that Japan would give Sakhalin Island to Russia in exchange for 18 Kuril Islands. 
Th en, following the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, Japan regained control of Sakhalin Island south of 50° lati-
tude. Japan then took control of the entire island following the Russian Revolution of 1917, but abandoned the 
island in 1924. Finally, at the end of World War II, the Soviet Union took control of the entire island, along 
with the Kurils, and forced the Japanese population out.
Both the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island are tectonically and volcanically active. A large earthquake in 
1995 killed approximately 2,000 people on Sakhalin, whose total island population is about 680,000. Th e 
Kurils are home to about 35 active volcanoes. 
Th e Kuril Islands are administered by Russian authorities on Sakhalin Island. Never large, the popula-
tion declined to about 16,000 following a major earthquake in 1994. Currently, some 3,500 border troops, 
far fewer than in Soviet times, remain to guard the territory. During the Soviet period, the islands were con-
sidered a vital garrison outpost. Th e military valued the island chain’s role in protecting the Sea of Okhotsk, 
where Soviet strategic submarines were located. Th e major industries are ﬁ sh processing, ﬁ shing, and crab-
bing, much of which is illegal. Once pampered and highly paid by the Soviet government, the Kuril island-
ers were neglected by Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Of necessity, the inhabitants are devel-
oping closer ties with northern Japan.
Th e Japanese Claim
Th e dispute between the two countries centers on controlling the four southernmost Kuril Islands, which were 
taken over by the Soviet Union in 1945. Japan claims that these islands are part of Japan, as they have always 
been visible with the naked eye from the Japanese island of Hokkaido and appear on centuries-old maps of Japan 
as being part of Japan. 
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At the San Francisco Peace Conference, Japan 
agreed to give up any claim to Sakhalin and the 
Kuril Islands north of the four closest to Japan – Shiko-
tan, Etorofu, Kunashiri and the tiny Habomai island 
group. At the time, Japan also agreed to give up con-
trol of Korea, Taiwan, the South China Sea islands, 
Penghu, and its Antarctic territory. 
Th e Soviet Union refused to agree to these terms 
and did not sign the peace treaty. Since that time, the 
Russian Federation replaced the Soviet Union and has 
agreed to re-examine the issue of the Kurils. 
Th e US Perspective 
Th ere are two prevalent misconceptions about the U.S. 
government’s policies on the Kuril – Northern Ter-
ritories – Islands dispute. Th e ﬁ rst is that President 
Roosevelt agreed at the Yalta Conference to cede “all” of 
the Kurils to the Soviet Union. In fact, the Yalta agree-
ment never used the word “all” and it was only during August 1945, in a series of exchanges between Stalin and 
Truman, that Truman agreed in General Order No. 1 to grant the USSR occupation rights to “all” of the Kurils, 
including the southernmost islands traditionally considered to be part of Hokkaido. Th e Department of State’s 
interpretation of the Yalta agreement and General Order No. 1 was that the Soviet occupation of the southern-
most Kuril islands was intended to be a temporary military occupation only, until a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty 
transferred sovereignty of the Kurils to the USSR. 
Th e second misconception concerns the so-called “Dulles Th reat Incident” of 1956, when Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles told Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu that if Japan gave up its claim against the 
USSR for the southern Kurils, then the United States might feel obliged to retain Okinawa in perpetuity. A 
large number of scholars, and especially Soviet scholars, have claimed that Dulles’s “threat” was intended to 
torpedo the renewal of friendly Japanese-Soviet relations. Newly declassiﬁ ed documents show, however, that 
Dulles was actually trying to help the Japanese negotiators by oﬀ ering them American-backed leverage against 
the Soviet Union. Contrary to many scholarly criticisms, the United States government’s policy on the Kuril 
Island dispute has been consistent in stating that in the absence of an oﬃ  cial peace treaty, the disputed islands 
remain Japanese territory.
Th e Russian View
Japan and Russia made some progress in negotiating the Kuril problem during the Yeltsin era. During the 1990s, 
the Kremlin seemed ready to recognize Japan’s territorial claims to the islands of Iturup, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and 
Habomai and cede them to Japan, as documented by several intergovernmental documents. Th ese texts include 
the Tokyo and Moscow declarations of 1993 and 1998 and the “Agreement on cooperation in ﬁ shing for living 
marine resources” signed also in 1998. Th ese documents expressed both countries’ willingness to conclude a peace 
treaty in 2000 and to “…enter the 21st century as trustworthy and eﬃ  cient partners.” However, under Putin, 
the Kremlin was ﬁ rm in asserting Russian sovereignty over the islands and the problem remains unresolved. 
Th e Soviet Union’s position rejecting Japan’s territorial claims to the southern Kuril Islands was ﬁ rm and 
based on “corresponding international agreements”. Th ese islands constitute more than 50 percent of the land 
surface of the whole archipelago and include the two largest islands, Iturup and Kunashiri. Th e Soviet view 
was last oﬃ  cially expressed in 1989. 
Th e major points of the Soviet position were that: 
a) Th e USSR holds the exclusive right to develop the southern Kurils; 
b) When these islands were part of Japan, they were used as a springboard for aggression toward neighboring 
countries, in particular to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941 and Soviet civilian ships during World War II, when 
a neutrality pact between Russia and Japan was in force; 
Fig 1. Map of Kuril Claims 
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c) Japan was an aggressor state in World War II. It was deprived of a part of its territory, including all Kuril 
Islands, as punishment by the winning countries, for its aggression against many nations.
d) Revising these international arrangements is tantamount to questioning the results of World War II. 
e) Th e Soviet Union demonstrated its intention to promote cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual 
beneﬁ ts as well as to “secure post-war borderlines between Russia and Japan.”
Th e problem seemed to be closed as Japan, by signing a variety of agreements, de facto recognized the Rus-
sian occupation of the four islands. However the general weakening of the state in the late Soviet period and 
internal frictions between Gorbachev and Yeltsin in their race for power made Soviet foreign policy and the 
“Kurils issue,” in particular, a weapon of this struggle.
During the ﬁ nal days of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin’s allies began to speak in support of a proposal to cede, 
or to sell, the islands to Japan at the cost of US $20–50 billion. During his visit to Japan in 1990, Yeltsin pro-
posed a “ﬁ ve-staged program for settling territorial claims”. Th e plan consisted of: 
1) oﬃ  cially recognizing the “Kuril problem”, 
2) demilitarizing the islands, 
3) declaring the territory a zone of free enterprise, 
4) signing a peace treaty and establishing “uniﬁ ed management” over  the islands, and 
5) a complete overview of the Kuril issue by a future generation of politicians.
During his presidency, Yeltsin never removed his ﬁ ve-point plan from the governmental agenda, but, at the 
same time, he never made it public at the oﬃ  cial level. Nevertheless, this plan might have been, and still may 
be, a “secret” foundation for the Kremlin’s policy toward the Kurils. Besides, these islands were never men-
tioned as a part of Russian territory, which was seen by many Russian specialists as absolutely inadmissible in 
such documents.
Th e Yeltsin-era Tokyo and Moscow Declarations both recognize the claim of Japan to the four islands. Th e 
Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956, to which Tokyo regularly refers as the basis for its bilateral relation-
ship, talks about a probable transfer of Habomai and Shikotan, the two smaller islands, and does not mention the 
larger islands of Kunashiri and Iturup. Th is transfer would take place only after the signing of a peace treaty. 
Unlike similar documents of the past, neither the Tokyo nor Moscow Declarations have been ratiﬁ ed as 
intergovernmental agreements by the Russian parliament. Some have speculated that Yeltsin’s administration 
did not submit these documents for ratiﬁ cation because it was aware of their disadvantageous content for Rus-
sia, leading to their ultimate rejection by the legislators.
Even though Yeltsin’s ﬁ ve-stage plan was never oﬃ  cially approved, key components of it have been imple-
mented. Th us, the ﬁ rst stage, recognition of the problem, was accomplished quickly and without any serious 
problems in 1994–1996.
Th e second stage, demilitarization of the islands, was implemented with no less success. As a result, there 
are only frontier posts and small naval units based on the Kurils at present. However, Russians claim that the 
Japanese armed forces in Hokkaido have increased in number and strengthened their combat capabilities due 
to additional state-of-the-art armament.
Japan interpreted the Russian military drawdown in the 1990s as a sign of Russia’s weakness and exerted 
unprecedented pressure on this part of Russia’s territory by authorizing Japanese ﬁ shing boats to operate in Rus-
sia’s 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone around the southern Kurils. As a result, the number of ﬁ shing violations 
grew to ten thousand. Under these circumstances, the then-commander of the Federal Frontier Troops General 
A. Nikolayev received permission to use force to protect Russian waters, including ﬁ ring at Japanese ships.
Th e subsequent confrontation threatened Yeltsin’s entire plan. Prompt diplomatic arrangements were 
made and negotiations to allow Japanese boats to ﬁ sh in Russia’s territorial waters were held between the two 
countries. 
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Th e third stage, encouraging free enterprise, was implemented by allowing Japanese citizens to visit the 
Kurils without a visa, negotiation of the ﬁ shery agreement in 1998, Japan’s humanitarian aid to inhabitants of 
the islands, and an appeal by Russian authorities to Japanese business circles to invest in the region.
Th e fourth stage of the plan, signing a peace treaty, has yet to be achieved. In 1999, Yeltsin’s team rejected 
the idea of signing a peace treaty for the ﬁ rst time, even though this idea had been proclaimed in the 1993 and 
1998 Declarations. Th is treaty was to deﬁ ne comprehensive approaches for future Russian-Japanese coopera-
tion in all areas including “the issue of a boundary solution”. 
Unfortunately, Putin has made no progress in signing a treaty. His attitude toward Japan’s territorial claims 
is clearly expressed in his repeated statements about the integrity of Russia’s territory and especially in his state-
ment in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on September 3, 1999: “Does anyone say that the government plans to cede the 
Kurils? We negotiate, we acknowledge the problem, but transfer of the Kurils is out of the question”. With nei-
ther side willing to make territorial concessions, the situation is stalemated.
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Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea – Cooperation and Conﬂ ict in 
Fisheries Management
By Geir Hønneland, the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Oslo, Norway
Abstract
Th e Barents Sea ﬁ sheries are managed bilaterally by Norway and Russia. Th e Joint Norwegian–Rus-
sian Fisheries Commission sets quotas for the most important ﬁ sh stocks in the area which are allo-
cated according to a standard formula. Th e collaboration between the two countries generally func-
tions well, but has since the late 1990s been plagued by disparity between scientiﬁ c recommendations 
and established quotas, and Norwegian claims of Russian overﬁ shing. 
Establishing an Institutional Framework
Th e Barents Sea comprises those parts of the Arctic Ocean that lie between the Norwegian mainland, the Sval-
bard archipelago and the Russian archipelagos Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land. Traditionally, the ﬁ sh and 
marine mammals of the Barents Sea have provided the basis for settlement along its shores, particularly in North-
ern Norway and in the Arkhangelsk region of Russia. Since the Russian Revolution in 1917, the city of Mur-
mansk on the Kola Peninsula has functioned as the nerve center of the Russian “northern ﬁ shery basin,” sec-
ond only in importance in the country to its “far eastern ﬁ shery basin.” Th e commercially most important ﬁ sh 
stock in the Barents Sea is the Northeast Arctic cod, by far the largest of the approximately 30 cod stocks in the 
North Atlantic. 
Th e United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1975–82) led to a transition from multilateral 
negotiations for the Barents Sea ﬁ sheries under the auspices of the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC ) to bilateral negotiations between coastal states with sovereign rights to ﬁ sh stocks. Norway and the 
Soviet Union entered into several bilateral ﬁ shery co-operation agreements in the mid-1970s. Th e Norwegian–
Russian management regime for the Barents Sea ﬁ sh stocks deﬁ nes objectives and practices for co-operative 
management between the two states within the ﬁ elds of research, regulation and compliance control . 
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Th e co-operation between Russian/Soviet and Norwegian scientists in the mapping of the Barents Sea ﬁ sh 
resources dates back to the 1950s. It is now institutionalized under the framework of  the International Coun-
cil for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). Quota settlement and technical regulation of ﬁ sheries are taken care 
of by the Joint Norwegian– (Soviet/)Russian Fisheries Commission, which has met annually since 1976. Th e 
Commission includes members of the two countries’ ﬁ shery authorities, ministries of foreign aﬀ airs, marine 
scientists and representatives of ﬁ shers’ organizations. Most importantly, it sets total allowable catches (TACs) 
for the three ﬁ sh stocks that are deﬁ ned as joint stocks of the two countries: cod, haddock and capelin. Cod 
and haddock are shared on a 50–50 basis, while the capelin quota is shared 60–40 in Norway’s favor. Finally, 
cooperation in compliance control was initiated in 1993, after the Norwegian Coast Guard had revealed con-
siderable Russian overﬁ shing following Russian vessels’ new practice of delivering most of their catch to Nor-
wegian ports instead of Murmansk. Th is collaboration includes the exchange of catch data and inspectors, as 
well as the harmonization of various enforcement routines. 
Evolving Cooperation
Th ree main periods can be distinguished in the thirty years since the bilateral management regime came into 
force: before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and after the turn of the millennium. Th e two ﬁ rst peri-
ods are treated brieﬂ y in the following analysis, with more attention given to the most urgent issues of recent 
years: overﬁ shing and the disparity between scientiﬁ c recommendations and TACs. 
Until the early 1990s, discussions in the Joint Norwegian–Soviet Fisheries Commission mainly centered 
on the size of the TACs and whether the smallest permitted mesh size and the minimum length of ﬁ sh should 
be increased. As the Soviet northern ﬁ shing ﬂ eet was mostly engaged in distant-water ﬁ sheries (mainly outside 
Western Africa and South America) and hence not so dependent on the nearby ﬁ shing grounds of the Bar-
ents Sea, the Soviet party to the Commission generally opted for the lower TAC recommendations given by 
ICES, while the Norwegian party in most years pressed quotas upwards. Norway, on the other hand, wanted 
to increase the lowest permitted size of ﬁ sh and net mesh, but failed to persuade the Soviets to introduce this 
regulatory measure. Th e ﬁ sh are generally smaller in the Soviet/Russian part of the Barents Sea, which explains 
the Soviet/Russian unwillingness to increase the mesh size.
Th e 1990s were characterized by the extensive coordination of technical management measures (e.g. the 
joint introduction of satellite tracking and of selection grids in trawls) and general agreement about the annual 
TAC levels. Th e Russians had now become more interested in the valuable cod stock – in Soviet times, they 
had been more concerned with quantities than global-market prices – and were more dependent on the Bar-
ents Sea ﬁ sheries as distant-waters ﬁ shing was discontinued in the post-Soviet period. But the Northeast Arctic 
cod stock was very healthy throughout the 1990s, so TACs could be set at comfortable levels without setting 
ICES’s scientiﬁ c recommendations aside. New problems emerged – both from a biological and an institutional 
point of view – when the cod stock began to reach crisis levels around the turn of the millennium. 
Conﬂ ict Over Shrinking Cod Stocks
Cod stock decline in the late 1990s coincided with the recognition internationally of the precautionary principle 
that a lack of scientiﬁ c certainty should not be used to postpone management measures that could prevent ﬁ sh-
eries degradation. Both the ICES and the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission adopted this princi-
ple. Th e marine scientists recommended drastic reductions in the Barents Sea cod quota, but the Commission 
annually established quotas far above these recommendations. Th e Russian party to the Commission strongly 
opposed the need for implementing quota reductions. Th e Norwegian party generally supported the scientiﬁ c 
recommendations, although opinions varied within the Norwegian ﬁ shing industry. 
While the Norwegians debated whether the established TACs were sustainable or not, the Russians seemed 
to view the issue as a battle between the two states, or between Russia and the West. Both the Russian media 
and the Russian members of the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission accused Norway of having 
ulterior motives for supporting lower TACs, such as maintaining high world-market prices for cod at a time 
when the country was starting artiﬁ cial breeding of this species. Norway largely gave in to Russian demands 
to keep quotas high since the alternative – no TAC agreement at all, and the eﬀ ective dismantlement of the 
bilateral management regime – was far less attractive. 
In 2001, the parties for the ﬁ rst time agreed on a three-year quota. Th is longer time horizon gave them some 
breathing space and a buﬀ er against sudden developments. Two years later, the Commission devised a fresh 
set of decision and action rules for management of its side of the Northeast Arctic cod stock, aimed at ensur-
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ing biological viability and greater economic predictability for ﬁ shery-dependent communities in Norway and 
Russia. Th ese action rules included:
average ﬁ sh mortality should be kept below the precautionary limit over three-year periods;• 
TAC should not change more than 10 percent from one year to the next; but• 
exceptions can be made in situations where the spawning stock has fallen below deﬁ ned critical levels.• 
Russian Overﬁ shing
Russian overﬁ shing after the break-up of the Soviet enforcement system was presumably brought to a halt by the 
measures introduced under the enforcement cooperation scheme between Norway and Russia in 1993. How-
ever, while the exchange of catch and landing data between the two countries might be a necessary factor in 
eliminating catch underreporting, it is hardly suﬃ  cient to prevent abuses. Sanctioning mechanisms in Russia, 
and the sincerity of Russian oﬃ  cials’ wish to eliminate overﬁ shing are uncertain elements in this respect. Fur-
ther, catches were delivered to transport vessels at sea from the late 1990s, as they were in Soviet days. While 
fresh ﬁ sh in the intervening period was brought to Norwegian ports, ﬁ shing vessels now handed the ﬁ sh over to 
transport vessels as frozen products, for delivery to Denmark, the Netherlands, UK, Portugal, Spain, and other 
European countries. As a result, the catch data exchange system of Norwegian and Russian enforcement author-
ities was no longer of much use. 
Two speciﬁ c questions emerged: how much ﬁ sh was being transferred from vessel to vessel in the Barents 
Sea, and how much of this product was being delivered to third countries. Seen from the point of view of Nor-
wegian ﬁ sheries management authorities, the Russians have not been particularly eager to help in addressing 
either issue. 
Around 2002–3, the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries increased its eﬀ orts to estimate actual Russian 
catches in the Barents Sea. Based on the results, ICES estimated unreported catches of Northeast Arctic cod 
as follows: 90,000 tons in 2002, 115,000 tons in 2003, 117,000 tons in 2004 and 166,000 tons in 2005. Th ese 
ﬁ gures imply an annual overﬁ shing in the range of 25–40 percent of the TAC during the period. In other 
words, the Russians have, according to ICES, overﬁ shed their national quotas of Northeast Arctic cod (which 
are approximately 50 percent of the TAC) by some 50–80 percent annually. 
Th e Russian ﬁ sheries management authorities did not accept Norwegian assertions that the problem was 
so severe. In autumn 2006, they admitted not knowing how much ﬁ sh is actually transferred at sea and deliv-
ered to third countries, but estimated Russian overﬁ shing to be around 20,000–30,000 tons annually in recent 
years.
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Scientiﬁ c Recommendations, Established TACs and Reported Catches of Northeast 
Arctic Cod during the Period 1990–2006
Year Primary recommendation 
(ICES)
Established TAC Reported catches*
1990 172,000 160,000 212,000
1991 215,000 215,000 319,000
1992 257,000 356,000 513,000
1993 385,000 500,000 582,000
1994 649,000 700,000 771,000
1995 682,000 700,000 740,000
1996 746,000 700,000 732,000
1997 787,000 850,000 762,000
1998 514,000 654,000 593,000
1999 360,000 480,000 485,000
2000 110,000 390,000 415,000
2001 263,000 395,000 426,000
2002 182,000 395,000 535,000
2003 305,000 395,000 552,000
2004 398,000 486,000 606,000
2005  485,000 485,000 641,000
2006 471,000 471,000 -
*) Including estimated unreported catches of 25,000 tons in 1990, 50,000 tons in 1991, 130,000 tons in 1992, 
50,000 tons in 1993, 25,000 tons in 1994, 90,000 tons in 2002, 115,000 tons in 2003, 117,000 tons in 2004 
and 166,000 tons in 2005. 
Sources: Recommendations: ACFM/ICES reports for the year in question; TACs: protocols from sessions in the Joint 
Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission for the year in question; catches: ICES AFWG Report 2006, Copenha-
gen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2006. 
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Russia and the WTO: One Step Forward, One Step Back
By Peter Rutland, Montreal
Absract
Most likely Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization will be delayed for a year or more. Russia 
faces a variety of obstacles from Georgia, Poland, and the broader anti-Russian sentiment in Europe. 
Optimists point out that Russia has one of the world’s biggest economies and that it does not make 
sense for it to remain outside the trading organization. Pessimists note, however, that election year 
politics may make any immediate action unlikely.
Close to an Agreement
In November 2006 it looked like Russia’s 13-year quest to enter the World Trade Organization had cleared its 
ﬁ nal hurdle. On the sidelines of an international summit in Hanoi, President George W. Bush signed a bilat-
eral agreement with President Vladimir Putin signifying US approval of Russia’s entry to the WTO. Russia has 
now signed bilateral agreements with 58 trading partners and only a handful of countries are still waiting to sign 
agreements. Among them are Vietnam, Cambodia, and Saudi Arabia.
Th e US agreement came as something of a surprise, since the failure to strike a deal at the July 2006 G8 
summit in St. Petersburg had led many to conclude that Russia had no real intention of joining the WTO. In 
the end, it turned out to be a case of diplomatic brinksmanship, with each side holding out for the best possi-
ble deal. Moscow accepted a compromise over the question of Russian inspection of American pork and poul-
try exporters, and the US accepted the Russian government’s package of legal and administrative measures to 
tighten sanctions on CD and DVD piracy. 
Entry by 2007 Unlikely
Since then, however, the optimism that a new era of pragmatism had entered Russia’s relations with its Western 
partners has slowly unraveled. It is now looking increasingly unlikely that Russia will complete the process for 
WTO entry by the end of 2007. Russia has been unable to schedule any formal accession talks at the WTO’s 
Geneva headquarters in over a year. Th e loss of momentum in negotiations has redoubled the voices of skeptics 
both inside Russia and in the West who question whether Moscow really intends to join the WTO club at all. 
Th e immediate challenge to Russia’s entry bid came from three directions. First, Georgia, which had signed 
oﬀ  on a bilateral deal approving Russia’s WTO entry in 2004, withdrew its agreement in July 2006, in the 
wake of Russia’s March ban on the import of Georgia’s wines. Moscow introduced the ban after claiming that 
Georgian exports included falsely-labeled wines that were not in fact from vintage vineyards. An additional 
complication was Russia’s October 2006 decision to suspend direct ﬂ ights between the two countries, citing 
an unpaid airline debt. Georgia subsequently added a demand that Russia assist Tbilisi in placing Georgian 
customs controllers on the border with Russia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, regions over which Georgia had 
lost control 15 years previously. Russian-Georgian negotiations on May 31, 2007, ended without result, with 
Moscow insisting that the customs issue is unrelated to WTO entry. 
Second, Poland retaliated against Russia’s year-old ban on Polish meat imports by vetoing the European 
Union’s plans to sign a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia to replace the 1994 
PCA that is due to expire in 2007. Th e European Union (EU) had signed oﬀ  on Russian WTO entry in 2004, 
in what was seen as a quid pro quo for Russian acceptance of the Kyoto accord on global warming. Th e EU-
Russia summit that took place in Samara on May 17–18 was a deep disappointment, resulting in no progress 
on virtually any front. In the wake of that meeting, Economics and Trade Minister German Gref told a meet-
ing of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Kazan that Moscow would not renegotiate 
the PCA with the EU until Russia secures entry to the WTO.
Th ird, Russia’s WTO bid came to be used as a political football in a broader current of anti-Russian senti-
ment, particularly in Europe. EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson said on April 20 at an energy forum 
in Bologna that that mistrust between the EU and Russia has reached “a level not seen since the Cold War.” 
Th e lead issues were the dispute with Estonia over the moving of a Soviet war memorial in April 2007, and 
European fears over energy security revived by the interruption of oil and has supplies to Belarus and Ukraine 
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respectively in January 2006 and January 2007. Th e meeting of a new Gas Exporter Countries Forum in Qatar 
at beginning of April also produced a degree of anxiety in energy-importing countries. Although Russian actions 
in battling the Chechen insurgency, a major focus of criticism for Moscow in the past, have quieted down in 
the past few years, other issues came along to cast a shadow over Russia’s image as a self-proclaimed member 
of the democratic community. Western observers criticized the sinister assassination of Aleksandr Litvinenko 
in 2006 and the forcible dispersal of opposition protestors in several Russian cities in 2007.
Although most of the foot-dragging on WTO is now coming from Europe, the US position has also been 
somewhat equivocal. US Trade Representative Susan Schwab stated at trade negotiations in Washington on 
April 9 that the US Congress is not ready to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment and that the WTO was “not 
yet” ready to accept Russia. But, the previous week at talks in Moscow, Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez 
told his hosts that Washington hopes to see Russia join the WTO by the end of this year.
Reasons for Optimism
Optimists will argue that these are but temporary glitches in what is now an unstoppable trend towards Russian 
membership in the WTO. Th ere are several grounds for the argument that Russia will enter the WTO at some 
point in the not-too-distant future.
First, there is the simple fact that Russia is the world’s tenth largest economy and seventeenth largest trading 
nation. It is simply anomalous that it has remained outside the ranks of WTO members, which now number 
149 countries, for so long. Th e fact that Russia is still outside the WTO makes it more diﬃ  cult for countries 
such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan to join, given that Russia is their leading trading partner. It is also another 
factor holding up the conclusion of agreements to tighten Russian economic integration with its Common-
wealth of Independent State (CIS) partners, something which is a priority for Moscow. Th is issue came up at 
the CIS summit in Yalta on May 24.
Second, doubters who point to the evidence of weakness of rule of law and non-market barriers to foreign 
entry in Russia should acknowledge that existing WTO members face similar problems. Russia’s tariﬀ  barri-
ers, which currently average 11.7 percent, are modest by international standards. Even so, Russia plans to cut 
the average weighted customs tariﬀ  rate to 9.9 percent by 2010. As part of the deal with the US, over the next 
seven years, Russia will reduce import tariﬀ s on foreign-made aircraft from 20 percent to 7.5 percent, which 
will increase the competitive pressures on Russia aircraft manufacturers. Th e country’s limits on foreign banks 
and insurers are similar to those of China – which joined the WTO in 2001. Foreign ﬁ rms currently account 
for an estimated 18 percent of Russia’s banking and 5 percent of Russia’s insurance market. Both are subject 
to a 25 percent ceiling, though the foreign bank ceiling will rise to 50 percent after WTO entry, with Russia 
reserving the right to intervene in individual cases. Take for example the question of CD and DVD piracy, 
which cost Hollywood an estimated $1.7 billion in lost sales in Russia in 2005. Indeed it is a problem, but 
Russia is only third in the world league table of DVD pirates – after China and Mexico, who are both already 
WTO members. 
Th ird, compromise had been reached on most of the laundry list of items that had concerned the US in the 
summer of 2006. Russia has indeed been slow to implement some of the changes that it promised – for exam-
ple, it has not yet waived the overﬂ ight fees for aircraft transiting from Europe to Asia, which generate $300 
million a year. Th e EU also wants Russia to stop charging higher railway fees for foreign train freight than 
for domestic loads. On the other hand, at the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg in June, Aero-
ﬂ ot agreed to buy 22 Boeing 787 Dreamliners, a deal which had been allowed to lapse in October 2006 – just 
before the US agreed to accept a compromise deal on Russian WTO entry. Also at the St. Petersburg Economic 
Forum, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Troika Dialog Investment, and the American 
Chamber of Commerce announced the formation of a Russian-American private sector working group to sup-
port Russian entry to the WTO.
Fourth, there is substantial evidence that Russia has made WTO entry a centerpiece of its economic devel-
opment strategy. Russia’s oﬃ  cial goals in joining the WTO are: non-discriminatory treatment for Russian 
exporters; access to WTO dispute settlement procedures; a better climate for incoming foreign investment and 
opportunities for outgoing Russian investment; to improve domestic competitiveness; to be a full participant 
in international trade negotiations; and to improve Russia’s image. 
Russia’s Foreign Policy. Selected Issues 91
Reasons for Pessimism
Th e pessimists also have some good arguments, however. First, Russian WTO entry is a focal point for politi-
cal mobilization. Critics of Russia can use it to send a signal to Putin about their unhappiness about some of his 
policies – as is the case with Georgia and Poland. But Russian nationalists can also use WTO to send a message 
to Western critics. As both Russia and the US will be electing new presidents in 2008, there is a high probabil-
ity that no substantial progress in WTO entry will be attempted next year, to avoid providing additional scope 
for such political opportunism. 
Second, there is the argument that Russia actually stands to make only modest gains from WTO entry. 
Th e fact that the Russian economy is so heavily dependent on oil and gas exports means that one cannot really 
extrapolate from the eﬃ  ciency eﬀ ects and investment boom that have accompanied WTO entry in other 
economies. International organizations such as the World Bank claim that Russia will see a 3 percent boost in 
GDP from WTO entry, but it is not at all clear that these studies take into account the speciﬁ cities of Russia’s 
resource-dependent economy.
Th ird, WTO entry is clearly a bone of contention between the liberal and security (siloviki) wings of the 
presidential administration. A new draft law on regulating foreign investment was approved at a government 
meeting on January 31, 2007. Any foreign company will need permission to exceed a 50 percent stake in a 
ﬁ rm on a list of restricted sectors, and any ﬁ rm controlled by a foreign government or international organiza-
tion would require approval for a 25 percent stake. Deputy Industry and Energy Minister Ivan Materov told 
a meeting of the Consultative Council on Foreign Investment that “Th e Federal Security Service is insisting 
on including some lines of business in this list while the (Economic Development and Trade Ministry) does 
not wish to see them there because this would run against the rules of the WTO.” Th e restricted list includes 
alloys, aerospace, arms and mineral resources.
Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov warned “If anyone believes that joining the WTO is the great-
est ambition of everyone in Russia, they are deeply mistaken.” Alexander Shokhin, president of the Russian 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, told a conference of foreign investors that “It’s time to stop seeking 
WTO membership, we should wait for them to ask us to join,” noting that “the balance of advantages and dis-
advantages of joining this organization is not obvious for Russia.” Even Putin himself seems to have become 
more skeptical about the beneﬁ ts of WTO entry. For example, on June 12 he said: “Old methods of decision 
making often don’t work. Th at is well seen both with the WTO and with the Doha Round, which goes, to say 
the least, with big diﬃ  culties.” 
Russia’s WTO entry seems trapped between two bureaucratic machines that are both fractious and slug-
gish, and that ﬁ nd it very diﬃ  cult to come up with deﬁ nitive policies: the European Union on one side and 
the Russia government on the other. Th e Kremlin elite is anxiously preparing for the ultimate test of a presi-
dential power succession, while the 27-headed hydra of Brussels is absorbed with struggle to draft a new union 
treaty. It looks increasing likely that the complex bargaining around Russia’s accession to the WTO club will 
fall between the cracks, and will be delayed for a year or more. 
About the author:
Peter Rutland is a professor of government at Wesleyan University.
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Russia and the WTO: A Russian View
By Natalya Volchkova, Moscow
Abstract
Russia ﬁ rst applied for WTO membership in 1993, but the process has dragged on. All analyses con-
cur that Russian manufacturing and service sectors will beneﬁ t little from WTO membership. Most of 
Russia’s exports are in the natural resource sector and these will not be aﬀ ected. Only metals export-
ers have an interest in the WTO to protect themselves against dumping accusations. Russia’s politi-
cal leaders, rather than the business community, have been the main driver behind the negotiations. 
Th ere are no foreign businesses that have a strong interest in Russian membership, in contrast to the 
case of China, which was backed by European and US businesses that wanted to see China in the 
club. Th e lack of a strong external push for Russian membership is deﬁ nitely slowing the process. 
Extensive Delays
For the past ﬁ ve years, usually in spring time, we regularly hear from top Russian oﬃ  cials that Russia could 
become a member of the WTO before the end of the year. Despite the promising announcements, Russia will 
soon become the country, which set the record for the longest WTO accession negotiations, surpassing previ-
ous record-holder China. Naturally, it makes sense to ask: What is taking so long?
Th ere are at least two sides in any negotiations. In this case, it is Russia and, generally speaking, the WTO. 
Th erefore we need to look for the reasons on both sides.
Historical Background
First, some history about the negotiations. Russia initially applied to the General Agreement on Tariﬀ s and 
Trade (GATT) in 1993. After GATT transformed into the WTO, Russia started accession negotiations in 1995 
within the Working Party (WP) on the Russian Federation’s accession to the WTO. Th e ﬁ rst rounds of negoti-
ations examined the trade and political regime in Russia and their compliance with WTO principles. Th en, in 
1998, Russia started bilateral talks with existing WTO members. Since 2000, when President Vladimir Putin 
came to oﬃ  ce, the negotiations became full-scale, covering all aspects of Russia’s accession to the WTO. Th ere 
have been 30 sessions of the WP so far.
At the beginning, the negotiation process was very slow, but it gained momentum after 2003. At present, 
the Russian bilateral negotiations on access to markets for goods and services are mostly completed. Never-
theless, although Russia is nearly at the end of the accession process, it must still resolve some of the most dif-
ﬁ cult issues. 
Mixed Assessments of the WTO’s Impact on Russia
Opinions and assessments concerning Russia’s possible WTO accession vary widely among business people and 
experts. Th e Russian government and the World Bank have conducted several major studies, seeking to deter-
mine the economic consequences of WTO accession. While there are some discrepancies in evaluating the quan-
titative changes in speciﬁ c sectors and at the economy-wide level, the researchers more or less agree in qualita-
tive terms. Th e general consensus is that the changes in outputs, consumption, prices and welfare due to the 
new tariﬀ  agreements are likely to be fairly small. Th is result makes sense because Russian tariﬀ  protections fell 
dramatically at the beginning of the 1990s, when Russia began building a market economy. Russia’s average tar-
iﬀ  in 2005 was 9.3 percent, reasonably close to the level of most WTO members. Most likely, it will not change 
much after accession, when the expected average tariﬀ  will be 7.3 percent. 
However, the World Bank experts emphasize that the Russian economy will gain the most beneﬁ ts from 
WTO accession as a result of the liberalization of business service markets. While there is no single way to 
model such changes, the estimated gains from the service liberalization range between 0.1 and 1.0 percent of 
GDP. Th is result also seems to be quite intuitive. Th e Russian services market only began functioning in the 
early 1990s. Naturally, it is extremely underdeveloped. Th e provision of some important business services is 
very limited and ineﬃ  cient, especially in highly protected areas. Th erefore the entrance of foreign providers of 
such services will diminish the transaction costs for business, while the Russian service providers either will 
work harder to increase their eﬃ  ciency or leave the market. 
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Sectoral Impact: Opponents of WTO Outweigh Supporters
Given these results and Russian trade patterns, it is clear how the interests for and against WTO entry are spread 
across the economy. Unfortunately for Russia, the usual supporters of accession – exporters – do not show any 
interest in the WTO, as most Russian exports are natural resources, which will not be aﬀ ected by accession. Th e 
only exception is the weak support from ferrous metals producers, because they will be in a better position to 
defend themselves against anti-dumping charges across the world after Russia becomes a member.
At the same time, the Russian manufacturing sector, which competes with imports, is quite unanimous 
in its opposition to WTO. Resistance among manufacturers naturally ranges from very little to substantial, 
depending on the degree of the current protection of a particular sector, with many sectors being rather indif-
ferent, especially after the question of the two-tier gas tariﬀ  was settled during earlier negotiations with the 
EU. Only a few industries actively protest against WTO accession and try, at a minimum, to negotiate favor-
able transition conditions if Russia does become a member. Naturally, the Russian automobile industry, which 
would face tough competition from foreign producers, is one of the most outspoken opponents. 
Th e service sectors are also opposed to joining WTO. Russian banks and insurance companies enjoy sub-
stantial protection under current regulations and do not welcome foreign competitors. Much of the most recent 
negotiations between Russia and the US representatives dealt with these two sectors. After long debates and 
mutual compromises, Russia agreed to reforms in these areas.
Th us, this distribution of interests across the Russian economy shows that the economically active sectors 
would gain little beneﬁ t from Russia joining the WTO, while the lobbies, who advocate against accession, are 
relatively stronger. Still, as we have observed, the negotiations gathered speed over the past ﬁ ve years and a pos-
itive outcome seems quite plausible. Who is in charge of such changes?
Political Leaders Push for Membership
As has often happened in Russian history, movement starts from the top. Economics and Trade Minister Ger-
man Gref advocated liberal positions from the very beginning of his tenure as the head of the economic bloc of 
the current Russian government. Nevertheless, since the Russian economy has enjoyed enormous budget sur-
pluses and strong economic growth, mostly caused by high oil prices since the beginning of the decade, the gov-
ernment is not enthusiastic about enacting strong economic reforms. However, the idea of becoming a WTO 
member still appeals to liberally-minded oﬃ  cials. 
Th e eﬀ ort to join the WTO also has secured support at the highest levels in politics. For the Russian pres-
ident, who enjoys meeting with the G8 leaders, the fact that Russia has so far been excluded from another 
global club hardly seems plausible. Th erefore, Russian executive branch oﬃ  cials pay a lot of attention to the 
question of WTO accession.
In order to overcome, or, at least, smooth over, the anti-WTO attitudes of the Russian business commu-
nity, the government initiated a large-scale information campaign to negotiate issues of WTO accession with 
business representatives. Th e Ministry of Economy reports that its representatives have conducted about 600 
meetings on this subject with exporters, importers, and industrial producers since 2000. Th e open consulta-
tions with the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE) and the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (CCI) became common occurrences and were widely cited in the press. Naturally, Minister Gref gets 
the most support from metals magnate Alexei Mordashev. 
To help the Russian regions make the transition to new rules of the game, which will have to be accepted after 
joining the WTO club, the Ministry organized around 200 meetings in almost all Russian regions over the past 
6 years. From 2004 to early 2007, the Ministry launched training courses for civil servants in many regions on 
various aspects of WTO accession. According to various polls, by mid-2005 more than half of all Russians sup-
ported the idea of the country’s joining the WTO, compared to less than 20 percent in 2001.    
While gathering support among business and the general public, the ministry representatives carefully pro-
ceed with the negotiations. If ministry positions were not supported by strong interests in the domestic econ-
omy, the oﬃ  cials needed to be very cautious in order to minimize the accusations from the antagonists. Even 
the government was divided in its approach to the WTO. While Gref pushed the negotiations, ministries rep-
resenting agricultural and industrial interests naturally sought protectionist measures. Almost everyone agrees 
that the full responsibility for Russia becoming a WTO member lies solely with the Ministry of Economy and 
German Gref.
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Concerns about Shabby Treatment of Russia
Th e experience of several CIS countries, which became WTO members earlier, is somewhat ambiguous. One of 
the common features of the WTO accession terms for those countries were the full and unconditional openness 
of the service sectors, only small levels of agricultural support, and very limited transition assistance.
From the very beginning, Russia stressed that it would never accept such poor terms of accession. Russia 
provided two justiﬁ cations for its position. From the economic point of view, the Russian trade representative 
sought to link all kinds of potential obligations to the actual state of the economy and forecasts of its future 
development and secure reasonable protection for national producers, while allowing an adequate competitive 
environment. From the political point of view, the country, which enjoyed international recognition as a super-
power in the past, considers it to be humiliating to be admitted to the global trade club on bad terms. Russian 
politicians and business representatives from the anti-WTO camp make this point to support their position.
Th us, the overall position of the Russian team on negotiations can be expressed in the following way. Since 
the ultimate goal of Russia is to become a modern and eﬀ ective economy and to fully and actively participate 
in world trade, it has no choice but to join the WTO. According to Russia’s oﬃ  cial position, WTO member-
ship is essential for increasing the access of Russian goods to foreign markets, easing the settlement of trade 
disputes, attracting foreign investments and facilitating Russian investments abroad, improving the compet-
itiveness of Russian goods, and last but not the least, improving Russia’s image abroad and voicing Russian 
national interests during the trade negotiations. However, even considering all these goals as very important, 
the achievement of the most favorable conditions for Russia to join the WTO is an essential and, sometimes, 
the only task for the accession negotiations. According to Gref, the balance of rights and obligations of Russia 
during its accession to the WTO should contribute to its economic growth. All of the above emphasizes that it 
is not only the goal of Russia to become a member of WTO, which is important in and of itself, but the means 
to achieve this goal are also very important on their own. 
Lack of Foreign Support for Russian Membership
Th is dichotomy could be easily overcome, if there were any special interests outside Russia, interested in seeing 
Russia as a fully ﬂ edged member of WTO. Unfortunately, there are few such interests. In the case of China, the 
natural lobbies for accession were US and European companies that had business interests in China. In the Rus-
sian case, there is no such lobbying. Moreover, without doing business in Russia at the moment, foreign coun-
tries do not clearly understand what kind of economic gains they could expect from cooperation with Russia 
in the future. In such a way, the lack of strong interests on the other side of the bargaining table does not con-
tribute to speedy trade talks. 
In such a manner, we end up with lengthy negotiations, during which both sides enjoy the process. Th e out-
come has high intrinsic value, at least for one party, even if the ultimate goal remains a distant prospect. 
Naturally, without strong economic interests on both sides of the table, the trade negotiations can eas-
ily become manipulated by political interests. Over the past ﬁ ve years, we have constantly observed trade-
oﬀ s between the economic and political issues that either accelerated or impeded the negotiation process. Of 
course, without knowing what is going on behind closed doors, we can only speculate. Strangely enough, Rus-
sia’s pompous campaign against participation in the Kyoto protocol to cut greenhouse gas emissions grew silent 
at the same time as the European WTO negotiators decided to compromise on the issue of two-tier gas tariﬀ s 
in Russia. Th e issue of Iran was especially emphasized at the time of WTO negotiations with the US. Russia 
broke its existing treaty with Georgia when the political situation there changed in a way Russia did not like. 
Overall, the fragile economic balance on the Russian side, with the occasional intervention of powerful polit-
ical interests, has yet to lead to a ﬁ nal outcome.
On June 18, 2007, the head of the Russian negotiators, Maxim Medvedkov, announced that the talks may be 
completed by the end of 2007. Having been disappointed for several years in a row, we have grounds to believe 
that his prediction is unlikely to come true unless political events force a happy ending to the negotiations. 
About the author:
Natalya Volchkova is an economist at the Center for Economic and Financial Research in Moscow. 
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Documentation: World Trade Organization: Principal Objectives and 
Functions, Accession Procedure
Objectives and principles. Th e World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor to the General Agreement on 
Tariﬀ s and Trade (GATT) which existed since 1947, began to operate on January 1, 1995. Th e WTO is designed 
to regulate the trade-political relations of the members on the basis of agreements of the Uruguay round of mul-
tilateral trade talks (1986–1994), the legal foundation of modern international trade.
Th e WTO setup agreement stipulates for a permanent forum of member states to settle problems aﬀ ect-
ing their multilateral trade relations, and control of Uruguay round agreements implementation. Th e WTO 
largely operates like the GATT, but it also controls a wider range of trade agreements (including trade in ser-
vices and trade-related intellectual property rights) and has much broader powers in terms of decision making 
procedure improvement and compliance by member states. A unique mechanism of trade dispute settlements 
is an integral part of the WTO.
Since 1947, discussions of global problems of liberalization and the prospects of international trade devel-
opment have been taking place in the framework of multilateral trade talks (MTT) under the GATT aegis. 
Eight rounds of MTT have taken place, including the Uruguay round, and the ninth round is under way. Th e 
main objective of this inﬂ uential international economic organization is world trade liberalization and guar-
antee of just competition.
Th e fundamental principles and rules of the GATT/WTO include: 
non-discriminatory trade, i.e. mutual most favored nation treatment in trade; • 
mutual granting of the national treatment to goods and services of foreign origin; • 
trade regulation mostly by tariﬀ  methods; • 
refusal to use quantitative or other restrictions; • 
trade policy transparency; • 
settlement of trade disputes by consultation and negotiations, etc. • 
Th e most important WTO functions include: control over compliance with the Uruguay round agreements; 
multilateral trade talks and discussions between interested member countries; settlement of trade disputes; mon-
itoring of member states’ national trade policies; technical assistance to developing nations in WTO-related mat-
ters; cooperation with specialized international organizations.
Th e general advantages of WTO membership can be summarized as follows:
more favorable access to international goods and services markets on the basis of predictable and stable • 
development of trade relations with WTO member states, including transparency of their foreign eco-
nomic policies,
access to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism providing protection of national interests, if infringed • 
on by counterparts, thus eliminating discrimination,
possibility to secure one’s current and strategic trade-economic interests by eﬃ  cient participation in MTT • 
in the process of development of new international trade rules.
Source: Russia and World Trade Organization; http://www.wto.ru/chto.asp?f=spravka&t=6, as of 14 June 2007.
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Documentation: Economic Eﬀ ects of Russian WTO accession
Source: Th omas Ratherford, David Tarr: Regional impacts of Russia’s accession to the WTO (23 June 2006), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Internal-Training/287823-1116536061368/Regional_
ImpactsOfRussiasAccessionToTheWTO.pdf
EV = Equivalent variation
Abstract of the source for the data of the tables and graphs:
“In this paper we develop a computable general equilibrium model of the regions of Russia to assess the impact 
of accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the regions of Russia. We estimate that the average 
gain in welfare as a percent of consumption for the whole country is 7.8 percent (or 4.3 percent of consump-
tion); we estimate that three regions will gain considerably more: Northwest (11.2 percent), St. Petersburg (10.6 
percent) and Far East (9.7 percent). On the other hand, we estimate that the Urals will gain only 6.2% of con-
sumption, considerably less than the national average. Th e principal explanation in our central analysis for the 
diﬀ erences across regions is the ability of the diﬀ erent regions to beneﬁ t from a reduction in barriers against 
foreign direct investment. Th e three regions with the largest welfare gains are clearly the regions with the esti-
mated largest shares of multinational investment. But the Urals has attracted relatively little FDI in the ser-
vices sectors. A additional reason for diﬀ erences across regions is quantiﬁ ed in our sensitivity analysis: regions 
may gain more from WTO accession if they can succeed in creating a good investment climate.”
Impact of WTO Accession on the Russian Market(% Change From Base Year)
Overall average
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 7.8%
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 4.3%
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 3.3%
Regional exports (% change) 1.9%
Real exchange rate (% change) 2.5%
International exports (% change) 9.4%
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor 4.1%
Skilled labor 4.2%
National capital 4.0%
Regional mobile capital 6.5%
Crude oil resources 4.9%
Natural gas resources 1.8%
Coal resources 10.8%
Speciﬁ c capital in domestic ﬁ rms - 24.7%
Speciﬁ c capital in multinational ﬁ rms 101.4%
Factor adjustments 
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 2.3%
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 2.5%
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Impact of WTO Accession on Regional Markets (Aggregate Welfare) 
(% Change From Base Year)
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Impact of Improved External Market Access on Russia’s Market: Welfare, Trade and 
Factor Market Eﬀ ects (% of Change From Base Year)
Average
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.3%
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.2%
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 0.1%
Regional exports (% change) 0.0%
Real exchange rate (% change) - 0.6%
International exports (% change) 0.6%
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor - 0.3%
Skilled labor 0.0%
National capital 0.2%
Regional mobile capital 0.4%
Crude oil resources - 1.4%
Natural gas resources - 2.5%
Coal resources - 1.7%
Speciﬁ c capital in domestic ﬁ rms - 0.4%
Speciﬁ c capital in multinational ﬁ rms 2.0%
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 0.7%
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 0.7%
98 Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perovic, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder (eds.)
Impact of Tariﬀ  Reductions on Russia’s Market: Welfare, Trade and Factor Market 
Eﬀ ects
(% Change From Base Year)
Average
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.7%
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.4%
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 1.4%
Regional exports (% change) 0.2%
Real exchange rate (% change) 2.0%
International exports (% change) 5.5%
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor 1.2%
Skilled labor 2.0%
National capital 1.7%
Regional mobile capital 2.2%
Crude oil resources 2.3%
Natural gas resources 1.2%
Coal resources 3.2%
Speciﬁ c capital in domestic ﬁ rms - 3.4%
Speciﬁ c capital in multinational ﬁ rms 10.9%
Factor adjustments 
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 1.3%
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 0.9%
Impact of WTO Accession on Output by Sector and Regional Market (Percentage Change)
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(Data used for the preceding graphs)
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